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From: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
To: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>,
	 Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
	Linux Memory Management List <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	 Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@dilger.ca>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	 Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	 Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	 Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
	 "Darrick J. Wong" <darrick.wong@oracle.com>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	 Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>,
	Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>,
	 Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>,
	Eric Van Hensbergen <ericvh@gmail.com>,
	 Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Harry Wentland <harry.wentland@amd.com>,
	 Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
	Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>,
	 Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>, Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>,
	Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>,
	 Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com>,
	Marco Elver <elver@google.com>,
	 Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	"Martin K. Petersen" <martin.petersen@oracle.com>,
	 Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>,
	Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
	 "Michael S . Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu>, Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>,
	 Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>, Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>,
	 Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>,
	Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
	 Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.com>, "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	 Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>,
	Wolfram Sang <wsa@the-dreams.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v3 27/36] kmsan: hooks for copy_to_user() and friends
Date: Thu, 5 Dec 2019 17:00:27 +0100
Message-ID: <CAG_fn=V8h9HnQHvhwWZyX0wSzy9ZgTG-v5at67GvD=uy-8ieuA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAAeHK+xKJzGzQdn4VTyFC_Dv9KHOcvC+GhDps6GzRJu2gwFfzw@mail.gmail.com>

On Fri, Nov 29, 2019 at 4:34 PM Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> wrote:
>
> On Fri, Nov 22, 2019 at 12:27 PM <glider@google.com> wrote:
> >
> > Memory that is copied from userspace must be unpoisoned.
> > Before copying memory to userspace, check it and report an error if it
> > contains uninitialized bits.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
> > To: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
> > Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
> > Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
> > Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
> > Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
> > ---
> > v3:
> >  - fixed compilation errors reported by kbuild test bot
> >
> > Change-Id: I38428b9c7d1909b8441dcec1749b080494a7af99
> > ---
> >  arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h   | 12 ++++++++++++
> >  include/asm-generic/cacheflush.h |  7 ++++++-
> >  include/asm-generic/uaccess.h    | 12 ++++++++++--
> >  include/linux/uaccess.h          | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
> >  lib/iov_iter.c                   |  6 ++++++
> >  lib/usercopy.c                   |  6 +++++-
> >  6 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
> > index 61d93f062a36..ac4b26583f7c 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
> > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
> > @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
> >   */
> >  #include <linux/compiler.h>
> >  #include <linux/kasan-checks.h>
> > +#include <linux/kmsan-checks.h>
> >  #include <linux/string.h>
> >  #include <asm/asm.h>
> >  #include <asm/page.h>
> > @@ -174,6 +175,7 @@ __typeof__(__builtin_choose_expr(sizeof(x) > sizeof(0UL), 0ULL, 0UL))
> >                         ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT                             \
> >                      : "0" (ptr), "i" (sizeof(*(ptr))));                \
> >         (x) = (__force __typeof__(*(ptr))) __val_gu;                    \
> > +       kmsan_unpoison_shadow(&(x), sizeof(*(ptr)));                    \
> >         __builtin_expect(__ret_gu, 0);                                  \
> >  })
> >
> > @@ -248,6 +250,7 @@ extern void __put_user_8(void);
> >         __chk_user_ptr(ptr);                                    \
> >         might_fault();                                          \
> >         __pu_val = x;                                           \
> > +       kmsan_check_memory(&(__pu_val), sizeof(*(ptr)));        \
> >         switch (sizeof(*(ptr))) {                               \
> >         case 1:                                                 \
> >                 __put_user_x(1, __pu_val, ptr, __ret_pu);       \
> > @@ -270,7 +273,9 @@ extern void __put_user_8(void);
> >
> >  #define __put_user_size(x, ptr, size, label)                           \
> >  do {                                                                   \
> > +       __typeof__(*(ptr)) __pus_val = x;                               \
> >         __chk_user_ptr(ptr);                                            \
> > +       kmsan_check_memory(&(__pus_val), size);                         \
> >         switch (size) {                                                 \
> >         case 1:                                                         \
> >                 __put_user_goto(x, ptr, "b", "b", "iq", label); \
> > @@ -295,7 +300,10 @@ do {                                                                       \
> >   */
> >  #define __put_user_size_ex(x, ptr, size)                               \
> >  do {                                                                   \
> > +       __typeof__(*(ptr)) __puse_val;                                  \
>
> Can we do = x here?
