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David Alan Gilbert" , , , , , Brijesh Singh Subject: [PATCH v9 00/43] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Guest Support Date: Fri, 28 Jan 2022 11:17:21 -0600 Message-ID: <20220128171804.569796-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" X-Originating-IP: [10.180.168.240] X-ClientProxiedBy: SATLEXMB03.amd.com (10.181.40.144) To SATLEXMB04.amd.com (10.181.40.145) X-EOPAttributedMessage: 0 X-MS-PublicTrafficType: Email X-MS-Office365-Filtering-Correlation-Id: 8940258b-08c2-42dd-b5c0-08d9e2822de0 X-MS-TrafficTypeDiagnostic: CH2PR12MB4889:EE_ X-Microsoft-Antispam-PRVS: X-MS-Oob-TLC-OOBClassifiers: OLM:5516; X-MS-Exchange-SenderADCheck: 1 X-MS-Exchange-AntiSpam-Relay: 0 X-Microsoft-Antispam: BCL:0; X-Microsoft-Antispam-Message-Info: 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 X-Forefront-Antispam-Report: CIP:165.204.84.17;CTRY:US;LANG:en;SCL:1;SRV:;IPV:CAL;SFV:NSPM;H:SATLEXMB04.amd.com;PTR:InfoDomainNonexistent;CAT:NONE;SFS:(13230001)(4636009)(40470700004)(36840700001)(46966006)(8936002)(70586007)(8676002)(4326008)(54906003)(110136005)(426003)(508600001)(70206006)(966005)(47076005)(83380400001)(86362001)(316002)(336012)(82310400004)(5660300002)(186003)(7696005)(36756003)(81166007)(26005)(1076003)(2616005)(36860700001)(16526019)(2906002)(40460700003)(44832011)(30864003)(6666004)(356005)(7416002)(7406005)(2101003)(36900700001)(20210929001);DIR:OUT;SFP:1101; X-OriginatorOrg: amd.com X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-OriginalArrivalTime: 28 Jan 2022 17:18:19.1713 (UTC) X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-Network-Message-Id: 8940258b-08c2-42dd-b5c0-08d9e2822de0 X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-Id: 3dd8961f-e488-4e60-8e11-a82d994e183d X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-OriginalAttributedTenantConnectingIp: TenantId=3dd8961f-e488-4e60-8e11-a82d994e183d;Ip=[165.204.84.17];Helo=[SATLEXMB04.amd.com] X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-AuthSource: DM6NAM11FT023.eop-nam11.prod.protection.outlook.com X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-AuthAs: Anonymous X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-FromEntityHeader: HybridOnPrem X-MS-Exchange-Transport-CrossTenantHeadersStamped: CH2PR12MB4889 X-Rspamd-Server: rspam06 X-Rspamd-Queue-Id: E4550C000B X-Stat-Signature: eaj7sh9eqxjrr41s4gjamz947ouk6jue Authentication-Results: imf28.hostedemail.com; dkim=pass header.d=amd.com header.s=selector1 header.b=vSoYmCrl; dmarc=pass (policy=quarantine) header.from=amd.com; spf=pass (imf28.hostedemail.com: domain of brijesh.singh@amd.com designates 40.107.102.77 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=brijesh.singh@amd.com X-Rspam-User: nil X-HE-Tag: 1643390301-923920 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Bogosity: Ham, tests=bogofilter, spamicity=0.000000, version=1.2.4 Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org Precedence: bulk X-Loop: owner-majordomo@kvack.org List-ID: This part of Secure Encrypted Paging (SEV-SNP) series focuses on the chan= ges required in a guest OS for SEV-SNP support. SEV-SNP builds upon existing SEV and SEV-ES functionality while adding new hardware-based memory protections. SEV-SNP adds strong memory integri= ty protection to help prevent malicious hypervisor-based attacks like data replay, memory re-mapping and more in order to create an isolated memory encryption environment. =20 This series provides the basic building blocks to support booting the SEV= -SNP VMs, it does not cover all the security enhancement introduced by the SEV= -SNP such as interrupt protection. Many of the integrity guarantees of SEV-SNP are enforced through a new structure called the Reverse Map Table (RMP). Adding a new page to SEV-SN= P VM requires a 2-step process. First, the hypervisor assigns a page to the guest using the new RMPUPDATE instruction. This transitions the page to guest-invalid. Second, the guest validates the page using the new PVALIDA= TE instruction. The SEV-SNP VMs can use the new "Page State Change Request N= AE" defined in the GHCB specification to ask hypervisor to add or remove page from the RMP table. Each page assigned to the SEV-SNP VM can either be validated or unvalidat= ed, as indicated by the Validated flag in the page's RMP entry. There are two approaches that can be taken for the page validation: Pre-validation and Lazy Validation. Under pre-validation, the pages are validated prior to first use. And und= er lazy validation, pages are validated when first accessed. An access to a unvalidated page results in a #VC exception, at which time the exception handler may validate the page. Lazy validation requires careful tracking = of the validated pages to avoid validating the same GPA more than once. The recently introduced "Unaccepted" memory type can be used to communicate t= he unvalidated memory ranges to the Guest OS. At this time we only sypport the pre-validation, the OVMF guest BIOS validates the entire RAM before the control is handed over to the guest k= ernel. The early_set_memory_{encrypted,decrypted} and set_memory_{encrypted,decr= ypted} are enlightened to perform the page validation or invalidation while setting = or clearing the encryption attribute from the page table. This series does not provide support for the Interrupt security yet which= will be added after the base support. The series is based on tip/master 94985da003a4 (origin/master, origin/HEAD) Merge branch into tip/master:= 'irq/urgent' The complete branch is at https://github.com/AMDESE/linux/tree/sev-snp-v9 Patch 1-4 defines multiple VMSA save area to support SEV,SEV-ES and SEV-S= NP guests. It is a pre-requisite for the SEV-SNP guest support, and included in the series for the