From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from mail-qt0-f200.google.com (mail-qt0-f200.google.com [209.85.216.200]) by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id CC8E76B02B4 for ; Fri, 26 May 2017 00:16:27 -0400 (EDT) Received: by mail-qt0-f200.google.com with SMTP id l39so82222848qtb.9 for ; Thu, 25 May 2017 21:16:27 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mx1.redhat.com (mx1.redhat.com. [209.132.183.28]) by mx.google.com with ESMTPS id 1si5326203qkn.263.2017.05.25.21.16.26 for (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Thu, 25 May 2017 21:16:26 -0700 (PDT) Reply-To: xlpang@redhat.com Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 28/32] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME References: <20170418211612.10190.82788.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net> <20170418212121.10190.94885.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net> From: Xunlei Pang Message-ID: <5927AC6E.8080209@redhat.com> Date: Fri, 26 May 2017 12:17:50 +0800 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20170418212121.10190.94885.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org List-ID: To: Tom Lendacky , linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-mm@kvack.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org Cc: Thomas Gleixner , Rik van Riel , Brijesh Singh , Toshimitsu Kani , Arnd Bergmann , Jonathan Corbet , Matt Fleming , Joerg Roedel , =?UTF-8?B?UmFkaW0gS3LEjW3DocWZ?= , Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk , Andrey Ryabinin , Ingo Molnar , "Michael S. Tsirkin" , Andy Lutomirski , "H. Peter Anvin" , Borislav Petkov , Paolo Bonzini , Alexander Potapenko , Dave Young , Larry Woodman , Dmitry Vyukov On 04/19/2017 at 05:21 AM, Tom Lendacky wrote: > Provide support so that kexec can be used to boot a kernel when SME is > enabled. > > Support is needed to allocate pages for kexec without encryption. This > is needed in order to be able to reboot in the kernel in the same manner > as originally booted. Hi Tom, Looks like kdump will break, I didn't see the similar handling for kdump cases, see kernel: kimage_alloc_crash_control_pages(), kimage_load_crash_segment(), etc. We need to support kdump with SME, kdump kernel/initramfs/purgatory/elfcorehdr/etc are all loaded into the reserved memory(see crashkernel=X) by userspace kexec-tools. I think a straightforward way would be to mark the whole reserved memory range without encryption before loading all the kexec segments for kdump, I guess we can handle this easily in arch_kexec_unprotect_crashkres(). Moreover, now that "elfcorehdr=X" is left as decrypted, it needs to be remapped to the encrypted data. Regards, Xunlei > > Additionally, when shutting down all of the CPUs we need to be sure to > flush the caches and then halt. This is needed when booting from a state > where SME was not active into a state where SME is active (or vice-versa). > Without these steps, it is possible for cache lines to exist for the same > physical location but tagged both with and without the encryption bit. This > can cause random memory corruption when caches are flushed depending on > which cacheline is written last. > > Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky > --- > arch/x86/include/asm/init.h | 1 + > arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h | 5 +++++ > arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h | 8 ++++++++ > arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h | 1 + > arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- > arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++++-- > arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c | 11 +++++++---- > include/linux/kexec.h | 14 ++++++++++++++ > kernel/kexec_core.c | 7 +++++++ > 9 files changed, 101 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/init.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/init.h > index 737da62..b2ec511 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/init.h > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/init.h > @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ struct x86_mapping_info { > void *context; /* context for alloc_pgt_page */ > unsigned long pmd_flag; /* page flag for PMD entry */ > unsigned long offset; /* ident mapping offset */ > + unsigned long kernpg_flag; /* kernel pagetable flag override */ > }; > > int kernel_ident_mapping_init(struct x86_mapping_info *info, pgd_t *pgd_page, > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h > index ac7692d..38b5920 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h > @@ -58,6 +58,11 @@ static inline __cpuidle void