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From: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
To: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
	 Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>,
	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
	 Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	Marco Elver <elver@google.com>,
	 Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>,
	Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com>,
	 Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	 kasan-dev <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>,
	 Linux ARM <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
	 Linux Memory Management List <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 07/44] kasan: rename KASAN_SHADOW_* to KASAN_GRANULE_*
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2020 14:45:21 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAG_fn=VukPaEerSHW=sTmMumiJbPkQUnsmg6-Dena7kXyZBaSw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <29bbfde90235ab7ac985e8bae79866cf885e4a29.1605046192.git.andreyknvl@google.com>

On Tue, Nov 10, 2020 at 11:11 PM Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> wrote:
>
> This is a preparatory commit for the upcoming addition of a new hardware
> tag-based (MTE-based) KASAN mode.
>
> The new mode won't be using shadow memory, but will still use the concept
> of memory granules. Each memory granule maps to a single metadata entry:
> 8 bytes per one shadow byte for generic mode, 16 bytes per one shadow byte
> for software tag-based mode, and 16 bytes per one allocation tag for
> hardware tag-based mode.
>
> Rename KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE to KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE, and KASAN_SHADOW_MASK
> to KASAN_GRANULE_MASK.
>
> Also use MASK when used as a mask, otherwise use SIZE.
>
> No functional changes.
>
> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>

> ---
> Change-Id: Iac733e2248aa9d29f6fc425d8946ba07cca73ecf
> ---
>  Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst |  2 +-
>  lib/test_kasan.c                  |  2 +-
>  lib/test_kasan_module.c           |  2 +-
>  mm/kasan/common.c                 | 39 ++++++++++++++++---------------
>  mm/kasan/generic.c                | 14 +++++------
>  mm/kasan/generic_report.c         |  8 +++----
>  mm/kasan/init.c                   |  8 +++----
>  mm/kasan/kasan.h                  |  4 ++--
>  mm/kasan/report.c                 | 10 ++++----
>  mm/kasan/tags_report.c            |  2 +-
>  10 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst b/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst
> index 2b68addaadcd..edca4be5e405 100644
> --- a/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst
> @@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ Most mappings in vmalloc space are small, requiring less than a full
>  page of shadow space. Allocating a full shadow page per mapping would
>  therefore be wasteful. Furthermore, to ensure that different mappings
>  use different shadow pages, mappings would have to be aligned to
> -``KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE``.
> +``KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE``.
>
>  Instead, we share backing space across multiple mappings. We allocate
>  a backing page when a mapping in vmalloc space uses a particular page
> diff --git a/lib/test_kasan.c b/lib/test_kasan.c
> index 662f862702fc..2947274cc2d3 100644
> --- a/lib/test_kasan.c
> +++ b/lib/test_kasan.c
> @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
>
>  #include "../mm/kasan/kasan.h"
>
> -#define OOB_TAG_OFF (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) ? 0 : KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE)
> +#define OOB_TAG_OFF (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) ? 0 : KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE)
>
>  /*
>   * We assign some test results to these globals to make sure the tests
> diff --git a/lib/test_kasan_module.c b/lib/test_kasan_module.c
> index 2d68db6ae67b..fcb991c3aaf8 100644
> --- a/lib/test_kasan_module.c
> +++ b/lib/test_kasan_module.c
> @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
>
>  #include "../mm/kasan/kasan.h"
>
> -#define OOB_TAG_OFF (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) ? 0 : KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE)
> +#define OOB_TAG_OFF (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) ? 0 : KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE)
>
>  static noinline void __init copy_user_test(void)
>  {
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c
> index a4b73fa0dd7e..f65c9f792f8f 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/common.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/common.c
> @@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ void *memcpy(void *dest, const void *src, size_t len)
>
>  /*
>   * Poisons the shadow memory for 'size' bytes starting from 'addr'.
> - * Memory addresses should be aligned to KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE.
> + * Memory addresses should be aligned to KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE.
