From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.4 required=3.0 tests=DKIMWL_WL_MED,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_IN_DEF_DKIM_WL autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id CFB8FC3F2D7 for ; Mon, 2 Mar 2020 16:43:34 +0000 (UTC) Received: from kanga.kvack.org (kanga.kvack.org [205.233.56.17]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9405B222C4 for ; Mon, 2 Mar 2020 16:43:34 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=google.com header.i=@google.com header.b="G85budQa" DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 9405B222C4 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=reject dis=none) header.from=google.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=owner-linux-mm@kvack.org Received: by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix) id 2A8116B0006; Mon, 2 Mar 2020 11:43:34 -0500 (EST) Received: by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix, from userid 40) id 258C36B0007; Mon, 2 Mar 2020 11:43:34 -0500 (EST) X-Delivered-To: int-list-linux-mm@kvack.org Received: by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix, from userid 63042) id 16D846B0008; Mon, 2 Mar 2020 11:43:34 -0500 (EST) X-Delivered-To: linux-mm@kvack.org Received: from forelay.hostedemail.com (smtprelay0241.hostedemail.com [216.40.44.241]) by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 016776B0006 for ; Mon, 2 Mar 2020 11:43:33 -0500 (EST) Received: from smtpin06.hostedemail.com (10.5.19.251.rfc1918.com [10.5.19.251]) by forelay01.hostedemail.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 97CE6180AD801 for ; Mon, 2 Mar 2020 16:43:33 +0000 (UTC) X-FDA: 76550993106.06.drop33_3c20334578a0e X-HE-Tag: drop33_3c20334578a0e X-Filterd-Recvd-Size: 7601 Received: from mail-oi1-f193.google.com (mail-oi1-f193.google.com [209.85.167.193]) by imf40.hostedemail.com (Postfix) with ESMTP for ; Mon, 2 Mar 2020 16:43:33 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-oi1-f193.google.com with SMTP id q81so10967882oig.0 for ; Mon, 02 Mar 2020 08:43:33 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20161025; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=7kNUg6jrLRYXBxRwxs+v6id6LKMnX/sXkRxwLGsubN8=; b=G85budQaXfEQvDNWIalbDXyWPGbmN1VgzYIvybMkE6FjzEE9OQ06bKVGmxbSFZLDeZ NCG1SEAjzWEvnPaBKjkeXOiCbefYDCeZuZT/wMi0k0Z8lRMg1ptUkwT9yyguQl1/2S+o jfJxI20+jwJY/A2UlJ9u9Qil4ApszAgT38+jjcvSvG9xoofpBq921uBU19jjtE1+amxO hwunfbFnfCp0nj6pojNjexPVGNkT+8IQLC8KySny/q03clG9aJQnNSB7rlhWMZOdoDcs Tlc1qt9VorvqgYNwFtqnCnSE57RGtJfTiH7WPMYBRl0+W5TnUTvBhMda5uGFAqYj+Yii VzMw== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=7kNUg6jrLRYXBxRwxs+v6id6LKMnX/sXkRxwLGsubN8=; b=WLVkeMuL/QeMTDQcjs7pXMae2+tBDATqfp3ap/GkI17I7l1O3H0WN4IpwBwoJlNsoQ P/8n9D74VrKZC1lFfZdc9hWHhwnt13FQmtqEAQQ1G+/ZqrsnVnh324DrIsIvbP8xEDqp 8o7dFyLIRITb5u5Bdp8aegMbBSiGS9SvhT7dZhnAPbt6ZHsefTPv5L0jXswxIwqhWcql oyMvru82DxXiywSsl9BJkz0p3tuQOEhzq8BrIa5GMNUnzMgimtsUpIpkjTwSbtc2w96+ 1zL5j6/TzI35KdqsSmRrpCuoh3CBtgN0jwEc8GhmN4opc5PxQwI7ONVaAT73cI+Pypft SVnA== X-Gm-Message-State: ANhLgQ2j6vuoeiT2aWmaBgqGWDofL67fL7WYV+FqyNNe3KI1d3tqk0XY ct/ySkPNrBinE4Qg8mLqiZJD3UpET7n1j0Mu/4FEfg== X-Google-Smtp-Source: ADFU+vtCTAmOxkVME2G4uhIibjer5xiSuOaaEPJPm0R3+yIEc30FvCfm1FJmjYEn5prQfE7J5MaCm+kNmricQKurjnA= X-Received: by 2002:a05:6808:8d0:: with SMTP id k16mr12043oij.68.1583167412109; Mon, 02 Mar 2020 08:43:32 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <20200301185244.zkofjus6xtgkx4s3@wittgenstein> <87a74zmfc9.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <87k142lpfz.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <875zfmloir.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> In-Reply-To: <875zfmloir.