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From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
To: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
	Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
	Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
	Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com>,
	Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>,
	Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>,
	Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>,
	Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@intel.com>
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>,
	"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH v27 20/31] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte() for shadow stack
Date: Fri, 21 May 2021 15:12:00 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210521221211.29077-21-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210521221211.29077-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>

Can_follow_write_pte() ensures a read-only page is COWed by checking the
FOLL_COW flag, and uses pte_dirty() to validate the flag is still valid.

Like a writable data page, a shadow stack page is writable, and becomes
read-only during copy-on-write, but it is always dirty.  Thus, in the
can_follow_write_pte() check, it belongs to the writable page case and
should be excluded from the read-only page pte_dirty() check.  Apply
the same changes to can_follow_write_pmd().

While at it, also split the long line into smaller ones.

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
v26:
- Instead of passing vm_flags, pass down vma pointer to can_follow_write_*().

v25:
- Split long line into smaller ones.

v24:
- Change arch_shadow_stack_mapping() to is_shadow_stack_mapping().

 mm/gup.c         | 16 ++++++++++++----
 mm/huge_memory.c | 16 ++++++++++++----
 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/mm/gup.c b/mm/gup.c
index 0697134b6a12..432ba7ccf8ae 100644
--- a/mm/gup.c
+++ b/mm/gup.c
@@ -438,10 +438,18 @@ static int follow_pfn_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address,
  * FOLL_FORCE can write to even unwritable pte's, but only
  * after we've gone through a COW cycle and they are dirty.
  */
-static inline bool can_follow_write_pte(pte_t pte, unsigned int flags)
+static inline bool can_follow_write_pte(pte_t pte, unsigned int flags,
+					struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 {
-	return pte_write(pte) ||
-		((flags & FOLL_FORCE) && (flags & FOLL_COW) && pte_dirty(pte));
+	if (pte_write(pte))
+		return true;
+	if ((flags & (FOLL_FORCE | FOLL_COW)) != (FOLL_FORCE | FOLL_COW))
+		return false;
+	if (!pte_dirty(pte))
+		return false;
+	if (is_shadow_stack_mapping(vma->vm_flags))
+		return false;
+	return true;
 }
 
 static struct page *follow_page_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
@@ -484,7 +492,7 @@ static struct page *follow_page_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 	}
 	if ((flags & FOLL_NUMA) && pte_protnone(pte))
 		goto no_page;
-	if ((flags & FOLL_WRITE) && !can_follow_write_pte(pte, flags)) {
+	if ((flags & FOLL_WRITE) && !can_follow_write_pte(pte, flags, vma)) {
 		pte_unmap_unlock(ptep, ptl);
 		return NULL;
 	}
diff --git a/mm/huge_memory.c b/mm/huge_memory.c
index 819f6c32eb5b..99352caf7188 100644
--- a/mm/huge_memory.c
+++ b/mm/huge_memory.c
@@ -1337,10 +1337,18 @@ vm_fault_t do_huge_pmd_wp_page(struct vm_fault *vmf, pmd_t orig_pmd)
  * FOLL_FORCE can write to even unwritable pmd's, but only
  * after we've gone through a COW cycle and they are dirty.
  */
-static inline bool can_follow_write_pmd(pmd_t pmd, unsigned int flags)
+static inline bool can_follow_write_pmd(pmd_t pmd, unsigned int flags,
+					struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 {
-	return pmd_write(pmd) ||
-	       ((flags & FOLL_FORCE) && (flags & FOLL_COW) && pmd_dirty(pmd));
+	if (pmd_write(pmd))
+		return true;
+	if ((flags & (FOLL_FORCE | FOLL_COW)) != (FOLL_FORCE | FOLL_COW))
+		return false;
+	if (!pmd_dirty(pmd))
+		return false;
+	if (is_shadow_stack_mapping(vma->vm_flags))
+		return false;
+	return true;
 }
 
 struct page *follow_trans_huge_pmd(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
@@ -1353,7 +1361,7 @@ struct page *follow_trans_huge_pmd(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 
 	assert_spin_locked(pmd_lockptr(mm, pmd));
 