>   */
>  void kasan_poison_memory(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value)
>  {
> @@ -138,13 +138,13 @@ void kasan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size)
>
>         kasan_poison_memory(address, size, tag);
>
> -       if (size & KASAN_SHADOW_MASK) {
> +       if (size & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK) {
>                 u8 *shadow = (u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(address + size);
>
>                 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS))
>                         *shadow = tag;
>                 else
> -                       *shadow = size & KASAN_SHADOW_MASK;
> +                       *shadow = size & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK;
>         }
>  }
>
> @@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ void kasan_unpoison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
>  void kasan_poison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
>  {
>         kasan_poison_memory(object,
> -                       round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE),
> +                       round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE),
>                         KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);
>  }
>
> @@ -368,7 +368,7 @@ static inline bool shadow_invalid(u8 tag, s8 shadow_byte)
>  {
>         if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC))
>                 return shadow_byte < 0 ||
> -                       shadow_byte >= KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE;
> +                       shadow_byte >= KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE;
>
>         /* else CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS: */
>         if ((u8)shadow_byte == KASAN_TAG_INVALID)
> @@ -407,7 +407,7 @@ static bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
>                 return true;
>         }
>
> -       rounded_up_size = round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
> +       rounded_up_size = round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
>         kasan_poison_memory(object, rounded_up_size, KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE);
>
>         if ((IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) && !quarantine) ||
> @@ -440,9 +440,9 @@ static void *__kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,
>                 return NULL;
>
>         redzone_start = round_up((unsigned long)(object + size),
> -                               KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
> +                               KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
>         redzone_end = round_up((unsigned long)object + cache->object_size,
> -                               KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
> +                               KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
>
>         if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS))
>                 tag = assign_tag(cache, object, false, keep_tag);
> @@ -486,7 +486,7 @@ void * __must_check kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size,
>
>         page = virt_to_page(ptr);
>         redzone_start = round_up((unsigned long)(ptr + size),
> -                               KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
> +                               KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
>         redzone_end = (unsigned long)ptr + page_size(page);
>
>         kasan_unpoison_memory(ptr, size);
> @@ -584,8 +584,8 @@ static int __meminit kasan_mem_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb,
>         shadow_size = nr_shadow_pages << PAGE_SHIFT;
>         shadow_end = shadow_start + shadow_size;
>
> -       if (WARN_ON(mem_data->nr_pages % KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE) ||
> -               WARN_ON(start_kaddr % (KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE << PAGE_SHIFT)))
> +       if (WARN_ON(mem_data->nr_pages % KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE) ||
> +               WARN_ON(start_kaddr % (KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE << PAGE_SHIFT)))
>                 return NOTIFY_BAD;
>
>         switch (action) {
> @@ -743,7 +743,7 @@ void kasan_poison_vmalloc(const void *start, unsigned long size)
>         if (!is_vmalloc_or_module_addr(start))
>                 return;
>
> -       size = round_up(size, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
> +       size = round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
>         kasan_poison_memory(start, size, KASAN_VMALLOC_INVALID);
>  }
>
> @@ -856,22 +856,22 @@ void kasan_release_vmalloc(unsigned long start, unsigned long end,
>         unsigned long region_start, region_end;
>         unsigned long size;
>
> -       region_start = ALIGN(start, PAGE_SIZE * KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
> -       region_end = ALIGN_DOWN(end, PAGE_SIZE * KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
> +       region_start = ALIGN(start, PAGE_SIZE * KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
> +       region_end = ALIGN_DOWN(end, PAGE_SIZE * KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
>
>         free_region_start = ALIGN(free_region_start,
> -                                 PAGE_SIZE * KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
> +                                 PAGE_SIZE * KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
>
>         if (start != region_start &&
>             free_region_start < region_start)
> -               region_start -= PAGE_SIZE * KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE;
> +               region_start -= PAGE_SIZE * KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE;
>
>         free_region_end = ALIGN_DOWN(free_region_end,
> -                                    PAGE_SIZE * KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
> +                                    PAGE_SIZE * KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
>
>         if (end != region_end &&
>             free_region_end > region_end)
> -               region_end += PAGE_SIZE * KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE;
> +               region_end += PAGE_SIZE * KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE;
>
>         shadow_start = kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)region_start);
>         shadow_end = kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)region_end);
> @@ -897,7 +897,8 @@ int kasan_module_alloc(void *addr, size_t size)
>         unsigned long shadow_start;
>
>         shadow_start = (unsigned long)kasan_mem_to_shadow(addr);
> -       scaled_size = (size + KASAN_SHADOW_MASK) >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT;
> +       scaled_size = (size + KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE - 1) >>
> +                               KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT;
>         shadow_size = round_up(scaled_size, PAGE_SIZE);
>
>         if (WARN_ON(!PAGE_ALIGNED(shadow_start)))
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/generic.c b/mm/kasan/generic.c
> index 7006157c674b..ec4417156943 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/generic.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/generic.c
> @@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ static __always_inline bool memory_is_poisoned_1(unsigned long addr)
>         s8 shadow_value = *(s8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)addr);
>
>         if (unlikely(shadow_value)) {
> -               s8 last_accessible_byte = addr & KASAN_SHADOW_MASK;
> +               s8 last_accessible_byte = addr & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK;
>                 return unlikely(last_accessible_byte >= shadow_value);
>         }
>
> @@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ static __always_inline bool memory_is_poisoned_2_4_8(unsigned long addr,
>          * Access crosses 8(shadow size)-byte boundary. Such access maps
>          * into 2 shadow bytes, so we need to check them both.
