From: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
To: x86@kernel.org, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
"H . J . Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>,
"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>,
kcc@google.com, eranian@google.com, rppt@kernel.org,
jamorris@linux.microsoft.com, dethoma@microsoft.com,
akpm@linux-foundation.org, Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com,
christina.schimpe@intel.com, david@redhat.com,
debug@rivosinc.com
Cc: rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH v7 02/41] x86/shstk: Add Kconfig option for shadow stack
Date: Mon, 27 Feb 2023 14:29:18 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230227222957.24501-3-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230227222957.24501-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Shadow stack provides protection for applications against function return
address corruption. It is active when the processor supports it, the
kernel has CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK enabled, and the application is built
for the feature. This is only implemented for the 64-bit kernel. When it
is enabled, legacy non-shadow stack applications continue to work, but
without protection.
Since there is another feature that utilizes CET (Kernel IBT) that will
share implementation with shadow stacks, create CONFIG_CET to signify
that at least one CET feature is configured.
Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
v5:
- Remove capitalization of shadow stack (Boris)
v3:
- Add X86_CET (Kees)
- Add back WRUSS dependency (Kees)
- Fix verbiage (Dave)
- Change from promt to bool (Kirill)
- Add more to commit log
v2:
- Remove already wrong kernel size increase info (tlgx)
- Change prompt to remove "Intel" (tglx)
- Update line about what CPUs are supported (Dave)
Yu-cheng v25:
- Remove X86_CET and use X86_SHADOW_STACK directly.
---
arch/x86/Kconfig | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler | 5 +++++
2 files changed, 29 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index a825bf031f49..f03791b73f9f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1851,6 +1851,11 @@ config CC_HAS_IBT
(CC_IS_CLANG && CLANG_VERSION >= 140000)) && \
$(as-instr,endbr64)
+config X86_CET
+ def_bool n
+ help
+ CET features configured (Shadow stack or IBT)
+
config X86_KERNEL_IBT
prompt "Indirect Branch Tracking"
def_bool y
@@ -1858,6 +1863,7 @@ config X86_KERNEL_IBT
# https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/commit/9d7001eba9c4cb311e03cd8cdc231f9e579f2d0f
depends on !LD_IS_LLD || LLD_VERSION >= 140000
select OBJTOOL
+ select X86_CET
help
Build the kernel with support for Indirect Branch Tracking, a
hardware support course-grain forward-edge Control Flow Integrity
@@ -1952,6 +1958,24 @@ config X86_SGX
If unsure, say N.
+config X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK
+ bool "X86 userspace shadow stack"
+ depends on AS_WRUSS
+ depends on X86_64
+ select ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS
+ select X86_CET
+ help
+ Shadow stack protection is a hardware feature that detects function
+ return address corruption. This helps mitigate ROP attacks.
+ Applications must be enabled to use it, and old userspace does not
+ get protection "for free".
+
+ CPUs supporting shadow stacks were first released in 2020.
+
+ See Documentation/x86/shstk.rst for more information.
+
+ If unsure, say N.
+
config EFI
bool "EFI runtime service support"
depends on ACPI
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler b/arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler
index b88f784cb02e..8ad41da301e5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler
@@ -24,3 +24,8 @@ config AS_GFNI
def_bool $(as-instr,vgf2p8mulb %xmm0$(comma)%xmm1$(comma)%xmm2)
help
Supported by binutils >= 2.30 and LLVM integrated assembler
+
+config AS_WRUSS
+ def_bool $(as-instr,wrussq %rax$(comma)(%rbx))
+ help
+ Supported by binutils >= 2.31 and LLVM integrated assembler
--
2.17.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-02-27 22:31 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 154+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-02-27 22:29 [PATCH v7 00/41] Shadow stacks for userspace Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 01/41] Documentation/x86: Add CET shadow stack description Rick Edgecombe
2023-03-01 14:21 ` Szabolcs Nagy
2023-03-01 14:38 ` Szabolcs Nagy
2023-03-01 18:07 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-01 18:32 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
[not found] ` <ZADQISkczejfgdoS@arm.com>
2023-03-03 22:35 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
[not found] ` <ZAYS6CHuZ0MiFvmE@arm.com>
2023-03-06 16:31 ` Florian Weimer
2023-03-06 18:08 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-07 13:03 ` szabolcs.nagy
2023-03-07 14:00 ` Florian Weimer
2023-03-06 18:05 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-06 20:31 ` Liang, Kan
2023-03-02 16:14 ` szabolcs.nagy
2023-03-02 21:17 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-03 16:30 ` szabolcs.nagy
2023-03-03 16:57 ` H.J. Lu
2023-03-03 17:39 ` szabolcs.nagy
2023-03-03 17:50 ` H.J. Lu
2023-03-03 17:41 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-27 22:29 ` Rick Edgecombe [this message]
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 03/41] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPU feature flags for shadow stacks Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 04/41] x86/cpufeatures: Enable CET CR4 bit for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 05/41] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 06/41] x86/fpu: Add helper for modifying xstate Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 07/41] x86: Move control protection handler to separate file Rick Edgecombe
2023-03-01 15:38 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 08/41] x86/shstk: Add user control-protection fault handler Rick Edgecombe
2023-03-01 18:06 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-01 18:14 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-01 18:37 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 09/41] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY from kernel RO pages Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 10/41] x86/mm: Move pmd_write(), pud_write() up in the file Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 11/41] mm: Introduce pte_mkwrite_kernel() Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 12/41] s390/mm: Introduce pmd_mkwrite_kernel() Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 13/41] mm: Make pte_mkwrite() take a VMA Rick Edgecombe
2023-03-01 7:03 ` Christophe Leroy
2023-03-01 8:16 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-03-02 12:19 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 14/41] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY Rick Edgecombe