native_halt(void) > asm volatile("hlt": : :"memory"); > } > > +static inline __cpuidle void native_wbinvd_halt(void) > +{ > + asm volatile("wbinvd; hlt" : : : "memory"); > +} > + > #endif > > #ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h > index 70ef205..e8183ac 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h > @@ -207,6 +207,14 @@ struct kexec_entry64_regs { > uint64_t r15; > uint64_t rip; > }; > + > +extern int arch_kexec_post_alloc_pages(void *vaddr, unsigned int pages, > + gfp_t gfp); > +#define arch_kexec_post_alloc_pages arch_kexec_post_alloc_pages > + > +extern void arch_kexec_pre_free_pages(void *vaddr, unsigned int pages); > +#define arch_kexec_pre_free_pages arch_kexec_pre_free_pages > + > #endif > > typedef void crash_vmclear_fn(void); > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h > index ce8cb1c..0f326f4 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h > @@ -213,6 +213,7 @@ enum page_cache_mode { > #define PAGE_KERNEL __pgprot(__PAGE_KERNEL | _PAGE_ENC) > #define PAGE_KERNEL_RO __pgprot(__PAGE_KERNEL_RO | _PAGE_ENC) > #define PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC __pgprot(__PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC | _PAGE_ENC) > +#define PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC_NOENC __pgprot(__PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC) > #define PAGE_KERNEL_RX __pgprot(__PAGE_KERNEL_RX | _PAGE_ENC) > #define PAGE_KERNEL_NOCACHE __pgprot(__PAGE_KERNEL_NOCACHE | _PAGE_ENC) > #define PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE __pgprot(__PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE | _PAGE_ENC) > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c > index 085c3b3..11c0ca9 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c > @@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ static int init_transition_pgtable(struct kimage *image, pgd_t *pgd) > set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(__pa(pte) | _KERNPG_TABLE)); > } > pte = pte_offset_kernel(pmd, vaddr); > - set_pte(pte, pfn_pte(paddr >> PAGE_SHIFT, PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC)); > + set_pte(pte, pfn_pte(paddr >> PAGE_SHIFT, PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC_NOENC)); > return 0; > err: > free_transition_pgtable(image); > @@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ static int init_pgtable(struct kimage *image, unsigned long start_pgtable) > .alloc_pgt_page = alloc_pgt_page, > .context = image, > .pmd_flag = __PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_EXEC, > + .kernpg_flag = _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC, > }; > unsigned long mstart, mend; > pgd_t *level4p; > @@ -597,3 +598,35 @@ void arch_kexec_unprotect_crashkres(void) > { > kexec_mark_crashkres(false); > } > + > +int arch_kexec_post_alloc_pages(void *vaddr, unsigned int pages, gfp_t gfp) > +{ > + int ret; > + > + if (sme_active()) { > + /* > + * If SME is active we need to be sure that kexec pages are > + * not encrypted because when we boot to the new kernel the > + * pages won't be accessed encrypted (initially). > + */ > + ret = set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)vaddr, pages); > + if (ret) > + return ret; > + > + if (gfp & __GFP_ZERO) > + memset(vaddr, 0, pages * PAGE_SIZE); > + } > + > + return 0; > +} > + > +void arch_kexec_pre_free_pages(void *vaddr, unsigned int pages) > +{ > + if (sme_active()) { > + /* > + * If SME is active we need to reset the pages back to being > + * an encrypted mapping before freeing them. > + */ > + set_memory_encrypted((unsigned long)vaddr, pages); > + } > +} > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c > index 0bb8842..f4e5de6 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c > @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ > #include > #include > #include > +#include > #include > #include > #include > @@ -355,8 +356,25 @@ bool xen_set_default_idle(void) > return ret; > } > #endif > + > void stop_this_cpu(void *dummy) > { > + bool do_wbinvd_halt = false; > + > + if (kexec_in_progress && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SME)) { > + /* > + * If we are performing a kexec and the processor supports > + * SME then we need to clear out cache information before > + * halting. With kexec, going from SME inactive to SME active > + * requires clearing cache entries so that addresses without > + * the encryption bit set don't corrupt the same physical > + * address that has the encryption bit set when caches are > + * flushed. Perform a wbinvd followed by a halt to achieve > + * this. > + */ > + do_wbinvd_halt = true; > + } > + > local_irq_disable(); > /* > * Remove