From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> To: "Adalbert Lazăr" <alazar@bitdefender.com>, kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org, virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org, "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>, "Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>, "Tamas K Lengyel" <tamas@tklengyel.com>, "Mathieu Tarral" <mathieu.tarral@protonmail.com>, "Samuel Laurén" <samuel.lauren@iki.fi>, "Patrick Colp" <patrick.colp@oracle.com>, "Jan Kiszka" <jan.kiszka@siemens.com>, "Stefan Hajnoczi" <stefanha@redhat.com>, "Weijiang Yang" <weijiang.yang@intel.com>, "Yu C Zhang" <yu.c.zhang@intel.com>, "Mihai Donțu" <mdontu@bitdefender.com>, "Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org> Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v6 74/92] kvm: x86: do not unconditionally patch the hypercall instruction during emulation Date: Wed, 14 Aug 2019 14:33:16 +0200 Message-ID: <50bade53-c584-504d-7c02-1238af731666@redhat.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <5d53f965.1c69fb81.cd952.035bSMTPIN_ADDED_BROKEN@mx.google.com> On 14/08/19 14:07, Adalbert Lazăr wrote: > On Tue, 13 Aug 2019 11:20:45 +0200, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> wrote: >> On 09/08/19 18:00, Adalbert Lazăr wrote: >>> From: Mihai Donțu <mdontu@bitdefender.com> >>> >>> It can happened for us to end up emulating the VMCALL instruction as a >>> result of the handling of an EPT write fault. In this situation, the >>> emulator will try to unconditionally patch the correct hypercall opcode >>> bytes using emulator_write_emulated(). However, this last call uses the >>> fault GPA (if available) or walks the guest page tables at RIP, >>> otherwise. The trouble begins when using KVMI, when we forbid the use of >>> the fault GPA and fallback to the guest pt walk: in Windows (8.1 and >>> newer) the page that we try to write into is marked read-execute and as >>> such emulator_write_emulated() fails and we inject a write #PF, leading >>> to a guest crash. >>> >>> The fix is rather simple: check the existing instruction bytes before >>> doing the patching. This does not change the normal KVM behaviour, but >>> does help when using KVMI as we no longer inject a write #PF. >> >> Fixing the hypercall is just an optimization. Can we just hush and >> return to the guest if emulator_write_emulated returns >> X86EMUL_PROPAGATE_FAULT? >> >> Paolo > > Something like this? > > err = emulator_write_emulated(...); > if (err == X86EMUL_PROPAGATE_FAULT) > err = X86EMUL_CONTINUE; > return err; Yes. The only difference will be that you'll keep getting #UD vmexits instead of hypercall vmexits. It's also safer, we want to obey those r-x permissions because PatchGuard would crash the system if it noticed the rewriting for whatever reason. Paolo >>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c >>> index 04b1d2916a0a..965c4f0108eb 100644 >>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c >>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c >>> @@ -7363,16 +7363,33 @@ int kvm_emulate_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) >>> } >>> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_emulate_hypercall); >>> >>> +#define KVM_HYPERCALL_INSN_LEN 3 >>> + >>> static int emulator_fix_hypercall(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt) >>> { >>> + int err; >>> struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = emul_to_vcpu(ctxt); >>> - char instruction[3]; >>> + char buf[KVM_HYPERCALL_INSN_LEN]; >>> + char instruction[KVM_HYPERCALL_INSN_LEN]; >>> unsigned long rip = kvm_rip_read(vcpu); >>> >>> + err = emulator_read_emulated(ctxt, rip, buf, sizeof(buf), >>> + &ctxt->exception); >>> + if (err != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) >>> + return err; >>> + >>> kvm_x86_ops->patch_hypercall(vcpu, instruction); >>> + if (!memcmp(instruction, buf, sizeof(instruction))) >>> + /* >>> + * The hypercall instruction is the correct one. Retry >>> + * its execution maybe we got here as a result of an >>> + * event other than #UD which has been resolved in the >>> + * mean time. >>> + */ >>> + return X86EMUL_CONTINUE; >>> >>> - return emulator_write_emulated(ctxt, rip, instruction, 3, >>> - &ctxt->exception); >>> + return emulator_write_emulated(ctxt, rip, instruction, >>> + sizeof(instruction), &ctxt->exception); >>> }
next prev parent reply index Thread overview: 168+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2019-08-09 15:59 [RFC PATCH v6 00/92] VM introspection Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 01/92] kvm: introduce KVMI (VM introspection subsystem) Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-12 20:20 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-08-13 9:11 ` Paolo Bonzini 2019-08-13 11:57 ` Adalbert Lazăr [not found] ` <5d52a5ae.1c69fb81.5c260.1573SMTPIN_ADDED_BROKEN@mx.google.com> 2019-08-13 12:09 ` Paolo Bonzini 2019-08-13 15:01 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-08-13 21:03 ` Paolo Bonzini 2019-08-14 9:48 ` Adalbert Lazăr [not found] ` <5d53d8d1.1c69fb81.7d32.0bedSMTPIN_ADDED_BROKEN@mx.google.com> 2019-08-14 10:37 ` Paolo Bonzini 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 02/92] kvm: introspection: add basic ioctls (hook/unhook) Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-13 8:44 ` Paolo Bonzini 2019-08-13 14:24 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 03/92] kvm: introspection: add permission access ioctls Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 04/92] kvm: introspection: add the read/dispatch message function Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 05/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_GET_VERSION Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 06/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_CONTROL_CMD_RESPONSE Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-13 9:15 ` Paolo Bonzini 2019-08-13 17:08 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 07/92] kvm: introspection: honor the reply option when handling the KVMI_GET_VERSION command Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-13 9:16 ` Paolo Bonzini 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 08/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_CHECK_COMMAND and KVMI_CHECK_EVENT Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 09/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_GET_GUEST_INFO Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 