completeness. Not sure if it will go through the tip or KV= M. It is also posted on KVM mailing list: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20211213173356.138726-3-brijesh.singh@amd.co= m/T/#m7d6868f3e81624323ea933d3a63a68949b286103 Additional resources --------------------- SEV-SNP whitepaper https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/SEV-SNP-strengthening-vm-isolat= ion-with-integrity-protection-and-more.pdf =20 APM 2: https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/24593.pdf (section 15.36) GHCB spec: https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/56421.pdf SEV-SNP firmware specification: https://developer.amd.com/sev/ v8: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20211210154332.11526-1-brijesh.singh@amd= .com/ v7: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20211110220731.2396491-40-brijesh.si= ngh@amd.com/ v6: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20211008180453.462291-1-brijesh.sing= h@amd.com/ v5: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210820151933.22401-1-brijesh.singh@amd= .com/ Changes since v8: * Setup the GHCB before taking the first #VC. * Make the CC blob structure size invariant. * Define the AP INIT macro and update the AP creation to use those macro instead of the hardcoded values. * Expand the comments to cover some of previous feedbacks. * Fix the commit messages based on the feedbacks. * Multiple fixes/cleanup on cpuid patches (based on Boris and Dave feedb= ack) * drop is_efi64 return arguments in favor of a separate efi_get_type()= helper. * drop is_efi64 input arguments in favor of calling efi_get_type() as-= needed. * move acpi.c's kexec-specific handling into library code. * fix stack protection for 32/64-bit builds. * Export add_identity_map() to avoid SEV-specific code in ident_map_64= .c. * use snp_abort() when terminating via initial ccblob scan. * fix the copyright header after the code refactor. * remove code duplication whereever possible. Changes since v7: * sevguest: extend the get report structure to accept the vmpl from user= space. * In the compressed path, move the GHCB protocol negotiation from VC han= dler to sev_enable(). * sev_enable(): don't expect SEV bit in status MSR when cpuid bit is pre= sent, update comments. * sme_enable(): call directly from head_64.S rather than as part of star= tup_64_setup_env, add comments * snp_find_cc_blob(), sev_prep_identity_maps(): add missing 'static' key= words to function prototypes Changes since v6: * Add rmpadjust() helper to be used by AP creation and vmpl0 detect func= tion. * Clear the VM communication key if guest detects that hypervisor is mod= ifying the SNP_GUEST_REQ response header. * Move the per-cpu GHCB registration from first #VC to idt setup. * Consolidate initial SEV/SME setup into a common entry point that gets = called early enough to also be used for SEV-SNP CPUID table setup. * SNP CPUID: separate initial SEV-SNP feature detection out into standal= one snp_init() routines, then add CPUID table setup to it as a separate pa= tch. * SNP CPUID: fix boot issue with Seabios due to ACPI relying on certain = EFI config table lookup failures as fallthrough cases rather than error ca= ses. * SNP CPUID: drop the use of a separate init routines to handle pointer = fixups after switching to kernel virtual addresses, instead use a helper that= uses RIP-relative addressing to access CPUID table when either on identity = mapping or kernel virtual addresses. Changes since v5: * move the seqno allocation in the sevguest driver. * extend snp_issue_guest_request() to accept the exit_info to simplify t= he logic. * use smaller structure names based on feedback. * explicitly clear the memory after the SNP guest request is completed. * cpuid validation: use a local copy of cpuid table instead of keeping firmware table mapped throughout boot. * cpuid validation: coding style fix-ups and refactor cpuid-related help= ers as suggested. * cpuid validation: drop a number of BOOT_COMPRESSED-guarded defs/declar= ations by moving things like snp_cpuid_init*() out of sev-shared.c and keepin= g only the common bits there. * Break up EFI config table helpers and related acpi.c changes into sepa= rate patches. * re-enable stack protection for 32-bit kernels as well, not just 64-bit Changes since v4: * Address the cpuid specific review comment * Simplified the macro based on the review feedback * Move macro definition to the patch that needs it * Fix the issues reported by the checkpath * Address the AP creation specific review comment Changes since v3: * Add support to use the PSP filtered CPUID. * Add support for the extended guest request. * Move sevguest driver in driver/virt/coco. * Add documentation for sevguest ioctl. * Add support to check the vmpl0. * Pass the VM encryption key and id to be used for encrypting guest mess= ages through the platform drv data. * Multiple cleanup and fixes to address the review feedbacks. Changes since v2: * Add support for AP startup using SNP specific vmgexit. * Add snp_prep_memory() helper. * Drop sev_snp_active() helper. * Add sev_feature_enabled() helper to check which SEV feature is active. * Sync the SNP guest message request header with latest SNP FW spec. * Multiple cleanup and fixes to address the review feedbacks. Changes since v1: * Integerate the SNP support in sev.