From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
To: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>, Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
x86@kernel.org, Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net>,
Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v16 07/11] secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2021 13:31:45 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210204113145.GR242749@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <YBqSejZ3XbUKFudR@dhcp22.suse.cz>
On Wed, Feb 03, 2021 at 01:09:30PM +0100, Michal Hocko wrote:
> On Tue 02-02-21 10:55:40, James Bottomley wrote:
> > On Tue, 2021-02-02 at 20:15 +0200, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> > > On Tue, Feb 02, 2021 at 03:34:29PM +0100, David Hildenbrand wrote:
> > > > On 02.02.21 15:32, Michal Hocko wrote:
> >
> > Well the safest security statement is that we never expose the data to
> > the kernel because it's a very clean security statement and easy to
> > enforce. It's also the easiest threat model to analyse. Once we do
> > start exposing the secret to the kernel it alters the threat profile
> > and the analysis and obviously potentially provides the ROP gadget to
> > an attacker to do the same. Instinct tells me that the loss of
> > security doesn't really make up for the ability to swap or migrate but
> > if there were a case for doing the latter, it would have to be a
> > security policy of the user (i.e. a user should be able to decide their
> > data is too sensitive to expose to the kernel).
>
> The security/threat model should be documented in the changelog as
> well. I am not a security expert but I would tend to agree that not
> allowing even temporal mapping for data copying (in the kernel) is the
> most robust approach. Whether that is generally necessary for users I do
> not know.
>
> From the API POV I think it makes sense to have two
> modes. NEVER_MAP_IN_KERNEL which would imply no migrateability, no
> copy_{from,to}_user, no gup or any other way for the kernel to access
> content of the memory. Maybe even zero the content on the last unmap to
> never allow any data leak. ALLOW_TEMPORARY would unmap the page from
> the direct mapping but it would still allow temporary mappings for
> data copying inside the kernel (thus allow CoW, copy*user, migration).
> Which one should be default and which an opt-in I do not know. A less
> restrictive mode to be default and the more restrictive an opt-in via
> flags makes a lot of sense to me though.
The default is already NEVER_MAP_IN_KERNEL, so there is no explicit flag
for this. ALLOW_TEMPORARY should be opt-in, IMHO, and we can add it on top
later on.
--
Sincerely yours,
Mike.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-02-04 11:32 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 78+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-01-21 12:27 [PATCH v16 00/11] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Mike Rapoport
2021-01-21 12:27 ` [PATCH v16 01/11] mm: add definition of PMD_PAGE_ORDER Mike Rapoport
2021-01-21 12:27 ` [PATCH v16 02/11] mmap: make mlock_future_check() global Mike Rapoport
2021-01-21 12:27 ` [PATCH v16 03/11] riscv/Kconfig: make direct map manipulation options depend on MMU Mike Rapoport
2021-01-21 12:27 ` [PATCH v16 04/11] set_memory: allow set_direct_map_*_noflush() for multiple pages Mike Rapoport
2021-01-21 12:27 ` [PATCH v16 05/11] set_memory: allow querying whether set_direct_map_*() is actually enabled Mike Rapoport
2021-01-21 12:27 ` [PATCH v16 06/11] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Mike Rapoport
2021-01-25 17:01 ` Michal Hocko
2021-01-25 21:36 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-01-26 7:16 ` Michal Hocko
2021-01-26 8:33 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-01-26 9:00 ` Michal Hocko
2021-01-26 9:20 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-01-26 9:49 ` Michal Hocko
2021-01-26 9:53 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-01-26 10:19 ` Michal Hocko
2021-01-26 9:20 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-03 12:15 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-04 11:34 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-01-21 12:27 ` [PATCH v16 07/11] secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation Mike Rapoport
2021-01-26 11:46 ` Michal Hocko
2021-01-26 11:56 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-01-26 12:08 ` Michal Hocko
2021-01-28 9:22 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-01-28 13:01 ` Michal Hocko
2021-01-28 13:28 ` Christoph Lameter
2021-01-28 13:49 ` Michal Hocko
2021-01-28 15:56 ` Christoph Lameter
2021-01-28 16:23 ` Michal Hocko
2021-01-28 15:28 ` James Bottomley
2021-01-29 7:03 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-01-28 21:05 ` James Bottomley
2021-01-29 7:53 ` Michal Hocko
2021-01-29 8:23 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-01 16:56 ` James Bottomley
2021-02-02 9:35 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-02 12:48 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-02 13:14 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-02 13:32 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-02 14:12 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-02 14:22 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-02 14:26 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-02 14:32 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-02 14:34 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-02 18:15 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-02 18:55 ` James Bottomley
2021-02-03 12:09 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-04 11:31 ` Mike Rapoport [this message]
2021-02-02 13:27 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-02 19:10 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-03 9:12 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-04 9:58 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-04 13:02 ` Michal Hocko
2021-01-29 7:21 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-01-29 8:51 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-02 14:42 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-01-21 12:27 ` [PATCH v16 08/11] secretmem: add memcg accounting Mike Rapoport
2021-01-25 16:17 ` Matthew Wilcox
2021-01-25 17:18 ` Shakeel Butt
2021-01-25 21:35 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-01-28 15:07 ` Shakeel Butt
2021-01-25 16:54 ` Michal Hocko
2021-01-25 21:38 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-01-26 7:31 ` Michal Hocko
2021-01-26 8:56 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-01-26 9:15 ` Michal Hocko
2021-01-26 14:48 ` Matthew Wilcox
2021-01-26 15:05 ` Michal Hocko
2021-01-27 18:42 ` Roman Gushchin
2021-01-28 7:58 ` Michal Hocko
2021-01-28 14:05 ` Shakeel Butt
2021-01-28 14:22 ` Michal Hocko
2021-01-28 14:57 ` Shakeel Butt
2021-01-21 12:27 ` [PATCH v16 09/11] PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users Mike Rapoport
2021-01-21 12:27 ` [PATCH v16 10/11] arch, mm: wire up memfd_secret system call where relevant Mike Rapoport
2021-01-25 18:18 ` Catalin Marinas
2021-01-21 12:27 ` [PATCH v16 11/11] secretmem: test: add basic selftest for memfd_secret(2) Mike Rapoport
2021-01-21 22:18 ` [PATCH v16 00/11] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Andrew Morton
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