10/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_CONTROL_VM_EVENTS Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 11/92] kvm: introspection: add vCPU related data Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 12/92] kvm: introspection: add a jobs list to every introspected vCPU Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 13/92] kvm: introspection: make the vCPU wait even when its jobs list is empty Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-13 8:43 ` Paolo Bonzini 2019-08-13 14:19 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 14/92] kvm: introspection: handle introspection commands before returning to guest Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-13 8:26 ` Paolo Bonzini 2019-08-13 13:54 ` Adalbert Lazăr [not found] ` <5d52c10e.1c69fb81.26904.fd34SMTPIN_ADDED_BROKEN@mx.google.com> 2019-08-13 14:45 ` Paolo Bonzini 2019-08-14 9:39 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 15/92] kvm: introspection: handle vCPU related introspection commands Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 16/92] kvm: introspection: handle events and event replies Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-13 8:55 ` Paolo Bonzini 2019-08-13 15:25 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 17/92] kvm: introspection: introduce event actions Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 18/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_EVENT_UNHOOK Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 19/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_EVENT_CREATE_VCPU Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 20/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_GET_VCPU_INFO Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 21/92] kvm: page track: add track_create_slot() callback Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 22/92] kvm: x86: provide all page tracking hooks with the guest virtual address Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 23/92] kvm: page track: add support for preread, prewrite and preexec Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 24/92] kvm: x86: wire in the preread/prewrite/preexec page trackers Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 25/92] kvm: x86: intercept the write access on sidt and other emulated instructions Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 26/92] kvm: x86: add kvm_mmu_nested_pagefault() Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-13 8:12 ` Paolo Bonzini 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 27/92] kvm: introspection: use page track Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-13 9:06 ` Paolo Bonzini 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 28/92] kvm: x86: consult the page tracking from kvm_mmu_get_page() and __direct_map() Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 29/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_CONTROL_EVENTS Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 30/92] kvm: x86: add kvm_spt_fault() Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 31/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_EVENT_PF Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 32/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_GET_PAGE_ACCESS Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 33/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_SET_PAGE_ACCESS Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 34/92] Documentation: Introduce EPT based Subpage Protection Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 35/92] KVM: VMX: Add control flags for SPP enabling Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 36/92] KVM: VMX: Implement functions for SPPT paging setup Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 37/92] KVM: VMX: Introduce SPP access bitmap and operation functions Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 38/92] KVM: VMX: Add init/set/get functions for SPP Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 39/92] KVM: VMX: Introduce SPP user-space IOCTLs Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 40/92] KVM: VMX: Handle SPP induced vmexit and page fault Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 41/92] KVM: MMU: Enable Lazy mode SPPT setup Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 42/92] KVM: MMU: Handle host memory remapping and reclaim Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 43/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_CONTROL_SPP Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 44/92] kvm: introspection: extend the internal database of tracked pages with write_bitmap info Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 45/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_GET_PAGE_WRITE_BITMAP Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 46/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_SET_PAGE_WRITE_BITMAP Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 47/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_READ_PHYSICAL and KVMI_WRITE_PHYSICAL Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 48/92] kvm: add kvm_vcpu_kick_and_wait() Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 49/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_PAUSE_VCPU and KVMI_EVENT_PAUSE_VCPU Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 50/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_GET_REGISTERS Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 51/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_SET_REGISTERS Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 52/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_GET_CPUID Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 53/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_INJECT_EXCEPTION + KVMI_EVENT_TRAP Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 54/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_CONTROL_CR and KVMI_EVENT_CR Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 55/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_CONTROL_MSR and KVMI_EVENT_MSR Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-12 21:05 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-08-15 6:36 ` Nicusor CITU 2019-08-19 18:36 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-08-20 8:44 ` Nicusor CITU 2019-08-20 11:43 ` Mihai Donțu 2019-08-21 15:18 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-08-19 18:52 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 