From: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
To: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
x86@kernel.org, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
"H . J . Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>,
"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>,
kcc@google.com, eranian@google.com, rppt@kernel.org,
jamorris@linux.microsoft.com, dethoma@microsoft.com,
akpm@linux-foundation.org, Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com,
christina.schimpe@intel.com
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 10/39] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW
Date: Mon, 23 Jan 2023 10:16:37 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <5ddbd710-1b4d-71ed-8dfe-928449a6f635@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230119212317.8324-11-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
On 19.01.23 22:22, Rick Edgecombe wrote:
> Some OSes have a greater dependence on software available bits in PTEs than
> Linux. That left the hardware architects looking for a way to represent a
> new memory type (shadow stack) within the existing bits. They chose to
> repurpose a lightly-used state: Write=0,Dirty=1. So in order to support
> shadow stack memory, Linux should avoid creating memory with this PTE bit
> combination unless it intends for it to be shadow stack.
>
> The reason it's lightly used is that Dirty=1 is normally set by HW
> _before_ a write. A write with a Write=0 PTE would typically only generate
> a fault, not set Dirty=1. Hardware can (rarely) both set Dirty=1 *and*
> generate the fault, resulting in a Write=0,Dirty=1 PTE. Hardware which
> supports shadow stacks will no longer exhibit this oddity.
>
> So that leaves Write=0,Dirty=1 PTEs created in software. To achieve this,
> in places where Linux normally creates Write=0,Dirty=1, it can use the
> software-defined _PAGE_COW in place of the hardware _PAGE_DIRTY. In other
> words, whenever Linux needs to create Write=0,Dirty=1, it instead creates
> Write=0,Cow=1 except for shadow stack, which is Write=0,Dirty=1.
> Further differentiated by VMA flags, these PTE bit combinations would be
> set as follows for various types of memory:
>
> (Write=0,Cow=1,Dirty=0):
> - A modified, copy-on-write (COW) page. Previously when a typical
> anonymous writable mapping was made COW via fork(), the kernel would
> mark it Write=0,Dirty=1. Now it will instead use the Cow bit. This
> happens in copy_present_pte().
> - A R/O page that has been COW'ed. The user page is in a R/O VMA,
> and get_user_pages(FOLL_FORCE) needs a writable copy. The page fault
> handler creates a copy of the page and sets the new copy's PTE as
> Write=0 and Cow=1.
> - A shared shadow stack PTE. When a shadow stack page is being shared
> among processes (this happens at fork()), its PTE is made Dirty=0, so
> the next shadow stack access causes a fault, and the page is
> duplicated and Dirty=1 is set again. This is the COW equivalent for
> shadow stack pages, even though it's copy-on-access rather than
> copy-on-write.
>
> (Write=0,Cow=0,Dirty=1):
> - A shadow stack PTE.
> - A Cow PTE created when a processor without shadow stack support set
> Dirty=1.
>
> There are six bits left available to software in the 64-bit PTE after
> consuming a bit for _PAGE_COW. No space is consumed in 32-bit kernels
> because shadow stacks are not enabled there.
>
> Implement only the infrastructure for _PAGE_COW. Changes to start
> creating _PAGE_COW PTEs will follow once other pieces are in place.
