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From: Kees Cook <>
To: Alexander Popov <>
Cc: Christopher Lameter <>,
	Matthew Wilcox <>,
	Pekka Enberg <>,
	David Rientjes <>,
	Joonsoo Kim <>,
	Andrew Morton <>,
	Linux-MM <>,
	LKML <>,
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] mm/slub.c: add a naive detection of double free or corruption
Date: Tue, 18 Jul 2017 13:04:42 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <>

On Tue, Jul 18, 2017 at 12:56 PM, Alexander Popov <> wrote:
> On 17.07.2017 22:11, Kees Cook wrote:
>> On Mon, Jul 17, 2017 at 12:01 PM, Alexander Popov <> wrote:
>>> Hello Christopher,
>>> Thanks for your reply.
>>> On 17.07.2017 21:04, Christopher Lameter wrote:
>>>> On Mon, 17 Jul 2017, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
>>>>> On Mon, Jul 17, 2017 at 07:45:07PM +0300, Alexander Popov wrote:
>>>>>> Add an assertion similar to "fasttop" check in GNU C Library allocator:
>>>>>> an object added to a singly linked freelist should not point to itself.
>>>>>> That helps to detect some double free errors (e.g. CVE-2017-2636) without
>>>>>> slub_debug and KASAN. Testing with hackbench doesn't show any noticeable
>>>>>> performance penalty.
>>>>>>  {
>>>>>> +   BUG_ON(object == fp); /* naive detection of double free or corruption */
>>>>>>     *(void **)(object + s->offset) = fp;
>>>>>>  }
>>>>> Is BUG() the best response to this situation?  If it's a corruption, then
>>>>> yes, but if we spot a double-free, then surely we should WARN() and return
>>>>> without doing anything?
>>>> The double free debug checking already does the same thing in a more
>>>> thourough way (this one only checks if the last free was the same
>>>> address). So its duplicating a check that already exists.
>>> Yes, absolutely. Enabled slub_debug (or KASAN with its quarantine) can detect
>>> more double-free errors. But it introduces much bigger performance penalty and
>>> it's disabled by default.
>>>> However, this one is always on.
>>> Yes, I would propose to have this relatively cheap check enabled by default. I
>>> think it will block a good share of double-free errors. Currently it's really
>>> easy to turn such a double-free into use-after-free and exploit it, since, as I
>>> wrote, next two kmalloc() calls return the same address. So we could make
>>> exploiting harder for a relatively low price.
>>> Christopher, if I change BUG_ON() to VM_BUG_ON(), it will be disabled by default
>>> again, right?
>> Let's merge this with the proposed CONFIG_FREELIST_HARDENED, then the
>> performance change is behind a config, and we gain the rest of the
>> freelist protections at the same time:
> Hello Kees,
> If I change BUG_ON() to VM_BUG_ON(), this check will work at least on Fedora
> since it has CONFIG_DEBUG_VM enabled. Debian based distros have this option
> disabled. Do you like that more than having this check under

I think there are two issues: first, this should likely be under
CONFIG_FREELIST_HARDENED since Christoph hasn't wanted to make these
changes enabled by default (if I'm understanding his earlier review
comments to me). The second issue is what to DO when a double-free is
discovered. Is there any way to make it safe/survivable? If not, I
think it should just be BUG_ON(). If it can be made safe, then likely
a WARN_ONCE and do whatever is needed to prevent the double-free.

> If you insist on putting this check under CONFIG_FREELIST_HARDENED, should I
> rebase onto your patch and send again?

That would be preferred for me -- I'd like to have both checks. :)


Kees Cook
Pixel Security

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  reply	other threads:[~2017-07-18 20:04 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-07-17 16:45 [PATCH 1/1] mm/slub.c: add a naive detection of double free or corruption Alexander Popov
2017-07-17 16:57 ` Christopher Lameter
2017-07-17 17:54 ` Matthew Wilcox
2017-07-17 18:04   ` Christopher Lameter
2017-07-17 19:01     ` Alexander Popov
2017-07-17 19:11       ` Kees Cook
2017-07-18 19:56         ` Alexander Popov
2017-07-18 20:04           ` Kees Cook [this message]
2017-07-19  8:38             ` Alexander Popov
2017-07-19 14:02             ` Christopher Lameter
2017-07-18 14:57       ` Christopher Lameter
2017-07-17 18:23   ` Alexander Popov

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