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[88.115.161.74]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id m22-20020ac24256000000b004b57bbaef87sm529496lfl.224.2023.02.23.13.41.14 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Thu, 23 Feb 2023 13:41:14 -0800 (PST) Date: Thu, 23 Feb 2023 23:41:12 +0200 From: Zhi Wang To: Michael Roth Cc: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , Brijesh Singh Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v8 34/56] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START command Message-ID: <20230223234112.000030ac@gmail.com> In-Reply-To: <20230220183847.59159-35-michael.roth@amd.com> References: <20230220183847.59159-1-michael.roth@amd.com> <20230220183847.59159-35-michael.roth@amd.com> X-Mailer: Claws Mail 4.1.0 (GTK 3.24.33; x86_64-w64-mingw32) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Rspamd-Server: rspam07 X-Rspamd-Queue-Id: 0B1EB14000E X-Rspam-User: X-Stat-Signature: cisrt3gomuszhbjg43uzbyw661e3ro4p X-HE-Tag: 1677188476-901450 X-HE-Meta: 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 8lC9UPFy 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 X-Bogosity: Ham, tests=bogofilter, spamicity=0.000000, version=1.2.4 Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org Precedence: bulk X-Loop: owner-majordomo@kvack.org List-ID: On Mon, 20 Feb 2023 12:38:25 -0600 Michael Roth wrote: > From: Brijesh Singh > > KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START begins the launch process for an SEV-SNP guest. > The command initializes a cryptographic digest context used to construct > the measurement of the guest. If the guest is expected to be migrated, > the command also binds a migration agent (MA) to the guest. > > For more information see the SEV-SNP specification. > > Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh > Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra > Signed-off-by: Michael Roth > --- > .../virt/kvm/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst | 24 ++++ > arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 121 +++++++++++++++++- > arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 1 + > include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 10 ++ > 4 files changed, 153 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst > index 2432213bd0ea..58971fc02a15 100644 > --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst > +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst > @@ -461,6 +461,30 @@ The flags bitmap is defined as:: > If the specified flags is not supported then return -EOPNOTSUPP, and the supported > flags are returned. > > +19. KVM_SNP_LAUNCH_START > +------------------------ > + > +The KVM_SNP_LAUNCH_START command is used for creating the memory encryption > +context for the SEV-SNP guest. To create the encryption context, user must > +provide a guest policy, migration agent (if any) and guest OS visible > +workarounds value as defined SEV-SNP specification. > + > +Parameters (in): struct kvm_snp_launch_start > + > +Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error > + > +:: > + > + struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_start { > + __u64 policy; /* Guest policy to use. */ > + __u64 ma_uaddr; /* userspace address of migration agent */ > + __u8 ma_en; /* 1 if the migration agent is enabled */ > + __u8 imi_en; /* set IMI to 1. */ > + __u8 gosvw[16]; /* guest OS visible workarounds */ > + }; > + > +See the SEV-SNP specification for further detail on the launch input. > + > References > ========== > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > index a8efe1f6bf77..097bb2138360 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ > #include > #include > #include > +#include > > #include "mmu.h" > #include "x86.h" > @@ -75,6 +76,8 @@ static unsigned int nr_asids; > static unsigned long *sev_asid_bitmap; > static unsigned long *sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap; > > +static int snp_decommission_context(struct kvm *kvm); > + > struct enc_region { > struct list_head list; > unsigned long npages; > @@ -100,12 +103,17 @@ static int sev_flush_asids(int min_asid, int max_asid) > down_write(&sev_deactivate_lock); > > wbinvd_on_all_cpus(); > - ret = sev_guest_df_flush(&error); > + > + if (sev_snp_enabled) > + ret = sev_do_cmd(SEV_CMD_SNP_DF_FLUSH, NULL, &error); > + else > + ret = sev_guest_df_flush(&error); > > up_write(&sev_deactivate_lock); > > if (ret) > - pr_err("SEV: DF_FLUSH failed, ret=%d, error=%#x\n", ret, error); > + pr_err("SEV%s: DF_FLUSH failed, ret=%d, error=%#x\n", > + sev_snp_enabled ? "-SNP" : "", ret, error); > > return ret; > } > @@ -2011,6 +2019,80 @@ int sev_vm_move_enc_context_from(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int source_fd) > return ret; > } > > +/* > + * The guest context contains all the information, keys and metadata > + * associated with the guest that the firmware tracks to implement SEV > + * and SNP features. The firmware stores the guest context in hypervisor > + * provide page via the SNP_GCTX_CREATE command. > + */ > +static void *snp_context_create(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) > +{ > + struct sev_data_snp_addr data = {}; > + void *context; > + int