>
> Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
> Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
> Co-developed-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
> ---
>
> v5:
> - Fix log, comments and whitespace (Boris)
> - Remove capitalization on shadow stack (Boris)
>
> v4:
> - Teach pte_flags_need_flush() about _PAGE_COW bit
> - Break apart patch for better bisectability
>
> v3:
> - Add comment around _PAGE_TABLE in response to comment
> from (Andrew Cooper)
> - Check for PSE in pmd_shstk (Andrew Cooper)
> - Get to the point quicker in commit log (Andrew Cooper)
> - Clarify and reorder commit log for why the PTE bit examples have
> multiple entries. Apply same changes for comment. (peterz)
> - Fix comment that implied dirty bit for COW was a specific x86 thing
> (peterz)
> - Fix swapping of Write/Dirty (PeterZ)
>
> v2:
> - Update commit log with comments (Dave Hansen)
> - Add comments in code to explain pte modification code better (Dave)
> - Clarify info on the meaning of various Write,Cow,Dirty combinations
>
> arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 78 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h | 59 +++++++++++++++++++--
> arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h | 3 +-
> 3 files changed, 134 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
> index b39f16c0d507..6d2f612c04b5 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
> @@ -301,6 +301,44 @@ static inline pte_t pte_clear_flags(pte_t pte, pteval_t clear)
> return native_make_pte(v & ~clear);
> }
>
> +/*
> + * Normally COW memory can result in Dirty=1,Write=0 PTEs. But in the case
> + * of X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK, the software COW bit is used, since the
> + * Dirty=1,Write=0 will result in the memory being treated as shadow stack
> + * by the HW. So when creating COW memory, a software bit is used
> + * _PAGE_BIT_COW. The following functions pte_mkcow() and pte_clear_cow()
> + * take a PTE marked conventionally COW (Dirty=1) and transition it to the
> + * shadow stack compatible version of COW (Cow=1).
> + */
> +static inline pte_t pte_mkcow(pte_t pte)
> +{
> + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK))
> + return pte;
> +
> + pte = pte_clear_flags(pte, _PAGE_DIRTY);
> + return pte_set_flags(pte, _PAGE_COW);
> +}
> +
> +static inline pte_t pte_clear_cow(pte_t pte)
> +{
> + /*
> + * _PAGE_COW is unnecessary on !X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK kernels, since
> + * the HW dirty bit can be used without creating shadow stack memory.
> + * See the _PAGE_COW definition for more details.
> + */
> + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK))
> + return pte;
> +
> + /*
> + * PTE is getting copied-on-write, so it will be dirtied
> + * if writable, or made shadow stack if shadow stack and
> + * being copied on access. Set the dirty bit for both
> + * cases.
> + */
> + pte = pte_set_flags(pte, _PAGE_DIRTY);
> + return pte_clear_flags(pte, _PAGE_COW);
> +}
> +
> #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_USERFAULTFD_WP
> static inline int pte_uffd_wp(pte_t pte)
> {
> @@ -413,6 +451,26 @@ static inline pmd_t pmd_clear_flags(pmd_t pmd, pmdval_t clear)
> return native_make_pmd(v & ~clear);
> }
>
> +/* See comments above pte_mkcow() */
> +static inline pmd_t pmd_mkcow(pmd_t pmd)
> +{
> + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK))
> + return pmd;
> +
> + pmd = pmd_clear_flags(pmd, _PAGE_DIRTY);
> + return pmd_set_flags(pmd, _PAGE_COW);
> +}
> +
> +/* See comments above pte_mkcow() */
> +static inline pmd_t pmd_clear_cow(pmd_t pmd)
> +{
> + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK))
> + return pmd;
> +
> + pmd = pmd_set_flags(pmd, _PAGE_DIRTY);
> + return pmd_clear_flags(pmd, _PAGE_COW);
> +}
> +
> #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_USERFAULTFD_WP
> static inline int pmd_uffd_wp(pmd_t pmd)
> {
> @@ -484,6 +542,26 @@ static inline pud_t pud_clear_flags(pud_t pud, pudval_t clear)
> return native_make_pud(v & ~clear);
> }
>
> +/* See comments above pte_mkcow() */
> +static inline pud_t pud_mkcow(pud_t pud)
> +{
> + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK))
> + return pud;
> +
> + pud = pud_clear_flags(pud, _PAGE_DIRTY);
> + return pud_set_flags(pud, _PAGE_COW);
> +}
> +
> +/* See comments above pte_mkcow() */
> +static inline pud_t pud_clear_cow(pud_t pud)
> +{
> + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK))
> + return pud;
> +
> + pud = pud_set_flags(pud, _PAGE_DIRTY);
> + return pud_clear_flags(pud, _PAGE_COW);
> +}
> +
> static inline pud_t pud_mkold(pud_t pud)
> {
> return pud_clear_flags(pud, _PAGE_ACCESSED);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
> index 0646ad00178b..5c3f942865d9 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
> @@ -21,7 +21,8 @@
> #define _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW2 10 /* " */
> #define _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW3 11 /* " */
> #define _PAGE_BIT_PAT_LARGE 12 /* On 2MB or 1GB pages */
> -#define _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW4 58 /* available for programmer */
> +#define _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW4 57 /* available for programmer */
> +#define _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW5 58 /* available for programmer */
> #define _PAGE_BIT_PKEY_BIT0 59 /* Protection Keys, bit 1/4 */
> #define _PAGE_BIT_PKEY_BIT1 60 /* Protection Keys, bit 2/4 */
> #define _PAGE_BIT_PKEY_BIT2 61 /* Protection Keys, bit 3/4 */
> @@ -34,6 +35,15 @@
> #define _PAGE_BIT_SOFT_DIRTY _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW3 /* software dirty tracking */
> #define _PAGE_BIT_DEVMAP _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW4
>
> +/*
> + * Indicates a copy-on-write page.