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> From: Jann Horn Date: Mon, 2 Mar 2020 17:43:05 +0100 Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCHv2] exec: Fix a deadlock in ptrace To: "Eric W. Biederman" , James Morris Cc: Bernd Edlinger , Christian Brauner , Jonathan Corbet , Alexander Viro , Andrew Morton , Alexey Dobriyan , Thomas Gleixner , Oleg Nesterov , Frederic Weisbecker , Andrei Vagin , Ingo Molnar , "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" , Yuyang Du , David Hildenbrand , Sebastian Andrzej Siewior , Anshuman Khandual , David Howells , Kees Cook , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Shakeel Butt , Jason Gunthorpe , Christian Kellner , Andrea Arcangeli , Aleksa Sarai , "Dmitry V. Levin" , "linux-doc@vger.kernel.org" , "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" , "linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org" , "linux-mm@kvack.org" , "stable@vger.kernel.org" , linux-security-module Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" X-Bogosity: Ham, tests=bogofilter, spamicity=0.000000, version=1.2.4 Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org Precedence: bulk X-Loop: owner-majordomo@kvack.org List-ID: On Mon, Mar 2, 2020 at 5:19 PM Eric W. Biederman wrote: > > Bernd Edlinger writes: > > > On 3/2/20 4:57 PM, Eric W. Biederman wrote: > >> Bernd Edlinger writes: > >> > >>> > >>> I tried this with s/EACCESS/EACCES/. > >>> > >>> The test case in this patch is not fixed, but strace does not freeze, > >>> at least with my setup where it did freeze repeatable. > >> > >> Thanks, That is what I was aiming at. > >> > >> So we have one method we can pursue to fix this in practice. > >> > >>> That is > >>> obviously because it bypasses the cred_guard_mutex. But all other > >>> process that access this file still freeze, and cannot be > >>> interrupted except with kill -9. > >>> > >>> However that smells like a denial of service, that this > >>> simple test case which can be executed by guest, creates a /proc/$pid/mem > >>> that freezes any process, even root, when it looks at it. > >>> I mean: "ln -s README /proc/$pid/mem" would be a nice bomb. > >> > >> Yes. Your the test case in your patch a variant of the original > >> problem. > >> > >> > >> I have been staring at this trying to understand the fundamentals of the > >> original deeper problem. > >> > >> The current scope of cred_guard_mutex in exec is because being ptraced > >> causes suid exec to act differently. So we need to know early if we are > >> ptraced. > >> > > > > It has a second use, that it prevents two threads entering execve, > > which would probably result in disaster. > > Exec can fail with an error code up until de_thread. de_thread causes > exec to fail with the error code -EAGAIN for the second thread to get > into de_thread. > > So no. The cred_guard_mutex is not needed for that case at all. > > >> If that case did not exist we could reduce the scope of the > >> cred_guard_mutex in exec to where your patch puts the cred_change_mutex. > >> > >> I am starting to think reworking how we deal with ptrace and exec is the > >> way to solve this problem. > > > I am 99% convinced that the fix is to move cred_guard_mutex down. "move cred_guard_mutex down" as in "take it once we've already set up the new process, past the point of no return"? > Then right after we take cred_guard_mutex do: > if (ptraced) { > use_original_creds(); > } > > And call it a day. > > The details suck but I am 99% certain that would solve everyones > problems, and not be too bad to audit either. Ah, hmm, that sounds like it'll work fine at least when no LSMs are involved. SELinux normally doesn't do the execution-degrading thing, it just blocks the execution completely - see their selinux_bprm_set_creds() hook. So I think they'd still need to set some state on the task that says "we're currently in the middle of an execution where the target task will run in context X", and then check against that in the ptrace_may_access hook. Or I suppose they could just kill the task near the end of execve, although that'd be kinda ugly.