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From: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
To: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>,
	Mateusz Nosek <mateusznosek0@gmail.com>,
	Laura Abbott <labbott@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 2/5] mm, page_poison: use static key more efficiently
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 2020 17:06:38 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <4dea1223-a2bf-89ec-afe7-72a3218e61a9@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <c4eb5301-0435-d296-5d32-a76ac58787b2@suse.cz>

On 12.11.20 15:37, Vlastimil Babka wrote:
> On 11/11/20 4:38 PM, David Hildenbrand wrote:
>> On 03.11.20 16:22, Vlastimil Babka wrote:
>>> Commit 11c9c7edae06 ("mm/page_poison.c: replace bool variable with static key")
>>> changed page_poisoning_enabled() to a static key check. However, the function
>>> is not inlined, so each check still involves a function call with overhead not
>>> eliminated when page poisoning is disabled.
>>>
>>> Analogically to how debug_pagealloc is handled, this patch converts
>>> page_poisoning_enabled() back to boolean check, and introduces
>>> page_poisoning_enabled_static() for fast paths. Both functions are inlined.
>>>
>>> The function kernel_poison_pages() is also called unconditionally and does
>>> the static key check inside. Remove it from there and put it to callers. Also
>>> split it to two functions kernel_poison_pages() and kernel_unpoison_pages()
>>> instead of the confusing bool parameter.
>>>
>>> Also optimize the check that enables page poisoning instead of debug_pagealloc
>>> for architectures without proper debug_pagealloc support. Move the check to
>>> init_mem_debugging_and_hardening() to enable a single static key instead of
>>> having two static branches in page_poisoning_enabled_static().
>>
>> [...]
>>
>>> + * For use in fast paths after init_mem_debugging() has run, or when a
>>> + * false negative result is not harmful when called too early.
>>> + */
>>> +static inline bool page_poisoning_enabled_static(void)
>>> +{
>>> +	return (static_branch_unlikely(&_page_poisoning_enabled));
>>
>> As already mentioned IIRC:
> 
> Yes, it was, and I thought I fixed it. Guess not.
> 
>> return static_branch_unlikely(&_page_poisoning_enabled);
>>
>>> +}
> 
>>> @@ -1260,7 +1271,8 @@ static __always_inline bool free_pages_prepare(struct page *page,
>>>    	if (want_init_on_free())
>>>    		kernel_init_free_pages(page, 1 << order);
>>>    
>>> -	kernel_poison_pages(page, 1 << order, 0);
>>> +	if (page_poisoning_enabled_static())
>>> +		kernel_poison_pages(page, 1 << order);
>>
>> This would look much better by having kernel_poison_pages() simply be
>> implemented in a header, where the static check is performed.
>>
>> Take a look at how it's handled in mm/shuffle.h
>    
> Ok. Fixup below.
> 
> ----8<----
> 
>   From 7ce26ba61296f583f0f9089e7887f07424f25d2c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> From: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
> Date: Thu, 12 Nov 2020 15:20:58 +0100
> Subject: [PATCH] mm, page_poison: use static key more efficiently-fix
> 
> Non-functional cleanups, per David Hildenbrand.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
> ---
>    include/linux/mm.h | 16 +++++++++++++---
>    mm/page_alloc.c    |  7 +++----
>    mm/page_poison.c   |  4 ++--
>    3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
> index 4d6dd9f44571..861b9392b5dc 100644
> --- a/include/linux/mm.h
> +++ b/include/linux/mm.h
> @@ -2867,8 +2867,8 @@ extern int apply_to_existing_page_range(struct mm_struct *mm,
>    
>    extern void init_mem_debugging_and_hardening(void);
>    #ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING
> -extern void kernel_poison_pages(struct page *page, int numpages);
> -extern void kernel_unpoison_pages(struct page *page, int numpages);
> +extern void __kernel_poison_pages(struct page *page, int numpages);
> +extern void __kernel_unpoison_pages(struct page *page, int numpages);
>    extern bool _page_poisoning_enabled_early;
>    DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(_page_poisoning_enabled);
>    static inline bool page_poisoning_enabled(void)
> @@ -2881,7 +2881,17 @@ static inline bool page_poisoning_enabled(void)
>     */
>    static inline bool page_poisoning_enabled_static(void)
>    {
> -	return (static_branch_unlikely(&_page_poisoning_enabled));
> +	return static_branch_unlikely(&_page_poisoning_enabled);
> +}
> +static inline void kernel_poison_pages(struct page *page, int numpages)
> +{
> +	if (page_poisoning_enabled_static())
> +		__kernel_poison_pages(page, numpages);
> +}
> +static inline void kernel_unpoison_pages(struct page *page, int numpages)
> +{
> +	if (page_poisoning_enabled_static())
> +		__kernel_unpoison_pages(page, numpages);
>    }
>    #else
>    static inline bool page_poisoning_enabled(void) { return false; }
> diff --git a/mm/page_alloc.c b/mm/page_alloc.c
> index fd7f9345adc0..1388b5939551 100644
> --- a/mm/page_alloc.c
> +++ b/mm/page_alloc.c
> @@ -1271,8 +1271,8 @@ static __always_inline bool free_pages_prepare(struct page *page,
>    	if (want_init_on_free())
>    		kernel_init_free_pages(page, 1 << order);
>    
> -	if (page_poisoning_enabled_static())
> -		kernel_poison_pages(page, 1 << order);
> +	kernel_poison_pages(page, 1 << order);
> +
>    	/*
>    	 * arch_free_page() can make the page's contents inaccessible.  s390
>    	 * does this.  So nothing which can access the page's contents should
> @@ -2281,8 +2281,7 @@ inline void post_alloc_hook(struct page *page, unsigned int order,
>    	if (debug_pagealloc_enabled_static())
>    		kernel_map_pages(page, 1 << order, 1);
>    	kasan_alloc_pages(page, order);
> -	if (page_poisoning_enabled_static())
> -		kernel_unpoison_pages(page, 1 << order);
> +	kernel_unpoison_pages(page, 1 << order);
>    	set_page_owner(page, order, gfp_flags);
>    }
>    
> diff --git a/mm/page_poison.c b/mm/page_poison.c
> index dd7aeada036f..4d75fc9ccc7a 100644
> --- a/mm/page_poison.c
> +++ b/mm/page_poison.c
> @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ static void poison_page(struct page *page)
>    	kunmap_atomic(addr);
>    }
>    
> -void kernel_poison_pages(struct page *page, int n)
> +void __kernel_poison_pages(struct page *page, int n)
>    {
>    	int i;
>    
> @@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ static void unpoison_page(struct page *page)
>    	kunmap_atomic(addr);
>    }
>    
> -void kernel_unpoison_pages(struct page *page, int n)
> +void __kernel_unpoison_pages(struct page *page, int n)
>    {
>    	int i;
>    
> 