{ch}. * Add support to query the hypervisor feature and detect whether SNP is = supported. * Define Linux specific reason code for the SNP guest termination. * Extend the setup_header provide a way for hypervisor to pass secret an= d cpuid page. * Add support to create a platform device and driver to query the attest= ation report and the derive a key. * Multiple cleanup and fixes to address Boris's review fedback. Brijesh Singh (20): KVM: SVM: Define sev_features and vmpl field in the VMSA x86/mm: Extend cc_attr to include AMD SEV-SNP x86/sev: Define the Linux specific guest termination reasons x86/sev: Save the negotiated GHCB version x86/sev: Check SEV-SNP features support x86/sev: Add a helper for the PVALIDATE instruction x86/sev: Check the vmpl level x86/compressed: Add helper for validating pages in the decompression stage x86/compressed: Register GHCB memory when SEV-SNP is active x86/sev: Register GHCB memory when SEV-SNP is active x86/sev: Add helper for validating pages in early enc attribute changes x86/kernel: Make the .bss..decrypted section shared in RMP table x86/kernel: Validate ROM memory before accessing when SEV-SNP is active x86/mm: Add support to validate memory when changing C-bit x86/boot: Add Confidential Computing type to setup_data x86/sev: Provide support for SNP guest request NAEs x86/sev: Register SEV-SNP guest request platform device virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver virt: sevguest: Add support to derive key virt: sevguest: Add support to get extended report Michael Roth (19): x86/compressed/64: Detect/setup SEV/SME features earlier in boot x86/sev: Detect/setup SEV/SME features earlier in boot x86/head/64: Re-enable stack protection x86/sev: Move MSR-based VMGEXITs for CPUID to helper KVM: x86: Move lookup of indexed CPUID leafs to helper x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI detection to helper x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI system table lookup to helper x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI config table lookup to helper x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI vendor table lookup to helper x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI kexec handling into common code KVM: SEV: Add documentation for SEV-SNP CPUID Enforcement x86/compressed/64: Add support for SEV-SNP CPUID table in #VC handlers x86/boot: Add a pointer to Confidential Computing blob in bootparams x86/compressed: Add SEV-SNP feature detection/setup x86/compressed: Use firmware-validated CPUID leaves for SEV-SNP guests x86/compressed: Export and rename add_identity_map() x86/compressed/64: Add identity mapping for Confidential Computing blob x86/sev: Add SEV-SNP feature detection/setup x86/sev: Use firmware-validated CPUID for SEV-SNP guests Tom Lendacky (4): KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the SEV-ES save area KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the GHCB save area KVM: SVM: Update the SEV-ES save area mapping x86/sev: Use SEV-SNP AP creation to start secondary CPUs Documentation/virt/coco/sevguest.rst | 121 +++ .../virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst | 28 + arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile | 1 + arch/x86/boot/compressed/acpi.c | 172 +--- arch/x86/boot/compressed/efi.c | 243 +++++ arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S | 32 +- arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c | 39 +- arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_64.c | 10 +- arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S | 36 - arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h | 55 +- arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c | 256 ++++- arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam_utils.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/cpuid.h | 38 + arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 2 + arch/x86/include/asm/setup.h | 1 - arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h | 82 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h | 102 +- arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h | 171 +++- arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h | 4 +- arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h | 13 + arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 1 - arch/x86/kernel/cc_platform.c | 2 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 4 + arch/x86/kernel/head64.c | 30 +- arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S | 37 +- arch/x86/kernel/probe_roms.c | 13 +- arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c | 526 +++++++++- arch/x86/kernel/sev.c | 934 ++++++++++++++++-- arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c | 3 + arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 19 +- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 24 +- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 4 +- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 2 +- arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 4 + arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c | 58 +- arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c | 8 + arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c | 15 + drivers/virt/Kconfig | 3 + drivers/virt/Makefile | 1 + drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/Kconfig | 12 + drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/Makefile | 2 + drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/sevguest.c | 739 ++++++++++++++ drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/sevguest.h | 98 ++ include/linux/cc_platform.h | 8 + include/linux/efi.h | 1 + include/uapi/linux/sev-guest.h | 80 ++ 46 files changed, 3652 insertions(+), 383 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/virt/coco/sevguest.rst create mode 100644 arch/x86/boot/compressed/efi.c create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/cpuid.h create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/Kconfig create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/Makefile create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/sevguest.c create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/sevguest.h create mode 100644 include/uapi/linux/sev-guest.h --=20 2.25.1