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Fri, 14 Aug 2020 14:01:08 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [10.9.0.18] ([185.248.161.177]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id r11sm17017268wrw.78.2020.08.14.14.01.04 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 bits=128/128); Fri, 14 Aug 2020 14:01:07 -0700 (PDT) Reply-To: alex.popov@linux.com Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC 0/2] Break heap spraying needed for exploiting use-after-free To: Kees Cook , Jann Horn , Will Deacon , Andrey Ryabinin , Alexander Potapenko , Dmitry Vyukov , Christoph Lameter , Pekka Enberg , David Rientjes , Joonsoo Kim , Andrew Morton , Masahiro Yamada , Masami Hiramatsu , Steven Rostedt , Peter Zijlstra , Krzysztof Kozlowski , Patrick Bellasi , David Howells , Eric Biederman , Johannes Weiner , Laura Abbott , Arnd Bergmann , Greg Kroah-Hartman , kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-mm@kvack.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Andrey Konovalov , Alexander Popov Cc: notify@kernel.org References: <20200813151922.1093791-1-alex.popov@linux.com> From: Alexander Popov Autocrypt: addr=alex.popov@linux.com; 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Linux x86_64; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/68.10.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20200813151922.1093791-1-alex.popov@linux.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Language: en-US Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Rspamd-Queue-Id: 8C95B1ACC3E X-Spamd-Result: default: False [0.00 / 100.00] X-Rspamd-Server: rspam04 X-Bogosity: Ham, tests=bogofilter, spamicity=0.000000, version=1.2.4 Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org Precedence: bulk X-Loop: owner-majordomo@kvack.org List-ID: On 13.08.2020 18:19, Alexander Popov wrote: > Hello everyone! Requesting for your comments. > > Use-after-free vulnerabilities in the Linux kernel are very popular for > exploitation. A few examples: > https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/09/a-cache-invalidation-bug-in-linux.html > https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2019/11/bad-binder-android-in-wild-exploit.html?m=1 > https://a13xp0p0v.github.io/2020/02/15/CVE-2019-18683.html > > Use-after-free exploits usually employ heap spraying technique. > Generally it aims to put controlled bytes at a predetermined memory > location on the heap. Heap spraying for exploiting use-after-free in > the Linux kernel relies on the fact that on kmalloc(), the slab allocator > returns the address of the memory that was recently freed. So allocating > a kernel object with the same size and controlled contents allows > overwriting the vulnerable freed object. > > I've found an easy way to break heap spraying for use-after-free > exploitation. I simply extracted slab freelist quarantine from KASAN > functionality and called it CONFIG_SLAB_QUARANTINE. Please see patch 1. > > If this feature is enabled, freed allocations are stored in the quarantine > and can't be instantly reallocated and overwritten by the exploit > performing heap spraying. > > In patch 2 you can see the lkdtm test showing how CONFIG_SLAB_QUARANTINE > prevents immediate reallocation of a freed heap object. > > I tested this patch series both for CONFIG_SLUB and CONFIG_SLAB. > > CONFIG_SLAB_QUARANTINE disabled: > # echo HEAP_SPRAY > /sys/kernel/debug/provoke-crash/DIRECT > lkdtm: Performing direct entry HEAP_SPRAY > lkdtm: Performing heap spraying... > lkdtm: attempt 0: spray alloc addr 00000000f8699c7d vs freed addr 00000000f8699c7d > lkdtm: freed addr is reallocated! > lkdtm: FAIL! Heap spraying succeed :( > > CONFIG_SLAB_QUARANTINE enabled: > # echo HEAP_SPRAY > /sys/kernel/debug/provoke-crash/DIRECT > lkdtm: Performing direct entry HEAP_SPRAY > lkdtm: Performing heap spraying... > lkdtm: attempt 0: spray alloc addr 000000009cafb63f vs freed addr 00000000173cce94 > lkdtm: attempt 1: spray alloc addr 000000003096911f vs freed addr 00000000173cce94 > lkdtm: attempt 2: spray alloc addr 00000000da60d755 vs freed addr 00000000173cce94 > lkdtm: attempt 3: spray alloc addr 000000000b415070 vs freed addr 00000000173cce94 > ... > lkdtm: attempt 126: spray alloc addr 00000000e80ef807 vs freed addr 00000000173cce94 > lkdtm: attempt 127: spray alloc addr 00000000398fe535 vs freed addr 00000000173cce94 > lkdtm: OK! Heap spraying hasn't succeed :) > > I did a brief performance evaluation of this feature. > > 1. Memory consumption. KASAN quarantine uses 1/32 of the memory. > CONFIG_SLAB_QUARANTINE disabled: > # free -m > total used free shared buff/cache available > Mem: 1987 39 1862 10 86 1907 > Swap: 0 0 0 > CONFIG_SLAB_QUARANTINE enabled: > # free -m > total used free shared buff/cache available > Mem: 1987 140 1760 10 87 1805 > Swap: 0 0 0 > > 2. Performance penalty. I used `hackbench -s 256 -l 200 -g 15 -f 25 -P`. > CONFIG_SLAB_QUARANTINE disabled (x86_64, CONFIG_SLUB): > Times: 3.088, 3.103, 3.068, 3.103, 3.107 > Mean: 3.0938 > Standard deviation: 0.0144 > CONFIG_SLAB_QUARANTINE enabled (x86_64, CONFIG_SLUB): > Times: 3.303, 3.329, 3.356, 3.314, 3.292 > Mean: 3.3188 (+7.3%) > Standard deviation: 0.0223 > > I would appreciate your feedback! While waiting for the feedback on these RFC patches, I compiled a list of topics for further research: - Possible ways to overwrite a quarantined heap object by making a large amount of allocations (with/without freeing them) - How init_on_free=1 affects heap spraying on a system with the heap quarantine - How releasing batches of quarantine objects right away affects heap spraying reliability - Heap spraying on multi-core systems with the heap quarantine - More precise performance evaluation - Possible ways to improve the security properties and performance results (KASAN quarantine has some interesting settings) Best regards, Alexander > Alexander Popov (2): > mm: Extract SLAB_QUARANTINE from KASAN > lkdtm: Add heap spraying test > > drivers/misc/lkdtm/core.c | 1 + > drivers/misc/lkdtm/heap.c | 40 ++++++++++++++ > drivers/misc/lkdtm/lkdtm.h | 1 + > include/linux/kasan.h | 107 ++++++++++++++++++++----------------- > include/linux/slab_def.h | 2 +- > include/linux/slub_def.h | 2 +- > init/Kconfig | 11 ++++ > mm/Makefile | 3 +- > mm/kasan/Makefile | 2 + > mm/kasan/kasan.h | 75 +++++++++++++------------- > mm/kasan/quarantine.c | 2 + > mm/kasan/slab_quarantine.c | 99 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > mm/slub.c | 2 +- > 13 files changed, 258 insertions(+), 89 deletions(-) > create mode 100644 mm/kasan/slab_quarantine.c >