> + */
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK
> +#define _PAGE_BIT_COW _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW5 /* copy-on-write */
> +#else
> +#define _PAGE_BIT_COW 0
> +#endif
> +
> /* If _PAGE_BIT_PRESENT is clear, we use these: */
> /* - if the user mapped it with PROT_NONE; pte_present gives true */
> #define _PAGE_BIT_PROTNONE _PAGE_BIT_GLOBAL
> @@ -117,6 +127,40 @@
> #define _PAGE_SOFTW4 (_AT(pteval_t, 0))
> #endif
>
> +/*
> + * The hardware requires shadow stack to be read-only and Dirty.
> + * _PAGE_COW is a software-only bit used to separate copy-on-write PTEs
> + * from shadow stack PTEs:
Is that really required?
For anon pages, we have PG_anon_exclusive, that can tell you whether the
page is "certainly exclusive" (now cow necessary) vs. "maybe shared"
(cow maybe necessary).
Why isn't that sufficient to make the same decisions here?
--
Thanks,
David / dhildenb
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-01-23 9:16 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 120+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-01-19 21:22 [PATCH v5 00/39] Shadow stacks for userspace Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-19 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 01/39] Documentation/x86: Add CET shadow stack description Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-20 0:38 ` Kees Cook
2023-01-19 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 02/39] x86/shstk: Add Kconfig option for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-20 0:40 ` Kees Cook
2023-01-19 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 03/39] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPU feature flags for shadow stacks Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-20 0:44 ` Kees Cook
2023-01-19 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 04/39] x86/cpufeatures: Enable CET CR4 bit for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-20 0:46 ` Kees Cook
2023-01-19 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 05/39] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-20 0:46 ` Kees Cook
2023-01-19 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 06/39] x86/fpu: Add helper for modifying xstate Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-20 0:47 ` Kees Cook
2023-02-01 11:01 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-01 17:31 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-01 18:18 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-01-19 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 07/39] x86: Add user control-protection fault handler Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-20 0:50 ` Kees Cook
2023-02-03 19:09 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-03 19:24 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-03 19:44 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-03 23:01 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-04 10:37 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-01-19 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 08/39] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY from kernel RO pages Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-20 0:52 ` Kees Cook
2023-01-19 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 09/39] x86/mm: Move pmd_write(), pud_write() up in the file Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-19 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 10/39] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-20 0:55 ` Kees Cook
2023-01-23 9:16 ` David Hildenbrand [this message]
2023-01-23 9:28 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-01-23 20:56 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-01-24 16:28 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-01-19 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 11/39] x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-20 0:57 ` Kees Cook
2023-02-09 14:08 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-09 17:09 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-10 13:57 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-10 17:00 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-17 16:11 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-17 16:53 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-01-19 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 12/39] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_COW Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-20 0:58 ` Kees Cook
2023-01-19 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 13/39] x86/mm: Start actually marking _PAGE_COW Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-19 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 14/39] mm: Move VM_UFFD_MINOR_BIT from 37 to 38 Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-19 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 15/39] mm: Introduce VM_SHADOW_STACK for shadow stack memory Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-19 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 16/39] x86/mm: Check shadow stack page fault errors Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-20 0:59 ` Kees Cook
