From: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>,
Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
Sandeep Patil <sspatil@android.com>,
Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Linux Memory Management List <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/4] mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options
Date: Thu, 16 May 2019 18:42:37 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAG_fn=VsJmyuEUYy16R_M5Hu2CX-PJkz9Kw4rdy9XUCAYHwV5g@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <201905160907.92FAC880@keescook>
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Date: Thu, May 16, 2019 at 6:20 PM
To: Alexander Potapenko
Cc: <akpm@linux-foundation.org>, <cl@linux.com>,
<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>, Masahiro Yamada, James Morris,
Serge E. Hallyn, Nick Desaulniers, Kostya Serebryany, Dmitry Vyukov,
Sandeep Patil, Laura Abbott, Randy Dunlap, Jann Horn, Mark Rutland,
<linux-mm@kvack.org>, <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
> On Tue, May 14, 2019 at 04:35:34PM +0200, Alexander Potapenko wrote:
> > Slowdown for the new features compared to init_on_free=0,
> > init_on_alloc=0:
> >
> > hackbench, init_on_free=1: +7.62% sys time (st.err 0.74%)
> > hackbench, init_on_alloc=1: +7.75% sys time (st.err 2.14%)
>
> I wonder if the patch series should be reorganized to introduce
> __GFP_NO_AUTOINIT first, so that when the commit with benchmarks appears,
> we get the "final" numbers...
>
> > Linux build with -j12, init_on_free=1: +8.38% wall time (st.err 0.39%)
> > Linux build with -j12, init_on_free=1: +24.42% sys time (st.err 0.52%)
> > Linux build with -j12, init_on_alloc=1: -0.13% wall time (st.err 0.42%)
> > Linux build with -j12, init_on_alloc=1: +0.57% sys time (st.err 0.40%)
>
> I'm working on reproducing these benchmarks. I'd really like to narrow
> down the +24% number here. But it does
I suspect the slowdown of init_on_free is bigger than that of
PAX_SANITIZE_MEMORY, as we've set the goal to have fully zeroed memory
at alloc time.
If we want a mode that only wipes the user data upon free() but
doesn't eliminate all uninit memory, then we can make it faster.
> > The slowdown for init_on_free=0, init_on_alloc=0 compared to the
> > baseline is within the standard error.
>
> I think the use of static keys here is really great: this is available
> by default for anyone that wants to turn it on.
>
> I'm thinking, given the configuable nature of this, it'd be worth adding
> a little more detail at boot time. I think maybe a separate patch could
> be added to describe the kernel's memory auto-initialization features,
> and add something like this to mm_init():
>
> +void __init report_meminit(void)
> +{
> + const char *stack;
> +
> + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL))
> + stack = "all";
> + else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL))
> + stack = "byref_all";
> + else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF))
> + stack = "byref";
> + else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_USER))
> + stack = "__user";
> + else
> + stack = "off";
> +
> + /* Report memory auto-initialization states for this boot. */
> + pr_info("mem auto-init: stack:%s, heap alloc:%s, heap free:%s\n",
> + stack, want_init_on_alloc(GFP_KERNEL) ? "on" : "off",
> + want_init_on_free() ? "on" : "off");
> +}
>
> To get a boot line like:
>
> mem auto-init: stack:off, heap alloc:off, heap free:on
For stack there's no binary on/off, as you can potentially build half
of the kernel with stack instrumentation and another half without it.
We could make the instrumentation insert a static global flag into
each translation unit, but this won't give us any interesting info.
> And one other thought I had was that in the init_on_free=1 case, there is
> a large pause at boot while memory is being cleared. I think it'd be handy
> to include a comment about that, just to keep people from being surprised:
>
> diff --git a/init/main.c b/init/main.c
> index cf0c3948ce0e..aea278392338 100644
> --- a/init/main.c
> +++ b/init/main.c
> @@ -529,6 +529,8 @@ static void __init mm_init(void)
> * bigger than MAX_ORDER unless SPARSEMEM.
> */
> page_ext_init_flatmem();
> + if (want_init_on_free())
> + pr_info("Clearing system memory ...\n");
> mem_init();
> kmem_cache_init();
> pgtable_init();
>
> Beyond these thoughts, I think this series is in good shape.
>
> Andrew (or anyone else) do you have any concerns about this?
>
> --
> Kees Cook
--
Alexander Potapenko
Software Engineer
Google Germany GmbH
Erika-Mann-Straße, 33
80636 München
Geschäftsführer: Paul Manicle, Halimah DeLaine Prado
Registergericht und -nummer: Hamburg, HRB 86891
Sitz der Gesellschaft: Hamburg
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-05-16 16:42 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20190514143537.10435-1-glider@google.com>
2019-05-14 14:35 ` [PATCH v2 1/4] mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options Alexander Potapenko
2019-05-16 16:19 ` Kees Cook
2019-05-16 16:42 ` Alexander Potapenko [this message]
2019-05-16 17:03 ` Kees Cook
2019-05-17 1:26 ` Kees Cook
2019-05-17 14:38 ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-05-17 14:04 ` Michal Hocko
2019-05-17 14:11 ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-05-17 14:20 ` Michal Hocko
2019-05-17 16:36 ` Kees Cook
2019-05-17 17:11 ` Michal Hocko
2019-05-14 14:35 ` [PATCH v2 2/4] lib: introduce test_meminit module Alexander Potapenko
2019-05-16 1:02 ` Kees Cook
2019-05-17 15:51 ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-05-17 16:37 ` Kees Cook
2019-05-14 14:35 ` [PATCH v2 3/4] gfp: mm: introduce __GFP_NO_AUTOINIT Alexander Potapenko
2019-05-17 12:59 ` Michal Hocko
2019-05-17 13:18 ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-05-17 13:25 ` Michal Hocko
2019-05-17 13:37 ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-05-17 14:01 ` Michal Hocko
2019-05-17 16:27 ` Kees Cook
2019-05-17 17:11 ` Michal Hocko
2019-05-21 14:18 ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-05-21 14:25 ` Michal Hocko
2019-05-14 14:35 ` [PATCH v2 4/4] net: apply __GFP_NO_AUTOINIT to AF_UNIX sk_buff allocations Alexander Potapenko
2019-05-16 16:53 ` Kees Cook
2019-05-17 0:26 ` Kees Cook
2019-05-17 8:49 ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-05-17 13:50 ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-05-17 16:13 ` Kees Cook
2019-05-17 0:50 ` [PATCH 5/4] mm: Introduce SLAB_NO_FREE_INIT and mark excluded caches Kees Cook
2019-05-17 8:34 ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-05-17 15:59 ` Kees Cook
2019-05-20 6:10 ` Mathias Krause
2019-05-20 16:12 ` Kees Cook
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