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From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: <x86@kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	<kvm@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
	<platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org>,
	<linux-coco@lists.linux.dev>, <linux-mm@kvack.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	"Vitaly Kuznetsov" <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
	Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Sergio Lopez <slp@redhat.com>, Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>,
	"Peter Zijlstra" <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>,
	Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@ibm.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>,
	Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>,
	"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	"Dr . David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>,
	<tony.luck@intel.com>, <marcorr@google.com>,
	<sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>,
	Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Subject: [PATCH v6 31/42] x86/boot: Add Confidential Computing type to setup_data
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 2021 13:04:42 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20211008180453.462291-32-brijesh.singh@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20211008180453.462291-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com>

While launching the encrypted guests, the hypervisor may need to provide
some additional information during the guest boot. When booting under the
EFI based BIOS, the EFI configuration table contains an entry for the
confidential computing blob that contains the required information.

To support booting encrypted guests on non-EFI VM, the hypervisor needs to
pass this additional information to the kernel with a different method.

For this purpose, introduce SETUP_CC_BLOB type in setup_data to hold the
physical address of the confidential computing blob location. The boot
loader or hypervisor may choose to use this method instead of EFI
configuration table. The CC blob location scanning should give preference
to setup_data data over the EFI configuration table.

In AMD SEV-SNP, the CC blob contains the address of the secrets and CPUID
pages. The secrets page includes information such as a VM to PSP
communication key and CPUID page contains PSP filtered CPUID values.
Define the AMD SEV confidential computing blob structure.

While at it, define the EFI GUID for the confidential computing blob.

Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h            | 12 ++++++++++++
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h |  1 +
 include/linux/efi.h                   |  1 +
 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
index 7f063127aa66..534fa1c4c881 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
@@ -44,6 +44,18 @@ struct es_em_ctxt {
 
 void do_vc_no_ghcb(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long exit_code);
 
+/* AMD SEV Confidential computing blob structure */
+#define CC_BLOB_SEV_HDR_MAGIC	0x45444d41
+struct cc_blob_sev_info {
+	u32 magic;
+	u16 version;
+	u16 reserved;
+	u64 secrets_phys;
+	u32 secrets_len;
+	u64 cpuid_phys;
+	u32 cpuid_len;
+};
+
 static inline u64 lower_bits(u64 val, unsigned int bits)
 {
 	u64 mask = (1ULL << bits) - 1;
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h
index b25d3f82c2f3..1ac5acca72ce 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
 #define SETUP_EFI			4
 #define SETUP_APPLE_PROPERTIES		5
 #define SETUP_JAILHOUSE			6
+#define SETUP_CC_BLOB			7
 
 #define SETUP_INDIRECT			(1<<31)
 
diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
index 6b5d36babfcc..75aeb2a56888 100644
--- a/include/linux/efi.h
+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
@@ -344,6 +344,7 @@ void efi_native_runtime_setup(void);
 #define EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID			EFI_GUID(0xc1c41626, 0x504c, 0x4092, 0xac, 0xa9, 0x41, 0xf9, 0x36, 0x93, 0x43, 0x28)
 #define EFI_CERT_X509_GUID			EFI_GUID(0xa5c059a1, 0x94e4, 0x4aa7, 0x87, 0xb5, 0xab, 0x15, 0x5c, 0x2b, 0xf0, 0x72)
 #define EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID		EFI_GUID(0x3bd2a492, 0x96c0, 0x4079, 0xb4, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xf9, 0x8e, 0xf1, 0x03, 0xed)
+#define EFI_CC_BLOB_GUID			EFI_GUID(0x067b1f5f, 0xcf26, 0x44c5, 0x85, 0x54, 0x93, 0xd7, 0x77, 0x91, 0x2d, 0x42)
 
 /*
  * This GUID is used to pass to the kernel proper the struct screen_info
-- 
2.25.1