rc; > + > + /* Allocate memory for context page */ > + context = snp_alloc_firmware_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); > + if (!context) > + return NULL; > + > + data.gctx_paddr = __psp_pa(context); > + rc = __sev_issue_cmd(argp->sev_fd, SEV_CMD_SNP_GCTX_CREATE, &data, &argp->error); > + if (rc) { > + snp_free_firmware_page(context); > + return NULL; > + } > + > + return context; > +} > + > +static int snp_bind_asid(struct kvm *kvm, int *error) > +{ > + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; > + struct sev_data_snp_activate data = {0}; > + > + data.gctx_paddr = __psp_pa(sev->snp_context); > + data.asid = sev_get_asid(kvm); > + return sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SNP_ACTIVATE, &data, error); According to the SNP ABI specification[1] 8.10 SNP_ACTIVATE: "The firmware checks that a DF_FLUSH is not required. If a DF_FLUSH is required, the firmware returns DFFLUSH_REQUIRED. Note that all ASIDs are marked to require a DF_FLUSH at reset." Do we need a SNP_DF_FLUSH here before calling SNP_ACTIVATE or handle the situation if the PSP firmware returns DFFLUSH_REQUIRED? [1] https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/56860.pdf > +} > + > +static int snp_launch_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) > +{ > + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; > + struct sev_data_snp_launch_start start = {0}; > + struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_start params; > + int rc; > + > + if (!sev_snp_guest(kvm)) > + return -ENOTTY; > + > + if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(params))) > + return -EFAULT; > + > + sev->snp_context = snp_context_create(kvm, argp); > + if (!sev->snp_context) > + return -ENOTTY; > + > + start.gctx_paddr = __psp_pa(sev->snp_context); > + start.policy = params.policy; > + memcpy(start.gosvw, params.gosvw, sizeof(params.gosvw)); > + rc = __sev_issue_cmd(argp->sev_fd, SEV_CMD_SNP_LAUNCH_START, &start, &argp->error); > + if (rc) > + goto e_free_context; > + > + sev->fd = argp->sev_fd; > + rc = snp_bind_asid(kvm, &argp->error); > + if (rc) > + goto e_free_context; > + > + return 0; > + > +e_free_context: > + snp_decommission_context(kvm); > + > + return rc; > +} > + > int sev_mem_enc_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) > { > struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd; > @@ -2101,6 +2183,9 @@ int sev_mem_enc_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) > case KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH: > r = sev_receive_finish(kvm, &sev_cmd); > break; > + case KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START: > + r = snp_launch_start(kvm, &sev_cmd); > + break; > default: > r = -EINVAL; > goto out; > @@ -2292,6 +2377,28 @@ int sev_vm_copy_enc_context_from(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int source_fd) > return ret; > } > > +static int snp_decommission_context(struct kvm *kvm) > +{ > + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; > + struct sev_data_snp_addr data = {}; > + int ret; > + > + /* If context is not created then do nothing */ > + if (!sev->snp_context) > + return 0; > + > + data.gctx_paddr = __sme_pa(sev->snp_context); > + ret = sev_do_cmd(SEV_CMD_SNP_DECOMMISSION, &data, NULL); > + if (WARN_ONCE(ret, "failed to release guest context")) > + return ret; > + > + /* free the context page now */ > + snp_free_firmware_page(sev->snp_context); > + sev->snp_context = NULL; > + > + return 0; > +} > + > void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm) > { > struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; > @@ -2333,7 +2440,15 @@ void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm) > } > } > > - sev_unbind_asid(kvm, sev->handle); > + if (sev_snp_guest(kvm)) { > + if (snp_decommission_context(kvm)) { > + WARN_ONCE(1, "Failed to free SNP guest context, leaking asid!\n"); > + return; > + } > + } else { > + sev_unbind_asid(kvm, sev->handle); > + } > + > sev_asid_free(sev); > } > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h > index 56a5c96d8a36..740969b57425 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h > @@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ struct kvm_sev_info { > struct misc_cg *misc_cg; /* For misc cgroup accounting */ > atomic_t migration_in_progress; > u64 snp_init_flags; > + void *snp_context; /* SNP guest context page */ > }; > > struct kvm_svm { > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h > index 499cc323f793..cf19799ca5ce 100644 > --- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h > @@ -1919,6 +1919,7 @@ enum sev_cmd_id { > > /* SNP specific commands */ > KVM_SEV_SNP_INIT, > + KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START, > > KVM_SEV_NR_MAX, > }; > @@ -2026,6 +2027,15 @@ struct kvm_snp_init { > __u64 flags; > }; > > +struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_start { > + __u64 policy; > + __u64 ma_uaddr; > + __u8 ma_en; > + __u8 imi_en; > + __u8 gosvw[16]; > + __u8 pad[6]; > +}; > + > #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_ENABLE_IOMMU (1 << 0) > #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_PCI_2_3 (1 << 1) > #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_MASK_INTX (1 << 2)