>          */
> -       if (unlikely(((addr + size - 1) & KASAN_SHADOW_MASK) < size - 1))
> +       if (unlikely(((addr + size - 1) & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK) < size - 1))
>                 return *shadow_addr || memory_is_poisoned_1(addr + size - 1);
>
>         return memory_is_poisoned_1(addr + size - 1);
> @@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ static __always_inline bool memory_is_poisoned_16(unsigned long addr)
>         u16 *shadow_addr = (u16 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)addr);
>
>         /* Unaligned 16-bytes access maps into 3 shadow bytes. */
> -       if (unlikely(!IS_ALIGNED(addr, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE)))
> +       if (unlikely(!IS_ALIGNED(addr, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE)))
>                 return *shadow_addr || memory_is_poisoned_1(addr + 15);
>
>         return *shadow_addr;
> @@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ static __always_inline bool memory_is_poisoned_n(unsigned long addr,
>                 s8 *last_shadow = (s8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)last_byte);
>
>                 if (unlikely(ret != (unsigned long)last_shadow ||
> -                       ((long)(last_byte & KASAN_SHADOW_MASK) >= *last_shadow)))
> +                       ((long)(last_byte & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK) >= *last_shadow)))
>                         return true;
>         }
>         return false;
> @@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ void kasan_cache_shutdown(struct kmem_cache *cache)
>
>  static void register_global(struct kasan_global *global)
>  {
> -       size_t aligned_size = round_up(global->size, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
> +       size_t aligned_size = round_up(global->size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
>
>         kasan_unpoison_memory(global->beg, global->size);
>
> @@ -274,10 +274,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__asan_handle_no_return);
>  /* Emitted by compiler to poison alloca()ed objects. */
>  void __asan_alloca_poison(unsigned long addr, size_t size)
>  {
> -       size_t rounded_up_size = round_up(size, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
> +       size_t rounded_up_size = round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
>         size_t padding_size = round_up(size, KASAN_ALLOCA_REDZONE_SIZE) -
>                         rounded_up_size;
> -       size_t rounded_down_size = round_down(size, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
> +       size_t rounded_down_size = round_down(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
>
>         const void *left_redzone = (const void *)(addr -
>                         KASAN_ALLOCA_REDZONE_SIZE);
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/generic_report.c b/mm/kasan/generic_report.c
> index 6bb3f66992df..7d5b9e5c7cfe 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/generic_report.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/generic_report.c
> @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ void *find_first_bad_addr(void *addr, size_t size)
>         void *p = addr;
>
>         while (p < addr + size && !(*(u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(p)))
> -               p += KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE;
> +               p += KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE;
>         return p;
>  }
>
> @@ -46,14 +46,14 @@ static const char *get_shadow_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info)
>         shadow_addr = (u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(info->first_bad_addr);
>
>         /*
> -        * If shadow byte value is in [0, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE) we can look
> +        * If shadow byte value is in [0, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE) we can look
>          * at the next shadow byte to determine the type of the bad access.
>          */
> -       if (*shadow_addr > 0 && *shadow_addr <= KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE - 1)
> +       if (*shadow_addr > 0 && *shadow_addr <= KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE - 1)
>                 shadow_addr++;
>
>         switch (*shadow_addr) {
> -       case 0 ... KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE - 1:
> +       case 0 ... KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE - 1:
>                 /*
>                  * In theory it's still possible to see these shadow values
>                  * due to a data race in the kernel code.