this CPU: > @@ -365,8 +383,12 @@ void stop_this_cpu(void *dummy) > disable_local_APIC(); > mcheck_cpu_clear(this_cpu_ptr(&cpu_info)); > > - for (;;) > - halt(); > + for (;;) { > + if (do_wbinvd_halt) > + native_wbinvd_halt(); > + else > + halt(); > + } > } > > /* > diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c b/arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c > index 04210a2..2c9fd3e 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c > +++ b/arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c > @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ static void ident_pmd_init(struct x86_mapping_info *info, pmd_t *pmd_page, > static int ident_pud_init(struct x86_mapping_info *info, pud_t *pud_page, > unsigned long addr, unsigned long end) > { > + unsigned long kernpg_flag = info->kernpg_flag ? : _KERNPG_TABLE; > unsigned long next; > > for (; addr < end; addr = next) { > @@ -39,7 +40,7 @@ static int ident_pud_init(struct x86_mapping_info *info, pud_t *pud_page, > if (!pmd) > return -ENOMEM; > ident_pmd_init(info, pmd, addr, next); > - set_pud(pud, __pud(__pa(pmd) | _KERNPG_TABLE)); > + set_pud(pud, __pud(__pa(pmd) | kernpg_flag)); > } > > return 0; > @@ -48,6 +49,7 @@ static int ident_pud_init(struct x86_mapping_info *info, pud_t *pud_page, > static int ident_p4d_init(struct x86_mapping_info *info, p4d_t *p4d_page, > unsigned long addr, unsigned long end) > { > + unsigned long kernpg_flag = info->kernpg_flag ? : _KERNPG_TABLE; > unsigned long next; > > for (; addr < end; addr = next) { > @@ -67,7 +69,7 @@ static int ident_p4d_init(struct x86_mapping_info *info, p4d_t *p4d_page, > if (!pud) > return -ENOMEM; > ident_pud_init(info, pud, addr, next); > - set_p4d(p4d, __p4d(__pa(pud) | _KERNPG_TABLE)); > + set_p4d(p4d, __p4d(__pa(pud) | kernpg_flag)); > } > > return 0; > @@ -76,6 +78,7 @@ static int ident_p4d_init(struct x86_mapping_info *info, p4d_t *p4d_page, > int kernel_ident_mapping_init(struct x86_mapping_info *info, pgd_t *pgd_page, > unsigned long pstart, unsigned long pend) > { > + unsigned long kernpg_flag = info->kernpg_flag ? : _KERNPG_TABLE; > unsigned long addr = pstart + info->offset; > unsigned long end = pend + info->offset; > unsigned long next; > @@ -104,14 +107,14 @@ int kernel_ident_mapping_init(struct x86_mapping_info *info, pgd_t *pgd_page, > if (result) > return result; > if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL)) { > - set_pgd(pgd, __pgd(__pa(p4d) | _KERNPG_TABLE)); > + set_pgd(pgd, __pgd(__pa(p4d) | kernpg_flag)); > } else { > /* > * With p4d folded, pgd is equal to p4d. > * The pgd entry has to point to the pud page table in this case. > */ > pud_t *pud = pud_offset(p4d, 0); > - set_pgd(pgd, __pgd(__pa(pud) | _KERNPG_TABLE)); > + set_pgd(pgd, __pgd(__pa(pud) | kernpg_flag)); > } > } > > diff --git a/include/linux/kexec.h b/include/linux/kexec.h > index d419d0e..1c76e3b 100644 > --- a/include/linux/kexec.h > +++ b/include/linux/kexec.h > @@ -383,6 +383,20 @@ static inline void *boot_phys_to_virt(unsigned long entry) > return phys_to_virt(boot_phys_to_phys(entry)); > } > > +#ifndef arch_kexec_post_alloc_pages > +static inline int arch_kexec_post_alloc_pages(void *vaddr, unsigned int pages, > + gfp_t gfp) > +{ > + return 0; > +} > +#endif > + > +#ifndef arch_kexec_pre_free_pages > +static inline void arch_kexec_pre_free_pages(void *vaddr, unsigned int pages) > +{ > +} > +#endif > + > #else /* !CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE */ > struct pt_regs; > struct task_struct; > diff --git a/kernel/kexec_core.c b/kernel/kexec_core.c > index bfe62d5..bb5e7e3 100644 > --- a/kernel/kexec_core.c > +++ b/kernel/kexec_core.c > @@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ > #include > #include > #include > +#include > > #include > #include > @@ -315,6 +316,9 @@ static struct page *kimage_alloc_pages(gfp_t gfp_mask, unsigned int order) > count = 1 << order; > for (i = 0; i < count; i++) > SetPageReserved(pages + i); > + > + arch_kexec_post_alloc_pages(page_address(pages), count, > + gfp_mask); > } > > return pages; > @@ -326,6 +330,9 @@ static void kimage_free_pages(struct page *page) > > order = page_private(page); > count = 1 << order; > + > + arch_kexec_pre_free_pages(page_address(page), count); > + > for (i = 0; i < count; i++) > ClearPageReserved(page + i); > __free_pages(page, order); > > > _______________________________________________ > kexec mailing list > kexec@lists.infradead.org > http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec -- To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to majordomo@kvack.org. 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