Yes. Fixed, thanks!
> >         __chk_user_ptr(ptr);                                            \
> > +       __puse_val = x;                                                 \
> > +       kmsan_check_memory(&(__puse_val), size);                        \
> >         switch (size) {                                                 \
> >         case 1:                                                         \
> >                 __put_user_asm_ex(x, ptr, "b", "b", "iq");              \
> > @@ -363,6 +371,7 @@ do {                                                                        \
> >         default:                                                        \
> >                 (x) = __get_user_bad();                                 \
> >         }                                                               \
> > +       kmsan_unpoison_shadow(&(x), size);                              \
> >  } while (0)
> >
> >  #define __get_user_asm(x, addr, err, itype, rtype, ltype, errret)      \
> > @@ -413,6 +422,7 @@ do {                                                                        \
> >         default:                                                        \
> >                 (x) = __get_user_bad();                                 \
> >         }                                                               \
> > +       kmsan_unpoison_shadow(&(x), size);                              \
> >  } while (0)
> >
> >  #define __get_user_asm_ex(x, addr, itype, rtype, ltype)                        \
> > @@ -428,11 +438,13 @@ do {                                                                      \
> >  #define __put_user_nocheck(x, ptr, size)                       \
> >  ({                                                             \
> >         __label__ __pu_label;                                   \
> > +       __typeof__(*(ptr)) __pun_val = x;                       \
>
> Not sure if this matters, but two lines below do (x).
Right.
> Also, why can't we use __pu_val instead of defining __pun_val?
Will do.
>
> >         int __pu_err = -EFAULT;                                 \
> >         __typeof__(*(ptr)) __pu_val = (x);                      \
> >         __typeof__(ptr) __pu_ptr = (ptr);                       \
> >         __typeof__(size) __pu_size = (size);                    \
> >         __uaccess_begin();                                      \
> > +       kmsan_check_memory(&(__pun_val), size);                 \
> >         __put_user_size(__pu_val, __pu_ptr, __pu_size, __pu_label);     \
> >         __pu_err = 0;                                           \
> >  __pu_label:                                                    \
> > diff --git a/include/asm-generic/cacheflush.h b/include/asm-generic/cacheflush.h
> > index a950a22c4890..707531dccf5e 100644
> > --- a/include/asm-generic/cacheflush.h
> > +++ b/include/asm-generic/cacheflush.h
> > @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
> >
> >  /* Keep includes the same across arches.  */
> >  #include <linux/mm.h>
> > +#include <linux/kmsan-checks.h>
> >
> >  #define ARCH_IMPLEMENTS_FLUSH_DCACHE_PAGE 0
> >
> > @@ -72,10 +73,14 @@ static inline void flush_cache_vunmap(unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
> >
> >  #define copy_to_user_page(vma, page, vaddr, dst, src, len) \
> >         do { \
> > +               kmsan_check_memory(src, len); \
> >                 memcpy(dst, src, len); \
> >                 flush_icache_user_range(vma, page, vaddr, len); \
> >         } while (0)
> >  #define copy_from_user_page(vma, page, vaddr, dst, src, len) \
> > -       memcpy(dst, src, len)
> > +       do { \
> > +               memcpy(dst, src, len); \
> > +               kmsan_unpoison_shadow(dst, len); \
> > +       } while (0)
> >
> >  #endif /* __ASM_CACHEFLUSH_H */
> > diff --git a/include/asm-generic/uaccess.h b/include/asm-generic/uaccess.h
> > index e935318804f8..508ee649aeef 100644
