From: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
To: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: "Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
"Jann Horn" <jannh@google.com>,
"Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
"Jeffrey Vander Stoep" <jeffv@google.com>,
"Michal Hocko" <mhocko@suse.com>,
"Shakeel Butt" <shakeelb@google.com>,
"David Rientjes" <rientjes@google.com>,
"Edgar Arriaga García" <edgararriaga@google.com>,
"Tim Murray" <timmurray@google.com>,
linux-mm <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
selinux@vger.kernel.org, "Linux API" <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
kernel-team <kernel-team@android.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] mm/madvise: replace ptrace attach requirement for process_madvise
Date: Fri, 8 Jan 2021 14:17:17 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAJuCfpHa3XHVEjNBDHJNo3RBWGdLnXsgZH9wyiGLqj655GwE2w@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <X/jZibYD1B42D+r7@google.com>
On Fri, Jan 8, 2021 at 2:15 PM Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> wrote:
>
> On Fri, Jan 08, 2021 at 12:58:57PM -0800, Suren Baghdasaryan wrote:
> > process_madvise currently requires ptrace attach capability.
> > PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH gives one process complete control over another
> > process. It effectively removes the security boundary between the
> > two processes (in one direction). Granting ptrace attach capability
> > even to a system process is considered dangerous since it creates an
> > attack surface. This severely limits the usage of this API.
> > The operations process_madvise can perform do not affect the correctness
> > of the operation of the target process; they only affect where the data
> > is physically located (and therefore, how fast it can be accessed).
> > What we want is the ability for one process to influence another process
> > in order to optimize performance across the entire system while leaving
> > the security boundary intact.
> > Replace PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH with a combination of PTRACE_MODE_READ
> > and CAP_SYS_NICE. PTRACE_MODE_READ to prevent leaking ASLR metadata
> > and CAP_SYS_NICE for influencing process performance.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
>
> It sounds logical to me.
> If security folks don't see any concern and fix below,
>
> Acked-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
>
> > @@ -1197,12 +1197,22 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(process_madvise, int, pidfd, const struct iovec __user *, vec,
> > goto release_task;
> > }
> >
> > - mm = mm_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS);
> > + /* Require PTRACE_MODE_READ to avoid leaking ASLR metadata. */
> > + mm = mm_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS);
> > if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(mm)) {
> > ret = IS_ERR(mm) ? PTR_ERR(mm) : -ESRCH;
> > goto release_task;
> > }
> >
> > + /*
> > + * Require CAP_SYS_NICE for influencing process performance. Note that
> > + * only non-destructive hints are currently supported.
> > + */
> > + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) {
> > + ret = -EPERM;
> > + goto release_task;
>
> mmput?
Ouch! Thanks for pointing it out! Will include in the next respin.
>
> > + }
> > +
> > total_len = iov_iter_count(&iter);
> >
> > while (iov_iter_count(&iter)) {
> > --
> > 2.30.0.284.gd98b1dd5eaa7-goog
> >
>
> --
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to kernel-team+unsubscribe@android.com.
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-01-08 22:17 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-01-08 20:58 [PATCH 1/1] mm/madvise: replace ptrace attach requirement for process_madvise Suren Baghdasaryan
2021-01-08 22:15 ` Minchan Kim
2021-01-08 22:17 ` Suren Baghdasaryan [this message]
2021-01-09 1:02 ` David Rientjes
2021-01-09 2:19 ` Suren Baghdasaryan
2021-01-11 10:20 ` Florian Weimer
2021-01-11 17:05 ` Suren Baghdasaryan
2021-01-11 17:09 ` Suren Baghdasaryan
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