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/init.c b/mm/kasan/init.c
> index 9ce8cc5b8621..dfddd6c39fe6 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/init.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/init.c
> @@ -442,8 +442,8 @@ void kasan_remove_zero_shadow(void *start, unsigned long size)
>         end = addr + (size >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT);
>
>         if (WARN_ON((unsigned long)start %
> -                       (KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE)) ||
> -           WARN_ON(size % (KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE)))
> +                       (KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE)) ||
> +           WARN_ON(size % (KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE)))
>                 return;
>
>         for (; addr < end; addr = next) {
> @@ -477,8 +477,8 @@ int kasan_add_zero_shadow(void *start, unsigned long size)
>         shadow_end = shadow_start + (size >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT);
>
>         if (WARN_ON((unsigned long)start %
> -                       (KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE)) ||
> -           WARN_ON(size % (KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE)))
> +                       (KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE)) ||
> +           WARN_ON(size % (KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE)))
>                 return -EINVAL;
>
>         ret = kasan_populate_early_shadow(shadow_start, shadow_end);
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan.h b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
> index 03450d3b31f7..c31e2c739301 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/kasan.h
> +++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
> @@ -5,8 +5,8 @@
>  #include <linux/kasan.h>
>  #include <linux/stackdepot.h>
>
> -#define KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE (1UL << KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT)
> -#define KASAN_SHADOW_MASK       (KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE - 1)
> +#define KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE     (1UL << KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT)
> +#define KASAN_GRANULE_MASK     (KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE - 1)
>
>  #define KASAN_TAG_KERNEL       0xFF /* native kernel pointers tag */
>  #define KASAN_TAG_INVALID      0xFE /* inaccessible memory tag */
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/report.c b/mm/kasan/report.c
> index d500923abc8b..7b8dcb799a78 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/report.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/report.c
> @@ -314,24 +314,24 @@ static bool __must_check get_address_stack_frame_info(const void *addr,
>                 return false;
>
>         aligned_addr = round_down((unsigned long)addr, sizeof(long));
> -       mem_ptr = round_down(aligned_addr, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
> +       mem_ptr = round_down(aligned_addr, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
>         shadow_ptr = kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)aligned_addr);
>         shadow_bottom = kasan_mem_to_shadow(end_of_stack(current));
>
>         while (shadow_ptr >= shadow_bottom && *shadow_ptr != KASAN_STACK_LEFT) {
>                 shadow_ptr--;
> -               mem_ptr -= KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE;
> +               mem_ptr -= KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE;
>         }
>
>         while (shadow_ptr >= shadow_bottom && *shadow_ptr == KASAN_STACK_LEFT) {
>                 shadow_ptr--;
> -               mem_ptr -= KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE;
> +               mem_ptr -= KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE;
>         }
>
>         if (shadow_ptr < shadow_bottom)
>                 return false;
>
> -       frame = (const unsigned long *)(mem_ptr + KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
> +       frame = (const unsigned long *)(mem_ptr + KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
>         if (frame[0] != KASAN_CURRENT_STACK_FRAME_MAGIC) {
>                 pr_err("KASAN internal error: frame info validation failed; invalid marker: %lu\n",
>                        frame[0]);
> @@ -599,6 +599,6 @@ void kasan_non_canonical_hook(unsigned long addr)
>         else
>                 bug_type = "maybe wild-memory-access";
>         pr_alert("KASAN: %s in range [0x%016lx-0x%016lx]\n", bug_type,
> -                orig_addr, orig_addr + KASAN_SHADOW_MASK);
> +                orig_addr, orig_addr + KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE - 1);
>  }
>  #endif