> > --- a/include/asm-generic/uaccess.h
> > +++ b/include/asm-generic/uaccess.h
> > @@ -142,7 +142,11 @@ static inline int __access_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
> >
> >  static inline int __put_user_fn(size_t size, void __user *ptr, void *x)
> >  {
> > -       return unlikely(raw_copy_to_user(ptr, x, size)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
> > +       int n;
> > +
> > +       n = raw_copy_to_user(ptr, x, size);
> > +       kmsan_copy_to_user(ptr, x, size, n);
> > +       return unlikely(n) ? -EFAULT : 0;
> >  }
> >
> >  #define __put_user_fn(sz, u, k)        __put_user_fn(sz, u, k)
> > @@ -203,7 +207,11 @@ extern int __put_user_bad(void) __attribute__((noreturn));
> >  #ifndef __get_user_fn
> >  static inline int __get_user_fn(size_t size, const void __user *ptr, void *x)
> >  {
> > -       return unlikely(raw_copy_from_user(x, ptr, size)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
> > +       int copied, to_copy = size;
> > +
> > +       copied = raw_copy_from_user(x, ptr, size);
> > +       kmsan_unpoison_shadow(x, to_copy - copied);
> > +       return unlikely(copied) ? -EFAULT : 0;
> >  }
> >
> >  #define __get_user_fn(sz, u, k)        __get_user_fn(sz, u, k)
> > diff --git a/include/linux/uaccess.h b/include/linux/uaccess.h
> > index d4ee6e942562..7550d11a8077 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/uaccess.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/uaccess.h
> > @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
> >  #include <linux/sched.h>
> >  #include <linux/thread_info.h>
> >  #include <linux/kasan-checks.h>
> > +#include <linux/kmsan-checks.h>
> >
> >  #define uaccess_kernel() segment_eq(get_fs(), KERNEL_DS)
> >
> > @@ -58,18 +59,26 @@
> >  static __always_inline __must_check unsigned long
> >  __copy_from_user_inatomic(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
> >  {
> > +       unsigned long to_copy = n;
> > +
> >         kasan_check_write(to, n);
> >         check_object_size(to, n, false);
> > -       return raw_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
> > +       n = raw_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
> > +       kmsan_unpoison_shadow(to, to_copy - n);
> > +       return n;
> >  }
> >
> >  static __always_inline __must_check unsigned long
> >  __copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
> >  {
> > +       unsigned long to_copy = n;
>
> This is confusing. I think we need a var for raw_copy_from_user()
> return value instead. Same in functions above and below.
raw_copy_from_user() returns the number of bytes _not_ copied from
userspace. So in the case it returns 0 we need to unpoison to_copy
bytes.
> > +
> >         might_fault();
> >         kasan_check_write(to, n);
> >         check_object_size(to, n, false);
> > -       return raw_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
> > +       n = raw_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
> > +       kmsan_unpoison_shadow(to, to_copy - n);
> > +       return n;
> >  }
> >
> >  /**
> > @@ -88,29 +97,39 @@ __copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
> >  static __always_inline __must_check unsigned long
> >  __copy_to_user_inatomic(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
> >  {
> > +       unsigned long to_copy = n;
> > +
> >         kasan_check_read(from, n);
> >         check_object_size(from, n, true);
> > -       return raw_copy_to_user(to, from, n);
> > +       n = raw_copy_to_user(to, from, n);
> > +       kmsan_copy_to_user((const void *)to, from, to_copy, n);
> > +       return n;
> >  }
> >
> >  static __always_inline __must_check unsigned long
> >  __copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
> >  {
> > +       unsigned long to_copy = n;
> > +
> >         might_fault();
> >         kasan_check_read(from, n);
> >         check_object_size(from, n, true);
> > -       return raw_copy_to_user(to, from, n);
