From: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
To: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>,
Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>,
Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>,
Serban Constantinescu <serbanc@google.com>,
Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
Elena Petrova <lenaptr@google.com>,
Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com>,
Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
kasan-dev@googlegroups.com,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH RFC v2 12/21] kasan: inline and rename kasan_unpoison_memory
Date: Thu, 22 Oct 2020 15:19:04 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <6f87cb86aeeca9f4148d435ff01ad7d21af4bdfc.1603372719.git.andreyknvl@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1603372719.git.andreyknvl@google.com>
Currently kasan_unpoison_memory() is used as both an external annotation
and as internal memory poisoning helper. Rename external annotation to
kasan_unpoison_data() and inline the internal helper for for hardware
tag-based mode to avoid undeeded function calls.
There's the external annotation kasan_unpoison_slab() that is currently
defined as static inline and uses kasan_unpoison_memory(). With this
change it's turned into a function call. Overall, this results in the
same number of calls for hardware tag-based mode as
kasan_unpoison_memory() is now inlined.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Ia7c8b659f79209935cbaab3913bf7f082cc43a0e
---
include/linux/kasan.h | 16 ++++++----------
kernel/fork.c | 2 +-
mm/kasan/common.c | 10 ++++++++++
mm/kasan/hw_tags.c | 6 ------
mm/kasan/kasan.h | 7 +++++++
mm/slab_common.c | 2 +-
6 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/kasan.h b/include/linux/kasan.h
index 6377d7d3a951..2b9023224474 100644
--- a/include/linux/kasan.h
+++ b/include/linux/kasan.h
@@ -66,14 +66,15 @@ static inline void kasan_disable_current(void) {}
#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
-void kasan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size);
-
void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order);
void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order);
void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size,
slab_flags_t *flags);
+void kasan_unpoison_data(const void *address, size_t size);
+void kasan_unpoison_slab(const void *ptr);
+
void kasan_poison_slab(struct page *page);
void kasan_unpoison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object);
void kasan_poison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object);
@@ -98,11 +99,6 @@ struct kasan_cache {
int free_meta_offset;
};
-size_t __ksize(const void *);
-static inline void kasan_unpoison_slab(const void *ptr)
-{
- kasan_unpoison_memory(ptr, __ksize(ptr));
-}
size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache);
bool kasan_save_enable_multi_shot(void);
@@ -110,8 +106,6 @@ void kasan_restore_multi_shot(bool enabled);
#else /* CONFIG_KASAN */
-static inline void kasan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size) {}
-
static inline void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order) {}
static inline void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order) {}
@@ -119,6 +113,9 @@ static inline void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache,
unsigned int *size,
slab_flags_t *flags) {}
+static inline void kasan_unpoison_data(const void *address, size_t size) { }
+static inline void kasan_unpoison_slab(const void *ptr) { }
+
static inline void kasan_poison_slab(struct page *page) {}
static inline void kasan_unpoison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache,
void *object) {}
@@ -158,7 +155,6 @@ static inline bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object,
return false;
}
-static inline void kasan_unpoison_slab(const void *ptr) { }
static inline size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache) { return 0; }
#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN */
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index b41fecca59d7..858d78eee6ec 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ static unsigned long *alloc_thread_stack_node(struct task_struct *tsk, int node)
continue;
/* Mark stack accessible for KASAN. */
- kasan_unpoison_memory(s->addr, THREAD_SIZE);
+ kasan_unpoison_data(s->addr, THREAD_SIZE);
/* Clear stale pointers from reused stack. */
memset(s->addr, 0, THREAD_SIZE);
diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c
index 9008fc6b0810..1a5e6c279a72 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/common.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/common.c
@@ -184,6 +184,16 @@ struct kasan_free_meta *kasan_get_free_meta(struct kmem_cache *cache,
return (void *)reset_tag(object) + cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset;
}
+void kasan_unpoison_data(const void *address, size_t size)
+{
+ kasan_unpoison_memory(address, size);
+}
+
+void kasan_unpoison_slab(const void *ptr)
+{
+ kasan_unpoison_memory(ptr, __ksize(ptr));
+}
+
void kasan_poison_slab(struct page *page)
{
unsigned long i;
diff --git a/mm/kasan/hw_tags.c b/mm/kasan/hw_tags.c
index f03161f3da19..915142da6b57 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/hw_tags.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/hw_tags.c
@@ -24,12 +24,6 @@ void __init kasan_init_tags(void)
pr_info("KernelAddressSanitizer initialized\n");
}
-void kasan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size)
-{
- set_mem_tag_range(reset_tag(address),
- round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE), get_tag(address));
-}
-
void kasan_set_free_info(struct kmem_cache *cache,
void *object, u8 tag)
{
diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan.h b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
index 8d84ae6f58f1..da08b2533d73 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/kasan.h
+++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
@@ -280,6 +280,12 @@ static inline void kasan_poison_memory(const void *address, size_t size, u8 valu
round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE), value);
}
+static inline void kasan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size)
+{
+ set_mem_tag_range(reset_tag(address),
+ round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE), get_tag(address));
+}
+
static inline bool check_invalid_free(void *addr)
{
u8 ptr_tag = get_tag(addr);
@@ -292,6 +298,7 @@ static inline bool check_invalid_free(void *addr)
#else /* CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */
void kasan_poison_memory(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value);
+void kasan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size);
bool check_invalid_free(void *addr);
#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */
diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c
index 53d0f8bb57ea..f1b0c4a22f08 100644
--- a/mm/slab_common.c
+++ b/mm/slab_common.c
@@ -1176,7 +1176,7 @@ size_t ksize(const void *objp)
* We assume that ksize callers could use whole allocated area,
* so we need to unpoison this area.