  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-10-08 18:06 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 96+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-10-08 18:04 [PATCH v6 00/42] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Guest Support Brijesh Singh
2021-10-08 18:04 ` [PATCH v6 01/42] x86/mm: Extend cc_attr to include AMD SEV-SNP Brijesh Singh
2021-10-08 18:04 ` [PATCH v6 02/42] x86/sev: Shorten GHCB terminate macro names Brijesh Singh
2021-10-11 13:15   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-10-08 18:04 ` [PATCH v6 03/42] x86/sev: Get rid of excessive use of defines Brijesh Singh
2021-10-11  8:48   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-10-08 18:04 ` [PATCH v6 04/42] x86/head64: Carve out the guest encryption postprocessing into a helper Brijesh Singh
2021-10-08 18:04 ` [PATCH v6 05/42] x86/sev: Define the Linux specific guest termination reasons Brijesh Singh
2021-10-08 18:04 ` [PATCH v6 06/42] x86/sev: Save the negotiated GHCB version Brijesh Singh
2021-10-08 18:04 ` [PATCH v6 07/42] x86/sev: Add support for hypervisor feature VMGEXIT Brijesh Singh
2021-10-13 14:02   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-10-08 18:04 ` [PATCH v6 08/42] x86/sev-es: initialize sev_status/features within #VC handler Brijesh Singh
2021-10-18 14:29   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-10-18 18:40     ` Michael Roth
2021-10-18 19:18       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-10-20 16:10         ` Michael Roth
2021-10-20 18:01           ` Borislav Petkov
2021-10-21  0:35             ` Michael Roth
2021-10-21 14:28               ` Borislav Petkov
2021-10-20 18:08           ` Borislav Petkov
2021-10-21  2:05             ` Michael Roth
2021-10-21 14:39               ` Borislav Petkov
2021-10-21 23:00                 ` Michael Roth
2021-10-21 14:48           ` Borislav Petkov
2021-10-21 15:56             ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-10-21 16:55               ` Borislav Petkov
2021-10-21 17:12                 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-10-21 17:37                   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-10-21 17:47                     ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-10-21 18:46                       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-10-21 21:34             ` Michael Roth
2021-10-21 14:51           ` Borislav Petkov
2021-10-21 20:41             ` Michael Roth
2021-10-25 11:04               ` Borislav Petkov
2021-10-25 16:35                 ` Michael Roth
2021-10-27 11:17                   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-10-27 15:13                     ` Michael Roth
2021-10-08 18:04 ` [PATCH v6 09/42] x86/sev: Check SEV-SNP features support Brijesh Singh
2021-10-19 14:47   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-10-08 18:04 ` [PATCH v6 10/42] x86/sev: Add a helper for the PVALIDATE instruction Brijesh Singh
2021-10-08 18:04 ` [PATCH v6 11/42] x86/sev: Check the vmpl level Brijesh Singh
2021-10-28 15:07   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-10-08 18:04 ` [PATCH v6 12/42] x86/compressed: Add helper for validating pages in the decompression stage Brijesh Singh
2021-10-08 18:04 ` [PATCH v6 13/42] x86/compressed: Register GHCB memory when SEV-SNP is active Brijesh Singh
2021-11-02 16:33   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-10-08 18:04 ` [PATCH v6 14/42] x86/sev: " Brijesh Singh
2021-11-02 16:53   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-11-02 18:24     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-11-02 18:44       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-11-03 20:10         ` Brijesh Singh
2021-11-04 13:58           ` Borislav Petkov
2021-11-04 15:26             ` Brijesh Singh
