From: David Laight <David.Laight@ACULAB.COM>
To: 'Christopher Lameter' <cl@linux.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>,
"Vitaly Nikolenko" <vnik@duasynt.com>,
Silvio Cesare <silvio.cesare@gmail.com>,
"linux-mm@kvack.org" <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: RE: [PATCH] slub: Relocate freelist pointer to middle of object
Date: Wed, 11 Mar 2020 14:48:05 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <6fbf67b5936a44feaf9ad5b58d39082b@AcuMS.aculab.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <alpine.DEB.2.21.2003081919290.14266@www.lameter.com>
From: Christopher Lameter
> Sent: 08 March 2020 19:21
>
> On Thu, 5 Mar 2020, Kees Cook wrote:
>
> > Instead of having the freelist pointer at the very beginning of an
> > allocation (offset 0) or at the very end of an allocation (effectively
> > offset -sizeof(void *) from the next allocation), move it away from
> > the edges of the allocation and into the middle. This provides some
> > protection against small-sized neighboring overflows (or underflows),
> > for which the freelist pointer is commonly the target. (Large or well
> > controlled overwrites are much more likely to attack live object contents,
> > instead of attempting freelist corruption.)
>
> Sounds good. You could even randomize the position to avoid attacks on via
> the freelist pointer.
Random overwrites could be detected (fairly cheaply) by putting two
copies of the pointer into the same cacheline in the buffer.
Or better make the second one 'pointer xor constant'.
David
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Registered Address Lakeside, Bramley Road, Mount Farm, Milton Keynes, MK1 1PT, UK
Registration No: 1397386 (Wales)
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-03-11 14:48 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-03-06 0:26 [PATCH] slub: Relocate freelist pointer to middle of object Kees Cook
2020-03-08 19:21 ` Christopher Lameter
2020-03-11 14:48 ` David Laight [this message]
2020-03-11 17:37 ` Kees Cook
2020-03-11 17:44 ` Kees Cook
2020-03-15 14:11 ` Christopher Lameter
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