56/92] kvm: x86: block any attempt to disable MSR interception if tracked by introspection Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 57/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_GET_XSAVE Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 58/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_GET_MTRR_TYPE Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 59/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_EVENT_XSETBV Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 60/92] kvm: x86: add kvm_arch_vcpu_set_guest_debug() Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 61/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_EVENT_BREAKPOINT Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 62/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_EVENT_HYPERCALL Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 63/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_EVENT_DESCRIPTOR Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 64/92] kvm: introspection: add single-stepping Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-12 20:50 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-08-13 12:51 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-14 12:36 ` Nicusor CITU 2019-08-14 12:53 ` Paolo Bonzini 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 65/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_EVENT_SINGLESTEP Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 66/92] kvm: introspection: add custom input when single-stepping a vCPU Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 67/92] kvm: introspection: use single stepping on unimplemented instructions Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 68/92] kvm: x86: emulate a guest page table walk on SPT violations due to A/D bit updates Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 69/92] kvm: x86: keep the page protected if tracked by the introspection tool Adalbert Lazăr 2019-09-10 14:26 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk 2019-09-10 16:28 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 70/92] kvm: x86: filter out access rights only when " Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-13 9:08 ` Paolo Bonzini 2019-08-13 16:06 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 71/92] mm: add support for remote mapping Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:24 ` DANGER WILL ROBINSON, DANGER Matthew Wilcox 2019-08-13 9:29 ` Paolo Bonzini 2019-08-13 11:24 ` Matthew Wilcox 2019-08-13 12:02 ` Paolo Bonzini 2019-08-13 11:01 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-15 19:19 ` Jerome Glisse 2019-08-15 20:16 ` Jerome Glisse 2019-08-16 17:45 ` Jason Gunthorpe 2019-08-23 12:39 ` Mircea CIRJALIU - MELIU 2019-09-05 18:09 ` Jerome Glisse 2019-09-09 17:00 ` Paolo Bonzini 2019-09-10 7:49 ` Mircea CIRJALIU - MELIU 2019-10-02 19:27 ` Jerome Glisse 2019-10-02 13:46 ` Paolo Bonzini 2019-10-02 14:15 ` Jerome Glisse 2019-10-02 16:18 ` Paolo Bonzini 2019-10-02 17:04 ` Jerome Glisse 2019-10-02 20:10 ` Paolo Bonzini 2019-10-03 15:42 ` Jerome Glisse 2019-10-03 15:50 ` Paolo Bonzini 2019-10-03 16:42 ` Mircea CIRJALIU - MELIU 2019-10-03 18:31 ` Jerome Glisse 2019-10-03 19:38 ` Paolo Bonzini 2019-10-04 9:41 ` Mircea CIRJALIU - MELIU 2019-10-04 11:46 ` Paolo Bonzini 2019-10-03 16:36 ` Mircea CIRJALIU - MELIU 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 72/92] kvm: introspection: add memory map/unmap support on the guest side Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 73/92] kvm: introspection: use remote mapping Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 74/92] kvm: x86: do not unconditionally patch the hypercall instruction during emulation Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-13 9:20 ` Paolo Bonzini 2019-08-14 12:07 ` Adalbert Lazăr [not found] ` <5d53f965.1c69fb81.cd952.035bSMTPIN_ADDED_BROKEN@mx.google.com> 2019-08-14 12:33 ` Paolo Bonzini [this message] 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 75/92] kvm: x86: disable gpa_available optimization in emulator_read_write_onepage() Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-13 8:47 ` Paolo Bonzini 2019-08-13 14:33 ` Adalbert Lazăr [not found] ` <5d52ca22.1c69fb81.4ceb8.e90bSMTPIN_ADDED_BROKEN@mx.google.com> 2019-08-13 14:35 ` Paolo Bonzini 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 76/92] kvm: x86: disable EPT A/D bits if introspection is present Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-13 9:18 ` Paolo Bonzini 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 77/92] kvm: introspection: add trace functions Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 78/92] kvm: x86: add tracepoints for interrupt and exception injections Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 79/92] kvm: x86: emulate movsd xmm, m64 Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-13 9:17 ` Paolo Bonzini 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 80/92] kvm: x86: emulate movss xmm, m32 Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 81/92] kvm: x86: emulate movq xmm, m64 Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 82/92] kvm: x86: emulate movq r, xmm Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 83/92] kvm: x86: emulate movd xmm, m32 Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 84/92] kvm: x86: enable the half part of movss, movsd, movups Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 85/92] kvm: x86: emulate lfence Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 86/92] kvm: x86: emulate xorpd xmm2/m128, xmm1 Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 87/92] kvm: x86: emulate xorps xmm/m128, xmm Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 88/92] kvm: x86: emulate fst/fstp m64fp Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 89/92] kvm: x86: make lock cmpxchg r, r/m atomic Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 90/92] kvm: x86: emulate lock cmpxchg8b atomically Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 91/92] kvm: x86: emulate lock cmpxchg16b m128 Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 92/92] kvm: x86: fallback to the single-step on multipage CMPXCHG emulation Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-12 18:23 ` [RFC PATCH v6 00/92] VM introspection Sean Christopherson 2019-08-12 21:40 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-08-13 9:34 ` Paolo Bonzini
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