2021-11-04 16:03               ` Boris Petkov
2021-10-08 18:04 ` [PATCH v6 15/42] x86/sev: Remove do_early_exception() forward declarations Brijesh Singh
2021-11-02 16:54   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-10-08 18:04 ` [PATCH v6 16/42] x86/sev: Add helper for validating pages in early enc attribute changes Brijesh Singh
2021-10-08 18:04 ` [PATCH v6 17/42] x86/kernel: Make the bss.decrypted section shared in RMP table Brijesh Singh
2021-10-08 18:04 ` [PATCH v6 18/42] x86/kernel: Validate rom memory before accessing when SEV-SNP is active Brijesh Singh
2021-10-08 18:04 ` [PATCH v6 19/42] x86/mm: Add support to validate memory when changing C-bit Brijesh Singh
2021-11-09 19:34   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-11-10 14:21     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 18:43       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-11-11 14:49         ` Tom Lendacky
2021-11-11 16:01           ` Borislav Petkov
2021-10-08 18:04 ` [PATCH v6 20/42] KVM: SVM: Define sev_features and vmpl field in the VMSA Brijesh Singh
2021-10-08 18:04 ` [PATCH v6 21/42] KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the SEV-ES save area Brijesh Singh
2021-10-08 18:04 ` [PATCH v6 22/42] KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the GHCB " Brijesh Singh
2021-10-08 18:04 ` [PATCH v6 23/42] KVM: SVM: Update the SEV-ES save area mapping Brijesh Singh
2021-10-08 18:04 ` [PATCH v6 24/42] x86/sev: Use SEV-SNP AP creation to start secondary CPUs Brijesh Singh
2021-10-08 18:04 ` [PATCH v6 25/42] x86/head: re-enable stack protection for 32/64-bit builds Brijesh Singh
2021-10-08 18:04 ` [PATCH v6 26/42] x86/sev: move MSR-based VMGEXITs for CPUID to helper Brijesh Singh
2021-10-08 18:04 ` [PATCH v6 27/42] KVM: x86: move lookup of indexed CPUID leafs " Brijesh Singh
2021-10-08 18:04 ` [PATCH v6 28/42] x86/compressed/acpi: move EFI system table lookup " Brijesh Singh
2021-10-08 18:04 ` [PATCH v6 29/42] x86/compressed/acpi: move EFI config " Brijesh Singh
2021-10-08 18:04 ` [PATCH v6 30/42] x86/compressed/acpi: move EFI vendor " Brijesh Singh
2021-10-08 18:04 ` Brijesh Singh [this message]
2021-10-08 18:04 ` [PATCH v6 32/42] x86/compressed/64: add support for SEV-SNP CPUID table in #VC handlers Brijesh Singh
2021-10-08 18:04 ` [PATCH v6 33/42] boot/compressed/64: use firmware-validated CPUID for SEV-SNP guests Brijesh Singh
2021-10-08 18:04 ` [PATCH v6 34/42] x86/boot: add a pointer to Confidential Computing blob in bootparams Brijesh Singh
2021-10-08 18:04 ` [PATCH v6 35/42] x86/compressed/64: store Confidential Computing blob address " Brijesh Singh
2021-10-08 18:04 ` [PATCH v6 36/42] x86/compressed/64: add identity mapping for Confidential Computing blob Brijesh Singh
2021-10-08 18:04 ` [PATCH v6 37/42] x86/sev: use firmware-validated CPUID for SEV-SNP guests Brijesh Singh
2021-10-08 18:04 ` [PATCH v6 38/42] x86/sev: Provide support for SNP guest request NAEs Brijesh Singh
2021-10-08 18:04 ` [PATCH v6 39/42] x86/sev: Register SNP guest request platform device Brijesh Singh
2021-10-08 18:04 ` [PATCH v6 40/42] virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver Brijesh Singh
2021-10-10 17:51   ` Dov Murik
2021-10-13 11:37     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-10-20 21:33   ` Peter Gonda
2021-10-27 16:07     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-10-27 20:10       ` Peter Gonda
2021-10-27 20:47         ` Brijesh Singh
2021-10-27 21:05           ` Peter Gonda
2021-10-27 21:12             ` Brijesh Singh
2021-10-27 21:15               ` Peter Gonda
2021-10-08 18:04 ` [PATCH v6 41/42] virt: sevguest: Add support to derive key Brijesh Singh
2021-10-08 18:04 ` [PATCH v6 42/42] virt: sevguest: Add support to get extended report Brijesh Singh

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