-	if (flags & FOLL_WRITE && !can_follow_write_pmd(*pmd, flags))
+	if (flags & FOLL_WRITE && !can_follow_write_pmd(*pmd, flags, vma))
 		goto out;
 
 	/* Avoid dumping huge zero page */
-- 
2.21.0



  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-05-21 22:13 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 47+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-05-21 22:11 [PATCH v27 00/31] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-05-21 22:11 ` [PATCH v27 01/31] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu
2021-05-21 22:11 ` [PATCH v27 02/31] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-05-21 22:11 ` [PATCH v27 03/31] x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
2021-05-21 22:11 ` [PATCH v27 04/31] x86/cpufeatures: Introduce CPU setup and option parsing for CET Yu-cheng Yu
2021-05-21 22:11 ` [PATCH v27 05/31] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states Yu-cheng Yu
2021-05-21 22:11 ` [PATCH v27 06/31] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler Yu-cheng Yu
2021-05-21 22:11 ` [PATCH v27 07/31] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY from kernel RO pages Yu-cheng Yu
2021-05-21 22:11 ` [PATCH v27 08/31] x86/mm: Move pmd_write(), pud_write() up in the file Yu-cheng Yu
2021-05-21 22:11 ` [PATCH v27 09/31] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2021-05-21 22:11 ` [PATCH v27 10/31] drm/i915/gvt: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Yu-cheng Yu
2021-05-21 22:11 ` [PATCH v27 11/31] x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2021-05-21 22:11 ` [PATCH v27 12/31] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2021-05-21 22:11 ` [PATCH v27 13/31] mm: Move VM_UFFD_MINOR_BIT from 37 to 38 Yu-cheng Yu
2021-05-21 22:25   ` Axel Rasmussen
2021-05-22  1:58     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-05-21 22:11 ` [PATCH v27 14/31] mm: Introduce VM_SHADOW_STACK for shadow stack memory Yu-cheng Yu
2021-05-21 22:11 ` [PATCH v27 15/31] x86/mm: Shadow Stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu
2021-05-21 22:11 ` [PATCH v27 16/31] x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-05-21 22:11 ` [PATCH v27 17/31] mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly Yu-cheng Yu
2021-05-21 22:11 ` [PATCH v27 18/31] mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-05-21 22:11 ` [PATCH v27 19/31] mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting Yu-cheng Yu
2021-05-21 22:12 ` Yu-cheng Yu [this message]
2021-05-21 22:12 ` [PATCH v27 21/31] mm/mprotect: Exclude shadow stack from preserve_write Yu-cheng Yu
2021-05-21 22:12 ` [PATCH v27 22/31] mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap() Yu-cheng Yu
2021-05-21 22:12 ` [PATCH v27 23/31] x86/cet/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack support Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-19 18:23   ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2021-07-20 17:13     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-05-21 22:12 ` [PATCH v27 24/31] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-05-22 23:39   ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-05-25 15:04     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-07-21 18:14   ` John Allen
2021-07-21 18:28     ` Florian Weimer
2021-07-21 18:34       ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-07-28 21:34         ` John Allen
2021-07-21 18:37     ` Dave Hansen
2021-07-21 20:14     ` H.J. Lu
2021-05-21 22:12 ` [PATCH v27 25/31] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce shadow stack token setup/verify routines Yu-cheng Yu
2021-05-21 22:12 ` [PATCH v27 26/31] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-05-21 22:12 ` [PATCH v27 27/31] ELF: Introduce arch_setup_elf_property() Yu-cheng Yu
2021-05-25 10:54   ` Catalin Marinas
2021-05-21 22:12 ` [PATCH v27 28/31] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-05-21 22:12 ` [PATCH v27 29/31] mm: Move arch_calc_vm_prot_bits() to arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h Yu-cheng Yu
2021-05-21 22:12 ` [PATCH v27 30/31] mm: Update arch_validate_flags() to test vma anonymous Yu-cheng Yu
2021-05-25 11:00   ` Catalin Marinas
2021-05-25 15:03     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-05-21 22:12 ` [PATCH v27 31/31] mm: Introduce PROT_SHADOW_STACK for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu

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