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/tags_report.c b/mm/kasan/tags_report.c
> index 5f183501b871..c87d5a343b4e 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/tags_report.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/tags_report.c
> @@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ void *find_first_bad_addr(void *addr, size_t size)
>         void *end = p + size;
>
>         while (p < end && tag == *(u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(p))
> -               p += KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE;
> +               p += KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE;
>         return p;
>  }
>
> --
> 2.29.2.222.g5d2a92d10f8-goog
>


-- 
Alexander Potapenko
Software Engineer

Google Germany GmbH
Erika-Mann-Straße, 33
80636 München

Geschäftsführer: Paul Manicle, Halimah DeLaine Prado
Registergericht und -nummer: Hamburg, HRB 86891
Sitz der Gesellschaft: Hamburg


  reply	other threads:[~2020-11-11 13:45 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 107+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-11-10 22:09 [PATCH v9 00/44] kasan: add hardware tag-based mode for arm64 Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-10 22:09 ` [PATCH v9 01/44] kasan: drop unnecessary GPL text from comment headers Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-11 13:16   ` Alexander Potapenko
2020-11-10 22:09 ` [PATCH v9 02/44] kasan: KASAN_VMALLOC depends on KASAN_GENERIC Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-11 13:19   ` Alexander Potapenko
2020-11-10 22:10 ` [PATCH v9 03/44] kasan: group vmalloc code Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-11 13:21   ` Alexander Potapenko
2020-11-10 22:10 ` [PATCH v9 04/44] s390/kasan: include asm/page.h from asm/kasan.h Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-10 22:10 ` [PATCH v9 05/44] kasan: shadow declarations only for software modes Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-11 13:25   ` Alexander Potapenko
2020-11-10 22:10 ` [PATCH v9 06/44] kasan: rename (un)poison_shadow to (un)poison_memory Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-11 13:26   ` Alexander Potapenko
2020-11-10 22:10 ` [PATCH v9 07/44] kasan: rename KASAN_SHADOW_* to KASAN_GRANULE_* Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-11 13:45   ` Alexander Potapenko [this message]
2020-11-10 22:10 ` [PATCH v9 08/44] kasan: only build init.c for software modes Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-11 13:46   ` Alexander Potapenko
2020-11-10 22:10 ` [PATCH v9 09/44] kasan: split out shadow.c from common.c Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-11 14:07   ` Alexander Potapenko
2020-11-10 22:10 ` [PATCH v9 10/44] kasan: define KASAN_GRANULE_PAGE Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-11 14:13   ` Alexander Potapenko
2020-11-11 18:47     ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-11 19:04       ` Marco Elver
2020-11-12  0:05         ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-10 22:10 ` [PATCH v9 11/44] kasan: rename report and tags files Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-11 14:15   ` Alexander Potapenko
2020-11-10 22:10 ` [PATCH v9 12/44] kasan: don't duplicate config dependencies Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-11 14:20   ` Alexander Potapenko
2020-11-10 22:10 ` [PATCH v9 13/44] kasan: hide invalid free check implementation Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-11 14:23   ` Alexander Potapenko
2020-11-10 22:10 ` [PATCH v9 14/44] kasan: decode stack frame only with KASAN_STACK_ENABLE Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-11 14:25   ` Alexander Potapenko
2020-11-10 22:10 ` [PATCH v9 15/44] kasan, arm64: only init shadow for software modes Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-11 14:30   ` Alexander Potapenko
2020-11-10 22:10 ` [PATCH v9 16/44] kasan, arm64: only use kasan_depth " Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-11 14:59   ` Alexander Potapenko
2020-11-10 22:10 ` [PATCH v9 17/44] kasan, arm64: move initialization message Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-11 15:03   ` Alexander Potapenko
2020-11-11 18:50     ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-12 15:09       ` Alexander Potapenko
2020-11-10 22:10 ` [PATCH v9 18/44] kasan, arm64: rename kasan_init_tags and mark as __init Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-11 15:05   ` Alexander Potapenko
2020-11-10 22:10 ` [PATCH v9 19/44] kasan: rename addr_has_shadow to addr_has_metadata Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-11 15:06   ` Alexander Potapenko
2020-11-10 22:10 ` [PATCH v9 20/44] kasan: rename print_shadow_for_address to print_memory_metadata Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-11 15:07   ` Alexander Potapenko
