From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com,
linux-mm@kvack.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
"Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>,
"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
"Toshimitsu Kani" <toshi.kani@hpe.com>,
"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
"Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"Larry Woodman" <lwoodman@redhat.com>,
"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v4 14/28] Add support to access boot related data in the clear
Date: Fri, 17 Mar 2017 14:50:14 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <79f1c44e-0138-8b50-8931-723a5d243644@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170308065555.GA11045@dhcp-128-65.nay.redhat.com>
On 3/8/2017 12:55 AM, Dave Young wrote:
> On 02/16/17 at 09:45am, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> [snip]
>> + * This function determines if an address should be mapped encrypted.
>> + * Boot setup data, EFI data and E820 areas are checked in making this
>> + * determination.
>> + */
>> +static bool memremap_should_map_encrypted(resource_size_t phys_addr,
>> + unsigned long size)
>> +{
>> + /*
>> + * SME is not active, return true:
>> + * - For early_memremap_pgprot_adjust(), returning true or false
>> + * results in the same protection value
>> + * - For arch_memremap_do_ram_remap(), returning true will allow
>> + * the RAM remap to occur instead of falling back to ioremap()
>> + */
>> + if (!sme_active())
>> + return true;
>
> From the function name shouldn't above be return false?
I've re-worked this so that the check is in a different location and
doesn't cause confusion.
>
>> +
>> + /* Check if the address is part of the setup data */
>> + if (memremap_is_setup_data(phys_addr, size))
>> + return false;
>> +
>> + /* Check if the address is part of EFI boot/runtime data */
>> + switch (efi_mem_type(phys_addr)) {
>> + case EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA:
>> + case EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA:
>
> Only these two types needed? I'm not sure about this, just bring up the
> question.
I've re-worked this code so that there is a single EFI routine that
checks boot_params.efi_info.efi_memmap/efi_systab, EFI tables and the
EFI memtype. As for the EFI memtypes, I believe those are the only
ones required. Some of the other types will be picked up by the e820
checks (ACPI, NVS, etc.).
Thanks,
Tom
>
>> + return false;
>> + default:
>> + break;
>> + }
>> +
>> + /* Check if the address is outside kernel usable area */
>> + switch (e820__get_entry_type(phys_addr, phys_addr + size - 1)) {
>> + case E820_TYPE_RESERVED:
>> + case E820_TYPE_ACPI:
>> + case E820_TYPE_NVS:
>> + case E820_TYPE_UNUSABLE:
>> + return false;
>> + default:
>> + break;
>> + }
>> +
>> + return true;
>> +}
>> +
>
> Thanks
> Dave
>
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-03-17 19:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 111+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-02-16 15:41 [RFC PATCH v4 00/28] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 01/28] x86: Documentation for AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20170216154211.19244.76656.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2017-02-16 17:56 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-16 19:48 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 02/28] x86: Set the write-protect cache mode for full PAT support Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20170216154225.19244.96438.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2017-02-17 11:07 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-17 15:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 03/28] x86: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20170216154236.19244.7580.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2017-02-16 18:13 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-16 19:42 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <a1a6a6d7-3aac-3138-1e75-6160f0427a6b-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-02-16 20:06 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-16 15:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 04/28] x86: Handle reduction in physical address size with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-02-17 11:04 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-16 15:43 ` [RFC PATCH v4 05/28] x86: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support Tom Lendacky
2017-02-17 12:00 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-25 15:29 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-28 23:01 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:43 ` [RFC PATCH v4 06/28] x86: Add support to enable SME during early boot processing Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20170216154319.19244.7863.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2017-02-20 12:51 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-21 14:55 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <a23be4fa-d7ef-4e7a-5b6b-73e120a5ca80-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-02-21 15:10 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-16 15:43 ` [RFC PATCH v4 07/28] x86: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20170216154332.19244.55451.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2017-02-20 15:21 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-21 17:18 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-22 12:08 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-20 18:38 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-22 16:43 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-22 18:13 ` Dave Hansen
2017-02-23 23:12 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-22 18:13 ` Dave Hansen