> > +       n = raw_copy_to_user(to, from, n);
> > +       kmsan_copy_to_user((const void *)to, from, to_copy, n);
> > +       return n;
> >  }
> >
> >  #ifdef INLINE_COPY_FROM_USER
> >  static inline __must_check unsigned long
> >  _copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
> >  {
> > -       unsigned long res = n;
> > +       unsigned long res = n, to_copy = n;
> > +
> >         might_fault();
> >         if (likely(access_ok(from, n))) {
> >                 kasan_check_write(to, n);
> >                 res = raw_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
> > +               kmsan_unpoison_shadow(to, to_copy - res);
> >         }
> >         if (unlikely(res))
> >                 memset(to + (n - res), 0, res);
> > @@ -125,10 +144,13 @@ _copy_from_user(void *, const void __user *, unsigned long);
> >  static inline __must_check unsigned long
> >  _copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
> >  {
> > +       unsigned long to_copy = n;
> > +
> >         might_fault();
> >         if (access_ok(to, n)) {
> >                 kasan_check_read(from, n);
> >                 n = raw_copy_to_user(to, from, n);
> > +               kmsan_copy_to_user(to, from, to_copy, n);
> >         }
> >         return n;
> >  }
> > diff --git a/lib/iov_iter.c b/lib/iov_iter.c
> > index 639d5e7014c1..f038676068b2 100644
> > --- a/lib/iov_iter.c
> > +++ b/lib/iov_iter.c
> > @@ -137,18 +137,24 @@
> >
> >  static int copyout(void __user *to, const void *from, size_t n)
> >  {
> > +       size_t to_copy = n;
> > +
> >         if (access_ok(to, n)) {
> >                 kasan_check_read(from, n);
> >                 n = raw_copy_to_user(to, from, n);
> > +               kmsan_copy_to_user(to, from, to_copy, n);
> >         }
> >         return n;
> >  }
> >
> >  static int copyin(void *to, const void __user *from, size_t n)
> >  {
> > +       size_t to_copy = n;
> > +
> >         if (access_ok(from, n)) {
> >                 kasan_check_write(to, n);
> >                 n = raw_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
> > +               kmsan_unpoison_shadow(to, to_copy - n);
> >         }
> >         return n;
> >  }
> > diff --git a/lib/usercopy.c b/lib/usercopy.c
> > index cbb4d9ec00f2..abfd93edecba 100644
> > --- a/lib/usercopy.c
> > +++ b/lib/usercopy.c
> > @@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
> >  // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> > +#include <linux/kmsan-checks.h>
> >  #include <linux/uaccess.h>
> >  #include <linux/bitops.h>
> >
> > @@ -7,11 +8,12 @@
> >  #ifndef INLINE_COPY_FROM_USER
> >  unsigned long _copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
> >  {
> > -       unsigned long res = n;
> > +       unsigned long res = n, to_copy = n;
> >         might_fault();
> >         if (likely(access_ok(from, n))) {
> >                 kasan_check_write(to, n);
> >                 res = raw_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
> > +               kmsan_unpoison_shadow(to, to_copy - res);
> >         }
> >         if (unlikely(res))
> >                 memset(to + (n - res), 0, res);
> > @@ -23,10 +25,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(_copy_from_user);
> >  #ifndef INLINE_COPY_TO_USER
> >  unsigned long _copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
> >  {
> > +       unsigned long to_copy = n;
> >         might_fault();
> >         if (likely(access_ok(to, n))) {
> >                 kasan_check_read(from, n);
> >                 n = raw_copy_to_user(to, from, n);
> > +               kmsan_copy_to_user(to, from, to_copy, n);
> >         }
> >         return n;
> >  }
> > --
> > 2.24.0.432.g9d3f5f5b63-goog
> >



-- 
Alexander Potapenko
Software Engineer

Google Germany GmbH
Erika-Mann-Straße, 33
80636 München

Geschäftsführer: Paul Manicle, Halimah DeLaine Prado
Registergericht und -nummer: Hamburg, HRB 86891