2023-01-19 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 17/39] x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-19 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 18/39] mm: Handle faultless write upgrades for shstk Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-23 9:50 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-01-23 20:47 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-01-24 16:24 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-01-24 18:14 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-01-25 9:27 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-01-25 18:43 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-01-26 0:59 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-01-26 8:46 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-01-26 20:19 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-01-27 16:12 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-01-28 0:51 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-01-31 8:46 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-01-31 23:33 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-01 9:03 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-02-01 17:32 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-01 18:03 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-01-26 8:57 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-01-26 20:16 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-01-27 16:19 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-01-19 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 19/39] mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-20 1:01 ` Kees Cook
2023-02-14 0:09 ` Deepak Gupta
2023-02-14 1:07 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-14 6:10 ` Deepak Gupta
2023-02-14 18:24 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-15 6:37 ` Deepak Gupta
2023-01-19 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 20/39] mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-19 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 21/39] mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-19 21:23 ` [PATCH v5 22/39] mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap() Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-19 21:23 ` [PATCH v5 23/39] mm: Don't allow write GUPs to shadow stack memory Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-23 9:10 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-01-23 10:45 ` Florian Weimer
2023-01-23 20:46 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-01-24 16:26 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-01-24 18:42 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-01-24 23:08 ` Kees Cook
2023-01-24 23:41 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-01-25 9:29 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-01-25 15:23 ` Kees Cook
2023-01-25 15:36 ` Schimpe, Christina
2023-01-25 16:43 ` Schimpe, Christina
2023-01-19 21:23 ` [PATCH v5 24/39] x86/mm: Introduce MAP_ABOVE4G Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-19 21:23 ` [PATCH v5 25/39] mm: Warn on shadow stack memory in wrong vma Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-20 1:01 ` Kees Cook
2023-01-19 21:23 ` [PATCH v5 26/39] x86: Introduce userspace API for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-20 1:04 ` Kees Cook
2023-01-19 21:23 ` [PATCH v5 27/39] x86/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack support Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-20 1:05 ` Kees Cook
2023-01-19 21:23 ` [PATCH v5 28/39] x86/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-19 21:23 ` [PATCH v5 29/39] x86/shstk: Introduce routines modifying shstk Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-20 1:05 ` Kees Cook
2023-01-19 21:23 ` [PATCH v5 30/39] x86/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-19 21:23 ` [PATCH v5 31/39] x86/shstk: Introduce map_shadow_stack syscall Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-20 1:07 ` Kees Cook
2023-01-19 21:23 ` [PATCH v5 32/39] x86/shstk: Support WRSS for userspace Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-20 1:06 ` Kees Cook
2023-01-19 21:23 ` [PATCH v5 33/39] x86: Expose thread features in /proc/$PID/status Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-19 21:23 ` [PATCH v5 34/39] x86/shstk: Wire in shadow stack interface Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-19 21:23 ` [PATCH v5 35/39] selftests/x86: Add shadow stack test Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-19 21:23 ` [PATCH v5 36/39] x86/fpu: Add helper for initing features Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-19 21:23 ` [PATCH v5 37/39] x86: Add PTRACE interface for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-20 1:08 ` Kees Cook
2023-01-19 21:23 ` [PATCH v5 38/39] x86/shstk: Add ARCH_SHSTK_UNLOCK Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-19 21:23 ` [PATCH v5 39/39] x86/shstk: Add ARCH_SHSTK_STATUS Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-20 1:08 ` Kees Cook
2023-01-19 22:26 ` [PATCH v5 00/39] Shadow stacks for userspace Andrew Morton
2023-01-20 17:27 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-01-20 19:19 ` Kees Cook
2023-01-25 19:46 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-01-20 17:48 ` John Allen
2023-01-22 8:20 ` Mike Rapoport
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