LGTM.

-- 
Thanks,

David / dhildenb



  reply	other threads:[~2020-11-12 16:07 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-11-03 15:22 [PATCH v2 0/5] cleanup page poisoning Vlastimil Babka
2020-11-03 15:22 ` [PATCH v2 1/5] mm, page_alloc: do not rely on the order of page_poison and init_on_alloc/free parameters Vlastimil Babka
2020-11-03 15:22 ` [PATCH v2 2/5] mm, page_poison: use static key more efficiently Vlastimil Babka
2020-11-11 15:38   ` David Hildenbrand
2020-11-12 14:37     ` Vlastimil Babka
2020-11-12 16:06       ` David Hildenbrand [this message]
2020-11-03 15:22 ` [PATCH v2 3/5] kernel/power: allow hibernation with page_poison sanity checking Vlastimil Babka
2020-11-05 18:36   ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2020-11-11 15:42   ` David Hildenbrand
2020-11-12 14:39     ` Vlastimil Babka
2020-11-12 15:52       ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2020-11-12 16:07       ` David Hildenbrand
2020-11-03 15:22 ` [PATCH v2 4/5] mm, page_poison: remove CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_NO_SANITY Vlastimil Babka
2020-11-11 15:43   ` David Hildenbrand
2020-11-03 15:22 ` [PATCH v2 5/5] mm, page_poison: remove CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_ZERO Vlastimil Babka
2020-11-11 15:45   ` David Hildenbrand

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