Sitz der Gesellschaft: Hamburg


  reply index

Thread overview: 120+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-11-22 11:25 [PATCH RFC v3 00/36] Add KernelMemorySanitizer infrastructure glider
2019-11-22 11:25 ` [PATCH RFC v3 01/36] stackdepot: check depot_index before accessing the stack slab glider
2019-11-27 14:22   ` Marco Elver
2019-11-22 11:25 ` [PATCH RFC v3 02/36] stackdepot: build with -fno-builtin glider
2019-11-27 14:22   ` Marco Elver
2019-11-22 11:25 ` [PATCH RFC v3 03/36] kasan: stackdepot: move filter_irq_stacks() to stackdepot.c glider
2019-11-27 14:22   ` Marco Elver
2019-11-27 14:56     ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-11-22 11:25 ` [PATCH RFC v3 04/36] stackdepot: reserve 5 extra bits in depot_stack_handle_t glider
2019-11-27 14:23   ` Marco Elver
2019-11-22 11:25 ` [PATCH RFC v3 05/36] kmsan: add ReST documentation glider
2019-11-27 14:22   ` Marco Elver
2019-12-03 12:42     ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-11-22 11:25 ` [PATCH RFC v3 06/36] kmsan: gfp: introduce __GFP_NO_KMSAN_SHADOW glider
2019-11-27 14:48   ` Marco Elver
2019-12-03 12:57     ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-11-22 11:25 ` [PATCH RFC v3 07/36] kmsan: introduce __no_sanitize_memory and __SANITIZE_MEMORY__ glider
2019-11-28 13:13   ` Marco Elver
2019-11-29 16:09   ` Andrey Konovalov
2019-12-16 11:35     ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-11-22 11:25 ` [PATCH RFC v3 08/36] kmsan: reduce vmalloc space glider
2019-11-28 13:30   ` Marco Elver
2019-11-22 11:25 ` [PATCH RFC v3 09/36] kmsan: add KMSAN bits to struct page and struct task_struct glider
2019-11-28 13:44   ` Marco Elver
2019-11-28 14:05     ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-11-22 11:25 ` [PATCH RFC v3 10/36] kmsan: add KMSAN runtime glider
2019-11-24 19:44   ` Wolfram Sang
2019-11-25  9:14     ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-11-29 16:07   ` Marco Elver
2019-12-19 14:16     ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-12-02 15:39   ` Andrey Konovalov
2019-12-20 18:58     ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-12-03 14:34   ` Andrey Konovalov
2019-11-22 11:25 ` [PATCH RFC v3 11/36] kmsan: stackdepot: don't allocate KMSAN metadata for stackdepot glider
2019-11-29 14:52   ` Andrey Konovalov
2019-12-03 14:27     ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-11-22 11:25 ` [PATCH RFC v3 12/36] kmsan: define READ_ONCE_NOCHECK() glider
2019-12-02 10:03   ` Marco Elver
2019-12-03 12:45     ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-11-22 11:25 ` [PATCH RFC v3 13/36] kmsan: make READ_ONCE_TASK_STACK() return initialized values glider
2019-12-02 10:07   ` Marco Elver
2019-12-05 15:52     ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-11-22 11:25 ` [PATCH RFC v3 14/36] kmsan: x86: sync metadata pages on page fault glider
2019-11-22 11:26 ` [PATCH RFC v3 15/36] kmsan: add tests for KMSAN glider
2019-11-29 14:14   ` Andrey Konovalov
2019-12-05 14:30     ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-11-22 11:26 ` [PATCH RFC v3 16/36] crypto: kmsan: disable accelerated configs under KMSAN glider
2019-12-02 13:25   ` Marco Elver
2019-12-05 14:51     ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-11-22 11:26 ` [PATCH RFC v3 17/36] kmsan: x86: disable UNWINDER_ORC " glider
2019-12-02 13:30   ` Marco Elver
2019-11-22 11:26 ` [PATCH RFC v3 18/36] kmsan: disable LOCK_DEBUGGING_SUPPORT glider
2019-12-02 13:33   ` Marco Elver
2019-12-03 14:34     ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-12-03 15:00       ` Qian Cai
2019-12-03 15:14         ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-12-03 18:02           ` Qian Cai
2019-12-03 18:38           ` Steven Rostedt
2019-12-04  8:41             ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-12-04 12:22               ` Petr Mladek
2019-12-04 13:12                 ` Qian Cai