2020-11-10 22:10 ` [PATCH v9 21/44] kasan: kasan_non_canonical_hook only for software modes Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-11 15:08   ` Alexander Potapenko
2020-11-11 18:52     ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-12 15:16       ` Alexander Potapenko
2020-11-12 19:27         ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-10 22:10 ` [PATCH v9 22/44] kasan: rename SHADOW layout macros to META Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-11 15:18   ` Alexander Potapenko
2020-11-10 22:10 ` [PATCH v9 23/44] kasan: separate metadata_fetch_row for each mode Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-11 15:22   ` Alexander Potapenko
2020-11-11 16:19     ` Alexander Potapenko
2020-11-10 22:10 ` [PATCH v9 24/44] kasan, arm64: don't allow SW_TAGS with ARM64_MTE Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-11 15:52   ` Alexander Potapenko
2020-11-10 22:10 ` [PATCH v9 25/44] kasan: introduce CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-11 15:58   ` Alexander Potapenko
2020-11-11 18:53     ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-10 22:10 ` [PATCH v9 26/44] arm64: Enable armv8.5-a asm-arch option Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-10 22:10 ` [PATCH v9 27/44] arm64: mte: Add in-kernel MTE helpers Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-10 22:10 ` [PATCH v9 28/44] arm64: mte: Reset the page tag in page->flags Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-12  9:31   ` Catalin Marinas
2020-11-12  9:39     ` Vincenzo Frascino
2020-11-10 22:10 ` [PATCH v9 29/44] arm64: mte: Add in-kernel tag fault handler Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-10 22:10 ` [PATCH v9 30/44] arm64: kasan: Allow enabling in-kernel MTE Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-12  9:43   ` Catalin Marinas
2020-11-12 16:46     ` Vincenzo Frascino
2020-11-13 11:17     ` Vincenzo Frascino
2020-11-13 12:00       ` Catalin Marinas
2020-11-13 12:04         ` Vincenzo Frascino
2020-11-10 22:10 ` [PATCH v9 31/44] arm64: mte: Convert gcr_user into an exclude mask Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-10 22:10 ` [PATCH v9 32/44] arm64: mte: Switch GCR_EL1 in kernel entry and exit Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-12  9:39   ` Catalin Marinas
2020-11-12  9:45     ` Vincenzo Frascino
2020-11-12  9:45       ` Catalin Marinas
2020-11-12  9:55         ` Vincenzo Frascino
2020-11-10 22:10 ` [PATCH v9 33/44] kasan, mm: untag page address in free_reserved_area Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-10 22:10 ` [PATCH v9 34/44] arm64: kasan: Align allocations for HW_TAGS Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-11 16:10   ` Alexander Potapenko
2020-11-10 22:10 ` [PATCH v9 35/44] arm64: kasan: Add arch layer for memory tagging helpers Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-10 22:10 ` [PATCH v9 36/44] kasan: define KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE for HW_TAGS Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-11 16:13   ` Alexander Potapenko
2020-11-10 22:10 ` [PATCH v9 37/44] kasan, x86, s390: update undef CONFIG_KASAN Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-11 16:15   ` Alexander Potapenko
2020-11-10 22:10 ` [PATCH v9 38/44] kasan, arm64: expand CONFIG_KASAN checks Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-11 16:22   ` Alexander Potapenko
2020-11-10 22:10 ` [PATCH v9 39/44] kasan, arm64: implement HW_TAGS runtime Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-12 17:37   ` Alexander Potapenko
2020-11-10 22:10 ` [PATCH v9 40/44] kasan, arm64: print report from tag fault handler Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-11 16:43   ` Alexander Potapenko
2020-11-10 22:10 ` [PATCH v9 41/44] kasan, mm: reset tags when accessing metadata Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-12 16:10   ` Alexander Potapenko
2020-11-10 22:10 ` [PATCH v9 42/44] kasan, arm64: enable CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-11 16:49   ` Alexander Potapenko
2020-11-10 22:10 ` [PATCH v9 43/44] kasan: add documentation for hardware tag-based mode Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-11 16:57   ` Alexander Potapenko
2020-11-11 18:54     ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-10 22:10 ` [PATCH v9 44/44] kselftest/arm64: Check GCR_EL1 after context switch Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-12  9:46   ` Catalin Marinas
2020-11-12 15:59   ` Alexander Potapenko
2020-11-12 16:09     ` Marco Elver
2020-11-12 16:41       ` Alexander Potapenko
2020-11-13 11:47     ` Vincenzo Frascino
2020-11-10 22:54 ` [PATCH v9 00/44] kasan: add hardware tag-based mode for arm64 Andrew Morton
2020-11-11 14:35   ` Andrey Konovalov

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