*/
- kasan_unpoison_memory(objp, size);
+ kasan_unpoison_data(objp, size);
return size;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ksize);
--
2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-10-22 13:20 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 71+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-10-22 13:18 [PATCH RFC v2 00/21] kasan: hardware tag-based mode for production use on arm64 Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-22 13:18 ` [PATCH RFC v2 01/21] kasan: simplify quarantine_put call site Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-27 12:40 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-10-22 13:18 ` [PATCH RFC v2 02/21] kasan: rename get_alloc/free_info Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-27 12:40 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-10-22 13:18 ` [PATCH RFC v2 03/21] kasan: introduce set_alloc_info Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-27 12:41 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-10-22 13:18 ` [PATCH RFC v2 04/21] kasan: unpoison stack only with CONFIG_KASAN_STACK Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-27 12:44 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-10-27 12:45 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-10-29 19:57 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-16 10:59 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-11-16 11:50 ` Marco Elver
2020-11-16 12:16 ` Catalin Marinas
2020-11-16 12:19 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-11-16 12:45 ` Vincenzo Frascino
2020-11-16 13:50 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-16 14:50 ` Vincenzo Frascino
2020-10-22 13:18 ` [PATCH RFC v2 05/21] kasan: allow VMAP_STACK for HW_TAGS mode Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-27 12:49 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-10-29 20:00 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-22 13:18 ` [PATCH RFC v2 06/21] kasan: mark kasan_init_tags as __init Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-28 10:08 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-10-29 20:08 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-22 13:18 ` [PATCH RFC v2 07/21] kasan, arm64: move initialization message Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-28 10:55 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-10-29 20:14 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-03 15:33 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-22 13:19 ` [PATCH RFC v2 08/21] kasan: remove __kasan_unpoison_stack Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-28 10:57 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-10-22 13:19 ` [PATCH RFC v2 09/21] kasan: inline kasan_reset_tag for tag-based modes Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-28 11:05 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-10-30 16:19 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-22 13:19 ` [PATCH RFC v2 10/21] kasan: inline random_tag for HW_TAGS Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-28 11:08 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-10-30 15:48 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-30 16:07 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-22 13:19 ` [PATCH RFC v2 11/21] kasan: inline kasan_poison_memory and check_invalid_free Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-28 11:29 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-10-22 13:19 ` Andrey Konovalov [this message]
2020-10-28 11:36 ` [PATCH RFC v2 12/21] kasan: inline and rename kasan_unpoison_memory Dmitry Vyukov
2020-10-30 16:34 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-30 17:46 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-10-22 13:19 ` [PATCH RFC v2 13/21] arm64: kasan: Add cpu_supports_tags helper Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-28 11:38 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-10-22 13:19 ` [PATCH RFC v2 14/21] kasan: add and integrate kasan boot parameters Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-22 18:50 ` Marco Elver
2020-10-22 20:28 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-28 12:27 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-10-30 19:30 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-30 14:45 ` Marco Elver
2020-10-30 19:30 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-22 13:19 ` [PATCH RFC v2 15/21] kasan: check kasan_enabled in annotations Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-28 16:47 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-10-30 19:47 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-22 13:19 ` [PATCH RFC v2 16/21] kasan: optimize poisoning in kmalloc and krealloc Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-28 16:55 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-11-02 15:17 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-22 13:19 ` [PATCH RFC v2 17/21] kasan: simplify kasan_poison_kfree Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-28 16:57 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-10-22 13:19 ` [PATCH RFC v2 18/21] kasan: rename kasan_poison_kfree Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-28 16:58 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-10-22 13:19 ` [PATCH RFC v2 19/21] kasan: don't round_up too much Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-28 17:01 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-10-22 13:19 ` [PATCH RFC v2 20/21] kasan: simplify assign_tag and set_tag calls Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-28 17:03 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-10-22 13:19 ` [PATCH RFC v2 21/21] kasan: clarify comment in __kasan_kfree_large Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-28 17:04 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-10-22 15:15 ` [PATCH RFC v2 00/21] kasan: hardware tag-based mode for production use on arm64 Dmitry Vyukov
2020-10-22 17:00 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-22 18:29 ` Kostya Serebryany
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