2019-12-04 16:24                   ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-12-04 18:03                     ` Qian Cai
2019-11-22 11:26 ` [PATCH RFC v3 20/36] kmsan: x86: increase stack sizes in KMSAN builds glider
2019-12-02 14:31   ` Marco Elver
2019-11-22 11:26 ` [PATCH RFC v3 21/36] kmsan: disable KMSAN instrumentation for certain kernel parts glider
2019-11-29 15:07   ` Andrey Konovalov
2019-12-10 10:35     ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-12-10 12:38       ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-12-10 12:43       ` Qian Cai
2019-11-22 11:26 ` [PATCH RFC v3 22/36] kmsan: mm: call KMSAN hooks from SLUB code glider
2019-12-02 15:36   ` Marco Elver
2019-12-10 12:07     ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-11-22 11:26 ` [PATCH RFC v3 23/36] kmsan: call KMSAN hooks where needed glider
2019-11-26 10:17   ` Petr Mladek
2019-11-26 10:52     ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-11-29 16:21   ` Andrey Konovalov
2019-12-16 11:30     ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-11-22 11:26 ` [PATCH RFC v3 24/36] kmsan: disable instrumentation of certain functions glider
2019-11-29 14:59   ` Andrey Konovalov
2019-12-18 10:02     ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-11-22 11:26 ` [PATCH RFC v3 25/36] kmsan: unpoison |tlb| in arch_tlb_gather_mmu() glider
2019-11-29 15:08   ` Andrey Konovalov
2019-12-03 14:19     ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-11-22 11:26 ` [PATCH RFC v3 26/36] kmsan: use __msan_memcpy() where possible glider
2019-11-29 15:13   ` Andrey Konovalov
2019-12-05 15:46     ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-11-22 11:26 ` [PATCH RFC v3 27/36] kmsan: hooks for copy_to_user() and friends glider
2019-11-29 15:34   ` Andrey Konovalov
2019-12-05 16:00     ` Alexander Potapenko [this message]
2019-12-05 16:44       ` Andrey Konovalov
2019-12-11 14:22         ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-11-22 11:26 ` [PATCH RFC v3 28/36] kmsan: enable KMSAN builds glider
2019-11-29 15:55   ` Andrey Konovalov
2019-12-11 12:51     ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-11-22 11:26 ` [PATCH RFC v3 29/36] kmsan: handle /dev/[u]random glider
2019-11-22 11:26 ` [PATCH RFC v3 30/36] kmsan: virtio: check/unpoison scatterlist in vring_map_one_sg() glider
2019-11-22 11:26 ` [PATCH RFC v3 31/36] kmsan: disable strscpy() optimization under KMSAN glider
2019-12-02 15:51   ` Marco Elver
2019-12-02 16:23     ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-12-03 11:19       ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-12-03 11:24         ` Marco Elver
2019-12-03 11:27           ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-11-22 11:26 ` [PATCH RFC v3 32/36] kmsan: add iomap support glider
2019-12-03 12:50   ` Marco Elver
2019-12-03 14:07     ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-11-22 11:26 ` [PATCH RFC v3 33/36] kmsan: dma: unpoison memory mapped by dma_direct_map_page() glider
2019-11-22 11:26 ` [PATCH RFC v3 34/36] kmsan: disable physical page merging in biovec glider
2019-12-03 12:54   ` Marco Elver
2019-12-03 13:38     ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-11-22 11:26 ` [PATCH RFC v3 35/36] kmsan: ext4: skip block merging logic in ext4_mpage_readpages for KMSAN glider
2019-11-25 16:05   ` Robin Murphy
2019-11-25 17:03     ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-12-03 14:22   ` Marco Elver
2019-12-05 14:31     ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-11-22 11:26 ` [PATCH RFC v3 36/36] net: kasan: kmsan: support CONFIG_GENERIC_CSUM on x86, enable it for KASAN/KMSAN glider
2019-12-03 14:17   ` Marco Elver
2019-12-05 14:37     ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-11-29 14:39 ` [PATCH RFC v3 00/36] Add KernelMemorySanitizer infrastructure Marco Elver
2019-12-02 16:02   ` Alexander Potapenko

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