2017-02-16 15:43 ` [RFC PATCH v4 08/28] x86: Extend the early_memremap support with additional attrs Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20170216154348.19244.11884.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2017-02-20 15:43 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-22 15:42 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:43 ` [RFC PATCH v4 09/28] x86: Add support for early encryption/decryption of memory Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20170216154358.19244.6082.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2017-02-20 18:22 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-22 15:48 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:44 ` [RFC PATCH v4 10/28] x86: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20170216154411.19244.99258.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2017-02-20 19:45 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-22 18:34 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:44 ` [RFC PATCH v4 11/28] x86: Add support to determine the E820 type of an address Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20170216154430.19244.95519.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2017-02-20 20:09 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-28 22:34 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-03 9:52 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-16 15:44 ` [RFC PATCH v4 12/28] efi: Add an EFI table address match function Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:44 ` [RFC PATCH v4 13/28] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return defined EFI mem types Tom Lendacky
2017-02-21 12:05 ` Matt Fleming
2017-02-23 17:27 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-24 9:57 ` Matt Fleming
2017-02-16 15:45 ` [RFC PATCH v4 14/28] Add support to access boot related data in the clear Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20170216154508.19244.58580.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2017-02-21 15:06 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-23 21:34 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-24 10:21 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-24 15:04 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-24 15:22 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-08 6:55 ` Dave Young
2017-03-17 19:50 ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2017-02-16 15:45 ` [RFC PATCH v4 15/28] Add support to access persistent memory " Tom Lendacky
2017-03-17 22:58 ` Elliott, Robert (Persistent Memory)
2017-03-23 21:02 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:45 ` [RFC PATCH v4 16/28] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute Tom Lendacky
2017-02-22 18:52 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-28 22:46 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:45 ` [RFC PATCH v4 17/28] x86: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:46 ` [RFC PATCH v4 18/28] x86: DMA support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-02-25 17:10 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-06 17:47 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:46 ` [RFC PATCH v4 19/28] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-02-17 15:59 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2017-02-17 16:51 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-02 17:01 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-02-27 17:52 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-28 23:19 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-01 11:17 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-16 15:46 ` [RFC PATCH v4 20/28] iommu/amd: Disable AMD IOMMU if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:46 ` [RFC PATCH v4 21/28] x86: Check for memory encryption on the APs Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20170216154647.19244.18733.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2017-02-27 18:17 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-28 23:28 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <5f461d57-9232-1cb3-d4d9-9b8a39d00b12-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-03-01 11:17 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-16 15:47 ` [RFC PATCH v4 22/28] x86: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47 ` [RFC PATCH v4 23/28] x86/kvm: Enable Secure Memory Encryption of nested page tables Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47 ` [RFC PATCH v4 24/28] x86: Access the setup data through debugfs decrypted Tom Lendacky
2017-03-08 7:04 ` Dave Young
2017-03-17 19:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47 ` [RFC PATCH v4 25/28] x86: Access the setup data through sysfs decrypted Tom Lendacky
2017-03-08 7:09 ` Dave Young
2017-03-17 20:09 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47 ` [RFC PATCH v4 26/28] x86: Allow kexec to be used with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-02-17 15:57 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2017-02-17 16:43 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-01 9:25 ` Dave Young
2017-03-01 9:27 ` Dave Young
2017-03-06 17:58 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-06 18:04 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-08 8:12 ` Dave Young
2017-02-28 10:35 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-01 15:36 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:48 ` [RFC PATCH v4 27/28] x86: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20170216154808.19244.475.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2017-03-01 17:36 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 18:30 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-02 18:51 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-16 15:48 ` [RFC PATCH v4 28/28] x86: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-03-01 18:40 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-07 16:05 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-07 17:42 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-08 15:05 ` Borislav Petkov
[not found] ` <20170216154158.19244.66630.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2017-02-18 18:12 ` [RFC PATCH v4 00/28] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Borislav Petkov
2017-02-21 15:09 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-21 17:42 ` Rik van Riel
[not found] ` <1487698965.17158.8.camel-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2017-02-21 17:53 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-01 9:17 ` Dave Young
2017-03-01 17:51 ` Tom Lendacky
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