From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from kanga.kvack.org (kanga.kvack.org [205.233.56.17]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 16580C433EF for ; Wed, 8 Jun 2022 02:21:57 +0000 (UTC) Received: by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix) id 0C91B6B0071; Tue, 7 Jun 2022 22:21:57 -0400 (EDT) Received: by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix, from userid 40) id 0788F6B0072; Tue, 7 Jun 2022 22:21:57 -0400 (EDT) X-Delivered-To: int-list-linux-mm@kvack.org Received: by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix, from userid 63042) id E5B156B0073; Tue, 7 Jun 2022 22:21:56 -0400 (EDT) X-Delivered-To: linux-mm@kvack.org Received: from relay.hostedemail.com (smtprelay0013.hostedemail.com [216.40.44.13]) by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D66CF6B0071 for ; Tue, 7 Jun 2022 22:21:56 -0400 (EDT) Received: from smtpin03.hostedemail.com (a10.router.float.18 [10.200.18.1]) by unirelay10.hostedemail.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A9FDC13AC for ; Wed, 8 Jun 2022 02:21:56 +0000 (UTC) X-FDA: 79553468232.03.008EFB8 Received: from mga04.intel.com (mga04.intel.com [192.55.52.120]) by imf01.hostedemail.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7EDED40048 for ; Wed, 8 Jun 2022 02:21:55 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=intel.com; i=@intel.com; q=dns/txt; s=Intel; t=1654654915; x=1686190915; h=date:from:to:cc:subject:message-id:reply-to:references: mime-version:in-reply-to; bh=qzLzlpXmYtyfLnr9kD61/kS6Q6YUitGZU8+jgBaVRi8=; b=XKtnqeogqHzxlMWYnpozTdudcka33p0WNF6YZQdTZn3j6FOjxa2DWolK SFAF09YHXXHMYlm/dyyiw8EsV939CyOlFzzOWTF+M1bsZmZbVCteOT6mI klXMqMTATS1vSlrAohPkxPOuk4SgOfTZL+Be8xQgYiqTi67Q0awpWPFnN vTLL2AhwhZCssfK3hiUSQNiwKZYS6zCiaW3c0CGLJ1WukEeU/hjZGUPPW OaNVnrVOq08WWmsX7W6yktYEDNq63Wqc/Fan0wTE6tyW7o6RNLZRyw4xY wKjy3uRZ6n8pK8+Tbmv3sYCay+nEXATL8hdlrZ06467zCEmivDv4wi3d+ g==; X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6400,9594,10371"; a="275550529" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.91,284,1647327600"; d="scan'208";a="275550529" Received: from orsmga007.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.58]) by fmsmga104.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 07 Jun 2022 19:21:54 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.91,284,1647327600"; d="scan'208";a="579856828" Received: from chaop.bj.intel.com (HELO localhost) ([10.240.192.101]) by orsmga007.jf.intel.com with ESMTP; 07 Jun 2022 19:21:44 -0700 Date: Wed, 8 Jun 2022 10:18:20 +0800 From: Chao Peng To: Marc Orr Cc: Vishal Annapurve , kvm list , LKML , linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, qemu-devel@nongnu.org, Paolo Bonzini , Jonathan Corbet , Sean Christopherson , Vitaly Kuznetsov , Wanpeng Li , Jim Mattson , Joerg Roedel , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , x86 , "H . Peter Anvin" , Hugh Dickins , Jeff Layton , "J . Bruce Fields" , Andrew Morton , Mike Rapoport , Steven Price , "Maciej S . Szmigiero" , Vlastimil Babka , Yu Zhang , "Kirill A . Shutemov" , Andy Lutomirski , Jun Nakajima , Dave Hansen , Andi Kleen , David Hildenbrand , aarcange@redhat.com, ddutile@redhat.com, dhildenb@redhat.com, Quentin Perret , Michael Roth , mhocko@suse.com Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 0/8] KVM: mm: fd-based approach for supporting KVM guest private memory Message-ID: <20220608021820.GA1548172@chaop.bj.intel.com> Reply-To: Chao Peng References: <20220519153713.819591-1-chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com> <20220607065749.GA1513445@chaop.bj.intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: X-Stat-Signature: kiz9xcwpgwj976k7ujre768otwk8ptr5 X-Rspam-User: Authentication-Results: imf01.hostedemail.com; dkim=pass header.d=intel.com header.s=Intel header.b=XKtnqeog; spf=none (imf01.hostedemail.com: domain of chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com has no SPF policy when checking 192.55.52.120) smtp.mailfrom=chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com; dmarc=pass (policy=none) header.from=intel.com X-Rspamd-Server: rspam12 X-Rspamd-Queue-Id: 7EDED40048 X-HE-Tag: 1654654915-173724 X-Bogosity: Ham, tests=bogofilter, spamicity=0.000000, version=1.2.4 Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org Precedence: bulk X-Loop: owner-majordomo@kvack.org List-ID: On Tue, Jun 07, 2022 at 05:55:46PM -0700, Marc Orr wrote: > On Tue, Jun 7, 2022 at 12:01 AM Chao Peng wrote: > > > > On Mon, Jun 06, 2022 at 01:09:50PM -0700, Vishal Annapurve wrote: > > > > > > > > Private memory map/unmap and conversion > > > > --------------------------------------- > > > > Userspace's map/unmap operations are done by fallocate() ioctl on the > > > > backing store fd. > > > > - map: default fallocate() with mode=0. > > > > - unmap: fallocate() with FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE. > > > > The map/unmap will trigger above memfile_notifier_ops to let KVM map/unmap > > > > secondary MMU page tables. > > > > > > > .... > > > > QEMU: https://github.com/chao-p/qemu/tree/privmem-v6 > > > > > > > > An example QEMU command line for TDX test: > > > > -object tdx-guest,id=tdx \ > > > > -object memory-backend-memfd-private,id=ram1,size=2G \ > > > > -machine q35,kvm-type=tdx,pic=no,kernel_irqchip=split,memory-encryption=tdx,memory-backend=ram1 > > > > > > > > > > There should be more discussion around double allocation scenarios > > > when using the private fd approach. A malicious guest or buggy > > > userspace VMM can cause physical memory getting allocated for both > > > shared (memory accessible from host) and private fds backing the guest > > > memory. > > > Userspace VMM will need to unback the shared guest memory while > > > handling the conversion from shared to private in order to prevent > > > double allocation even with malicious guests or bugs in userspace VMM. > > > > I don't know how malicious guest can cause that. The initial design of > > this serie is to put the private/shared memory into two different > > address spaces and gives usersapce VMM the flexibility to convert > > between the two. It can choose respect the guest conversion request or > > not. > > For example, the guest could maliciously give a device driver a > private page so that a host-side virtual device will blindly write the > private page. With this patch series, it's actually even not possible for userspace VMM to allocate private page by a direct write, it's basically unmapped from there. If it really wants to, it should so something special, by intention, that's basically the conversion, which we should allow. > > > It's possible for a usrspace VMM to cause double allocation if it fails > > to call the unback operation during the conversion, this may be a bug > > or not. Double allocation may not be a wrong thing, even in conception. > > At least TDX allows you to use half shared half private in guest, means > > both shared/private can be effective. Unbacking the memory is just the > > current QEMU implementation choice. > > Right. But the idea is that this patch series should accommodate all > of the CVM architectures. Or at least that's what I know was > envisioned last time we discussed this topic for SNP [*]. AFAICS, this series should work for both TDX and SNP, and other CVM architectures. I don't see where TDX can work but SNP cannot, or I missed something here? > > Regardless, it's important to ensure that the VM respects its memory > budget. For example, within Google, we run VMs inside of containers. > So if we double allocate we're going to OOM. This seems acceptable for > an early version of CVMs. But ultimately, I think we need a more > robust way to ensure that the VM operates within its memory container. > Otherwise, the OOM is going to be hard to diagnose and distinguish > from a real OOM. Thanks for bringing this up. But in my mind I still think userspace VMM can do and it's its responsibility to guarantee that, if that is hard required. By design, userspace VMM is the decision-maker for page conversion and has all the necessary information to know which page is shared/private. It also has the necessary knobs to allocate/free the physical pages for guest memory. Definitely, we should make userspace VMM more robust. Chao > > [*] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20210820155918.7518-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com/ > > > > > Chao > > > > > > Options to unback shared guest memory seem to be: > > > 1) madvise(.., MADV_DONTNEED/MADV_REMOVE) - This option won't stop > > > kernel from backing the shared memory on subsequent write accesses > > > 2) fallocate(..., FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE...) - For file backed shared > > > guest memory, this option still is similar to madvice since this would > > > still allow shared memory to get backed on write accesses > > > 3) munmap - This would give away the contiguous virtual memory region > > > reservation with holes in the guest backing memory, which might make > > > guest memory management difficult. > > > 4) mprotect(... PROT_NONE) - This would keep the virtual memory > > > address range backing the guest memory preserved > > > > > > ram_block_discard_range_fd from reference implementation: > > > https://github.com/chao-p/qemu/tree/privmem-v6 seems to be relying on > > > fallocate/madvise. > > > > > > Any thoughts/suggestions around better ways to unback the shared > > > memory in order to avoid double allocation scenarios? > > I agree with Vishal. I think this patch set is making great progress. > But the double allocation scenario seems like a high-level design > issue that warrants more discussion.