2023-03-02 12:48 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-02 17:01 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 15/41] x86/mm: Update ptep/pmdp_set_wrprotect() for _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 16/41] x86/mm: Start actually marking _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 17/41] mm: Move VM_UFFD_MINOR_BIT from 37 to 38 Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 18/41] mm: Introduce VM_SHADOW_STACK for shadow stack memory Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 19/41] x86/mm: Check shadow stack page fault errors Rick Edgecombe
2023-03-03 14:00 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-03 14:39 ` Dave Hansen
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 20/41] x86/mm: Teach pte_mkwrite() about stack memory Rick Edgecombe
2023-03-03 15:37 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 21/41] mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2023-03-06 8:08 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-07 1:29 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-07 10:32 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-07 10:44 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-03-08 22:48 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-17 17:09 ` Deepak Gupta
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 22/41] mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting Rick Edgecombe
2023-03-06 13:01 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-06 18:11 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-06 18:16 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-07 10:42 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-03-17 17:12 ` Deepak Gupta
2023-03-17 17:16 ` Dave Hansen
2023-03-17 17:28 ` Deepak Gupta
2023-03-17 17:42 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-17 19:26 ` Deepak Gupta
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 23/41] mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap() Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 24/41] mm: Don't allow write GUPs to shadow stack memory Rick Edgecombe
2023-03-06 13:10 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-06 18:15 ` Andy Lutomirski
2023-03-06 18:33 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-06 18:57 ` Andy Lutomirski
2023-03-07 1:47 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-17 17:05 ` Deepak Gupta
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 25/41] x86/mm: Introduce MAP_ABOVE4G Rick Edgecombe
2023-03-06 18:09 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-07 1:10 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 26/41] mm: Warn on shadow stack memory in wrong vma Rick Edgecombe
2023-03-08 8:53 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-08 23:36 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 27/41] x86/mm: Warn if create Write=0,Dirty=1 with raw prot Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-27 22:54 ` Kees Cook
2023-03-08 9:23 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-08 23:35 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 28/41] x86: Introduce userspace API for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2023-03-08 10:27 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-08 23:32 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-09 12:57 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-09 16:56 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-09 23:51 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-10 1:13 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-10 2:03 ` H.J. Lu
2023-03-10 20:00 ` H.J. Lu
2023-03-10 20:27 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-10 20:43 ` H.J. Lu
2023-03-10 21:01 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-10 11:40 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 29/41] x86/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack support Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 30/41] x86/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2023-03-02 17:34 ` Szabolcs Nagy
2023-03-02 21:48 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-08 15:26 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-08 20:03 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-09 14:12 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-09 16:59 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-09 17:04 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-09 20:29 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 31/41] x86/shstk: Introduce routines modifying shstk Rick Edgecombe
2023-03-09 16:48 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-09 17:03 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-09 17:22 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 32/41] x86/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2023-03-09 17:02 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-09 17:16 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-09 23:35 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 33/41] x86/shstk: Introduce map_shadow_stack syscall Rick Edgecombe
[not found] ` <ZADbP7HvyPHuwUY9@arm.com>
2023-03-02 21:21 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-09 18:55 ` Deepak Gupta
2023-03-09 19:39 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-09 21:08 ` Deepak Gupta
2023-03-10 0:14 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-10 21:00 ` Deepak Gupta
2023-03-10 21:43 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-16 20:07 ` Deepak Gupta
2023-03-14 7:19 ` Mike Rapoport
2023-03-16 19:30 ` Deepak Gupta
2023-03-10 16:11 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-10 17:12 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-10 20:05 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-10 20:19 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-10 20:26 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 34/41] x86/shstk: Support WRSS for userspace Rick Edgecombe
2023-03-10 16:44 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-10 17:16 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 35/41] x86: Expose thread features in /proc/$PID/status Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 36/41] x86/shstk: Wire in shadow stack interface Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 37/41] selftests/x86: Add shadow stack test Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 38/41] x86/fpu: Add helper for initing features Rick Edgecombe
2023-03-11 12:54 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-13 2:45 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-13 11:03 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-13 16:10 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-13 17:10 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-13 23:31 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 39/41] x86: Add PTRACE interface for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2023-03-11 15:06 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-13 2:53 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 40/41] x86/shstk: Add ARCH_SHSTK_UNLOCK Rick Edgecombe
2023-03-11 15:11 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-13 3:04 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-13 11:05 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 41/41] x86/shstk: Add ARCH_SHSTK_STATUS Rick Edgecombe
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