From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
To: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Cc: Lokesh Gidra <lokeshgidra@google.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>,
Daniel Colascione <dancol@dancol.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org>,
Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>,
Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>,
Aaron Goidel <acgoide@tycho.nsa.gov>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
"Joel Fernandes (Google)" <joel@joelfernandes.org>,
YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>,
Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>,
Adrian Reber <areber@redhat.com>,
Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>,
Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
SElinux list <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
kaleshsingh@google.com, Calin Juravle <calin@google.com>,
Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>,
Jeffrey Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>,
kernel-team@android.com, linux-mm@kvack.org,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>,
Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v13 3/4] selinux: teach SELinux about anonymous inodes
Date: Fri, 8 Jan 2021 15:58:36 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAHC9VhQHjNwTNGw4PP=w0h+NOvJzcDWHyAsj2Q6s+itJ_hY71g@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAEjxPJ6TA_nXrUJ6CjhG-j0_oAj9WU1vRn5pGvjDqQ2Bk9VVag@mail.gmail.com>
On Fri, Jan 8, 2021 at 2:35 PM Stephen Smalley
<stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Wed, Jan 6, 2021 at 10:03 PM Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> wrote:
> > On Wed, Nov 11, 2020 at 8:54 PM Lokesh Gidra <lokeshgidra@google.com> wrote:
> > > From: Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com>
> > >
> > > This change uses the anon_inodes and LSM infrastructure introduced in
> > > the previous patches to give SELinux the ability to control
> > > anonymous-inode files that are created using the new
> > > anon_inode_getfd_secure() function.
> > >
> > > A SELinux policy author detects and controls these anonymous inodes by
> > > adding a name-based type_transition rule that assigns a new security
> > > type to anonymous-inode files created in some domain. The name used
> > > for the name-based transition is the name associated with the
> > > anonymous inode for file listings --- e.g., "[userfaultfd]" or
> > > "[perf_event]".
> > >
> > > Example:
> > >
> > > type uffd_t;
> > > type_transition sysadm_t sysadm_t : anon_inode uffd_t "[userfaultfd]";
> > > allow sysadm_t uffd_t:anon_inode { create };
> > >
> > > (The next patch in this series is necessary for making userfaultfd
> > > support this new interface. The example above is just
> > > for exposition.)
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com>
> > > Signed-off-by: Lokesh Gidra <lokeshgidra@google.com>
> > > ---
> > > security/selinux/hooks.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > > security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 2 ++
> > > 2 files changed, 58 insertions(+)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> > > index 6b1826fc3658..d092aa512868 100644
> > > --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> > > +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> > > @@ -2927,6 +2927,61 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
> > > return 0;
> > > }
> > >
> > > +static int selinux_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode,
> > > + const struct qstr *name,
> > > + const struct inode *context_inode)
> > > +{
> > > + const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
> > > + struct common_audit_data ad;
> > > + struct inode_security_struct *isec;
> > > + int rc;
> > > +
> > > + if (unlikely(!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)))
> > > + return 0;
> > > +
> > > + isec = selinux_inode(inode);
> > > +
> > > + /*
> > > + * We only get here once per ephemeral inode. The inode has
> > > + * been initialized via inode_alloc_security but is otherwise
> > > + * untouched.
> > > + */
> > > +
> > > + if (context_inode) {
> > > + struct inode_security_struct *context_isec =
> > > + selinux_inode(context_inode);
> > > + if (context_isec->initialized != LABEL_INITIALIZED)
> > > + return -EACCES;
> > > +
> > > + isec->sclass = context_isec->sclass;
> >
> > Taking the object class directly from the context_inode is
> > interesting, and I suspect problematic. In the case below where no
> > context_inode is supplied the object class is set to
> > SECCLASS_ANON_INODE, which is correct, but when a context_inode is
> > supplied there is no guarantee that the object class will be set to
> > SECCLASS_ANON_INODE. This could both pose a problem for policy
> > writers (how do you distinguish the anon inode from other normal file
> > inodes in this case?) as well as an outright fault later in this
> > function when we try to check the ANON_INODE__CREATE on an object
> > other than a SECCLASS_ANON_INODE object.
> >
> > It works in the userfaultfd case because the context_inode is
> > originally created with this function so the object class is correctly
> > set to SECCLASS_ANON_INODE, but can we always guarantee that to be the
> > case? Do we ever need or want to support using a context_inode that
> > is not SECCLASS_ANON_INODE?
>
> Sorry, I haven't been following this. IIRC, the original reason for
> passing a context_inode was to support the /dev/kvm or similar use
> cases where the driver is creating anonymous inodes to represent
> specific objects/interfaces derived from the device node and we want
> to be able to control subsequent ioctl operations on those anonymous
> inodes in the same manner as for the device node. For example, ioctl
> operations on /dev/kvm can end up returning file descriptors for
> anonymous inodes representing a specific VM or VCPU or similar. If we
> propagate the security class and SID from the /dev/kvm inode (the
> context inode) to the new anonymous inode, we can write a single
> policy rule over all ioctl operations related to /dev/kvm.
Thanks for the background, and the /dev/kvm example, that is what I was missing.
> That's
> also why we used the FILE__CREATE permission here originally; that was
> also intentional. All the file-related classes including anon_inode
> inherit a common set of file permissions including create and thus we
> often use the FILE__<permission> in common code when checking
> permission against any potentially derived class.
Yes, if all of the anonymous inodes are not going to fall into the
anon_inode object class then FILE__CREATE makes the most sense.
Thanks Stephen.
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-01-08 20:58 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-11-12 1:53 [PATCH v13 0/4] SELinux support for anonymous inodes and UFFD Lokesh Gidra
2020-11-12 1:53 ` [PATCH v13 1/4] security: add inode_init_security_anon() LSM hook Lokesh Gidra
2020-11-12 1:53 ` [PATCH v13 2/4] fs: add LSM-supporting anon-inode interface Lokesh Gidra
2021-01-07 2:09 ` Paul Moore
2021-01-07 2:42 ` dancol
2021-01-07 3:05 ` Paul Moore
2021-01-07 2:43 ` Lokesh Gidra
2021-01-07 3:08 ` Paul Moore
2020-11-12 1:53 ` [PATCH v13 3/4] selinux: teach SELinux about anonymous inodes Lokesh Gidra
2021-01-07 3:03 ` Paul Moore
2021-01-07 3:55 ` Lokesh Gidra
2021-01-07 22:30 ` Paul Moore
2021-01-07 22:40 ` Lokesh Gidra
2021-01-08 19:35 ` Stephen Smalley
2021-01-08 20:17 ` Lokesh Gidra
2021-01-08 21:23 ` Stephen Smalley
2021-01-08 21:31 ` Lokesh Gidra
2021-01-08 20:58 ` Paul Moore [this message]
2020-11-12 1:53 ` [PATCH v13 4/4] userfaultfd: use secure anon inodes for userfaultfd Lokesh Gidra
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