linux-mm.kvack.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, sparclinux@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org, Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
	Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>,
	Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>, Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
	Laura Abbott <labbott@fedoraproject.org>,
	Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>,
	Ard
Subject: Re: [PATCH 9/9] mm: SLUB hardened usercopy support
Date: Thu, 07 Jul 2016 14:35:17 +1000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20403.5479379401$1467866197@news.gmane.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1467843928-29351-10-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>

Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> writes:

> Under CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY, this adds object size checking to the
> SLUB allocator to catch any copies that may span objects.
>
> Based on code from PaX and grsecurity.
>
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

> diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
> index 825ff4505336..0c8ace04f075 100644
> --- a/mm/slub.c
> +++ b/mm/slub.c
> @@ -3614,6 +3614,33 @@ void *__kmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node)
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kmalloc_node);
>  #endif
>  
> +#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY
> +/*
> + * Rejects objects that are incorrectly sized.
> + *
> + * Returns NULL if check passes, otherwise const char * to name of cache
> + * to indicate an error.
> + */
> +const char *__check_heap_object(const void *ptr, unsigned long n,
> +				struct page *page)
> +{
> +	struct kmem_cache *s;
> +	unsigned long offset;
> +
> +	/* Find object. */
> +	s = page->slab_cache;
> +
> +	/* Find offset within object. */
> +	offset = (ptr - page_address(page)) % s->size;
> +
> +	/* Allow address range falling entirely within object size. */
> +	if (offset <= s->object_size && n <= s->object_size - offset)
> +		return NULL;
> +
> +	return s->name;
> +}

I gave this a quick spin on powerpc, it blew up immediately :)

  Brought up 16 CPUs
  usercopy: kernel memory overwrite attempt detected to c0000001fe023868 (kmalloc-16) (9 bytes)
  CPU: 8 PID: 103 Comm: kdevtmpfs Not tainted 4.7.0-rc3-00098-g09d9556ae5d1 #55
  Call Trace:
  [c0000001fa0cfb40] [c0000000009bdbe8] dump_stack+0xb0/0xf0 (unreliable)
  [c0000001fa0cfb80] [c00000000029cf44] __check_object_size+0x74/0x320
  [c0000001fa0cfc00] [c00000000005d4d0] copy_from_user+0x60/0xd4
  [c0000001fa0cfc40] [c00000000022b6cc] memdup_user+0x5c/0xf0
  [c0000001fa0cfc80] [c00000000022b90c] strndup_user+0x7c/0x110
  [c0000001fa0cfcc0] [c0000000002d6c28] SyS_mount+0x58/0x180
  [c0000001fa0cfd10] [c0000000005ee908] devtmpfsd+0x98/0x210
  [c0000001fa0cfd80] [c0000000000df810] kthread+0x110/0x130
  [c0000001fa0cfe30] [c0000000000095e8] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x74

SLUB tracing says:

  TRACE kmalloc-16 alloc 0xc0000001fe023868 inuse=186 fp=0x          (null)

Which is not 16-byte aligned, which seems to be caused by the red zone?
The following patch fixes it for me, but I don't know SLUB enough to say
if it's always correct.


diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
index 0c8ace04f075..66191ea4545a 100644
--- a/mm/slub.c
+++ b/mm/slub.c
@@ -3630,6 +3630,9 @@ const char *__check_heap_object(const void *ptr, unsigned long n,
 	/* Find object. */
 	s = page->slab_cache;
 
+	/* Subtract red zone if enabled */
+	ptr = restore_red_left(s, ptr);
+
 	/* Find offset within object. */
 	offset = (ptr - page_address(page)) % s->size;
 
cheers
_______________________________________________
Linuxppc-dev mailing list
Linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
https://lists.ozlabs.org/listinfo/linuxppc-dev

  parent reply	other threads:[~2016-07-07  4:35 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 56+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-07-06 22:25 [PATCH 0/9] mm: Hardened usercopy Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 1/9] " Kees Cook
2016-07-07  5:37   ` Baruch Siach
2016-07-07 17:25     ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 18:35       ` Baruch Siach
2016-07-07  7:42   ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07 17:29     ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 19:34       ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07  8:01   ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-07 17:37     ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08  5:34       ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08  5:34       ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08  5:34       ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08  5:34       ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08  9:22       ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-07 16:19   ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-07 16:35   ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-07 17:41     ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 2/9] x86/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 3/9] ARM: uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 4/9] arm64/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-07 10:07   ` Mark Rutland
2016-07-07 17:19     ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 5/9] ia64/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 6/9] powerpc/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 7/9] sparc/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 8/9] mm: SLAB hardened usercopy support Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 9/9] mm: SLUB " Kees Cook
2016-07-07  4:35   ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-07  4:35   ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-07  4:35   ` Michael Ellerman [this message]
2016-07-07  4:35   ` Michael Ellerman
     [not found]   ` <577ddc18.d351190a.1fa54.ffffbe79SMTPIN_ADDED_BROKEN@mx.google.com>
2016-07-07 18:56     ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-08 10:19       ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08 10:19       ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08 10:19       ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08 10:19       ` [kernel-hardening] " Michael Ellerman
2016-07-07  7:30 ` [PATCH 0/9] mm: Hardened usercopy Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-07 17:27   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08  8:46 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-08 16:19   ` Linus Torvalds
2016-07-08 18:23     ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-09  2:22 ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-09  2:44   ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-09  7:55     ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-09  8:25   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-07-09 12:58     ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-09 17:03     ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:01   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 21:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-09 23:16   ` PaX Team
2016-07-10  9:16     ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-10 12:03       ` PaX Team
2016-07-10 12:38         ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 18:40           ` Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:34         ` Kees Cook

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to='20403.5479379401$1467866197@news.gmane.org' \
    --to=mpe@ellerman.id.au \
    --cc=aarcange@redhat.com \
    --cc=bp@suse.de \
    --cc=catalin.marinas@arm.com \
    --cc=cl@linux.com \
    --cc=dvyukov@google.com \
    --cc=fenghua.yu@intel.com \
    --cc=iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com \
    --cc=jack@suse.cz \
    --cc=keescook@chromium.org \
    --cc=kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com \
    --cc=labbott@fedoraproject.org \
    --cc=linux-arch@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org \
    --cc=linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
    --cc=linux@armlinux.org.uk \
    --cc=luto@kernel.org \
    --cc=minipli@googlemail.com \
    --cc=pageexec@freemail.hu \
    --cc=riel@redhat.com \
    --cc=rientjes@google.com \
    --cc=sparclinux@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=spender@grsecurity.net \
    --cc=tony.luck@intel.com \
    --cc=will.deacon@arm.com \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).