From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
To: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>,
Jonathan Adams <jwadams@google.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
x86@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 2/7] x86/sci: add core implementation for system call isolation
Date: Fri, 26 Apr 2019 07:46:18 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <627d9321-466f-c4ed-c658-6b8567648dc6@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1556228754-12996-3-git-send-email-rppt@linux.ibm.com>
On 4/25/19 2:45 PM, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> After the isolated system call finishes, the mappings created during its
> execution are cleared.
Yikes. I guess that stops someone from calling write() a bunch of times
on every filesystem using every block device driver and all the DM code
to get a lot of code/data faulted in. But, it also means not even
long-running processes will ever have a chance of behaving anything
close to normally.
Is this something you think can be rectified or is there something
fundamental that would keep SCI page tables from being cached across
different invocations of the same syscall?
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-04-26 14:46 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 41+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-04-25 21:45 [RFC PATCH 0/7] x86: introduce system calls addess space isolation Mike Rapoport
2019-04-25 21:45 ` [RFC PATCH 1/7] x86/cpufeatures: add X86_FEATURE_SCI Mike Rapoport
2019-04-25 21:45 ` [RFC PATCH 2/7] x86/sci: add core implementation for system call isolation Mike Rapoport
2019-04-26 7:49 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-04-28 5:45 ` Mike Rapoport
2019-04-26 8:31 ` Ingo Molnar
2019-04-26 9:58 ` Ingo Molnar
2019-04-26 21:26 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-04-27 8:47 ` Ingo Molnar
2019-04-27 10:46 ` Ingo Molnar
2019-04-29 18:26 ` James Morris
2019-04-29 18:43 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-04-29 18:46 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-04-30 5:03 ` Ingo Molnar
2019-04-30 9:38 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-04-30 11:05 ` Ingo Molnar
2019-05-02 11:35 ` Robert O'Callahan
2019-05-02 15:20 ` Ingo Molnar
2019-05-02 21:07 ` Robert O'Callahan
2019-04-26 14:44 ` James Bottomley
2019-04-26 14:46 ` Dave Hansen [this message]
2019-04-26 14:57 ` James Bottomley
2019-04-26 15:07 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-04-26 15:19 ` James Bottomley
2019-04-26 17:40 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-04-26 18:49 ` James Bottomley
2019-04-26 19:22 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-04-25 21:45 ` [RFC PATCH 3/7] x86/entry/64: add infrastructure for switching to isolated syscall context Mike Rapoport
2019-04-25 21:45 ` [RFC PATCH 4/7] x86/sci: hook up isolated system call entry and exit Mike Rapoport
2019-04-25 21:45 ` [RFC PATCH 5/7] x86/mm/fault: hook up SCI verification Mike Rapoport
2019-04-26 7:42 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-04-28 5:47 ` Mike Rapoport
2019-04-30 16:44 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-05-01 5:39 ` Mike Rapoport
2019-04-25 21:45 ` [RFC PATCH 6/7] security: enable system call isolation in kernel config Mike Rapoport
2019-04-25 21:45 ` [RFC PATCH 7/7] sci: add example system calls to exercse SCI Mike Rapoport
2019-04-26 0:30 ` [RFC PATCH 0/7] x86: introduce system calls addess space isolation Andy Lutomirski
2019-04-26 8:07 ` Jiri Kosina
2019-04-28 6:01 ` Mike Rapoport
2019-04-26 14:41 ` Dave Hansen
2019-04-28 6:08 ` Mike Rapoport
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