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From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
To: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Cc: X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	 Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	 "open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	 linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
	 Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
	 Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
	 Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
	 Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	 Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	 Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
	Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
	 Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	 Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
	 Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com>,
	Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>,
	 Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>,
	Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>,
	 "Huang, Haitao" <haitao.huang@intel.com>,
	Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v20 06/25] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2021 11:48:33 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrVBTocCecYfTMEqeeHSquyWLPYBDP4eWQECo9WFYg2_pg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210210175703.12492-7-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>

On Wed, Feb 10, 2021 at 9:58 AM Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> wrote:
>
> A control-protection fault is triggered when a control-flow transfer
> attempt violates Shadow Stack or Indirect Branch Tracking constraints.
> For example, the return address for a RET instruction differs from the copy
> on the shadow stack; or an indirect JMP instruction, without the NOTRACK
> prefix, arrives at a non-ENDBR opcode.
>
> The control-protection fault handler works in a similar way as the general
> protection fault handler.  It provides the si_code SEGV_CPERR to the signal
> handler.
>
> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h    |  4 ++
>  arch/x86/kernel/idt.c              |  4 ++
>  arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c    |  2 +-
>  arch/x86/kernel/traps.c            | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h |  3 +-
>  5 files changed, 74 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h
> index f656aabd1545..ff4b3bf634da 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h
> @@ -574,6 +574,10 @@ DECLARE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(X86_TRAP_SS,    exc_stack_segment);
>  DECLARE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(X86_TRAP_GP,        exc_general_protection);
>  DECLARE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(X86_TRAP_AC,        exc_alignment_check);
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET
> +DECLARE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(X86_TRAP_CP, exc_control_protection);
> +#endif
> +
>  /* Raw exception entries which need extra work */
>  DECLARE_IDTENTRY_RAW(X86_TRAP_UD,              exc_invalid_op);
>  DECLARE_IDTENTRY_RAW(X86_TRAP_BP,              exc_int3);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c b/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c
> index ee1a283f8e96..e8166d9bbb10 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c
> @@ -105,6 +105,10 @@ static const __initconst struct idt_data def_idts[] = {
>  #elif defined(CONFIG_X86_32)
>         SYSG(IA32_SYSCALL_VECTOR,       entry_INT80_32),
>  #endif
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET
> +       INTG(X86_TRAP_CP,               asm_exc_control_protection),
> +#endif
>  };
>
>  /*
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c b/arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c
> index a5330ff498f0..dd92490b1e7f 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c
> @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ static inline void signal_compat_build_tests(void)
>          */
>         BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGILL  != 11);
>         BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGFPE  != 15);
> -       BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGSEGV != 9);
> +       BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGSEGV != 10);
>         BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGBUS  != 5);
>         BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGTRAP != 5);
>         BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGCHLD != 6);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
> index 7f5aec758f0e..8c7fa91a57c9 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
> @@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
>  #include <linux/io.h>
>  #include <linux/hardirq.h>
>  #include <linux/atomic.h>
> +#include <linux/nospec.h>
>
>  #include <asm/stacktrace.h>
>  #include <asm/processor.h>
> @@ -606,6 +607,68 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(exc_general_protection)
>         cond_local_irq_disable(regs);
>  }
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET
> +static const char * const control_protection_err[] = {
> +       "unknown",
> +       "near-ret",
> +       "far-ret/iret",
> +       "endbranch",
> +       "rstorssp",
> +       "setssbsy",
> +       "unknown",
> +};
> +
> +/*
> + * When a control protection exception occurs, send a signal to the responsible
> + * application.  Currently, control protection is only enabled for user mode.
> + * This exception should not come from kernel mode.
> + */
> +DEFINE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(exc_control_protection)
> +{
> +       static DEFINE_RATELIMIT_STATE(rs, DEFAULT_RATELIMIT_INTERVAL,
> +                                     DEFAULT_RATELIMIT_BURST);
> +       struct task_struct *tsk;
> +
> +       if (!user_mode(regs)) {
> +               pr_emerg("PANIC: unexpected kernel control protection fault\n");
> +               die("kernel control protection fault", regs, error_code);
> +               panic("Machine halted.");

I think it would be nice to decode the error code and print the cause.

> +       }
> +
> +       cond_local_irq_enable(regs);

We got rid of user mode irqs off a while ago.   You can just do
local_irq_enable();

> +
> +       if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CET))
> +               WARN_ONCE(1, "Control protection fault with CET support disabled\n");
> +
> +       tsk = current;
> +       tsk->thread.error_code = error_code;
> +       tsk->thread.trap_nr = X86_TRAP_CP;



> +
> +       /*
> +        * Ratelimit to prevent log spamming.
> +        */
> +       if (show_unhandled_signals && unhandled_signal(tsk, SIGSEGV) &&
> +           __ratelimit(&rs)) {
> +               unsigned long ssp;
> +               int err;
> +
> +               err = array_index_nospec(error_code, ARRAY_SIZE(control_protection_err));

Shouldn't this do a bounds check?  You also need to handle the ENCL bit.

> +
> +               rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, ssp);
> +               pr_emerg("%s[%d] control protection ip:%lx sp:%lx ssp:%lx error:%lx(%s)",
> +                        tsk->comm, task_pid_nr(tsk),
> +                        regs->ip, regs->sp, ssp, error_code,
> +                        control_protection_err[err]);

That should be pr_info();

> +               print_vma_addr(KERN_CONT " in ", regs->ip);
> +               pr_cont("\n");
> +       }
> +
> +       force_sig_fault(SIGSEGV, SEGV_CPERR,
> +                       (void __user *)uprobe_get_trap_addr(regs));
> +       cond_local_irq_disable(regs);
> +}
> +#endif
> +
>  static bool do_int3(struct pt_regs *regs)
>  {
>         int res;
> diff --git a/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h b/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h
> index d2597000407a..1c2ea91284a0 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h
> @@ -231,7 +231,8 @@ typedef struct siginfo {
>  #define SEGV_ADIPERR   7       /* Precise MCD exception */
>  #define SEGV_MTEAERR   8       /* Asynchronous ARM MTE error */
>  #define SEGV_MTESERR   9       /* Synchronous ARM MTE exception */
> -#define NSIGSEGV       9
> +#define SEGV_CPERR     10      /* Control protection fault */
> +#define NSIGSEGV       10
>
>  /*
>   * SIGBUS si_codes
> --
> 2.21.0
>


  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-02-10 19:48 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-02-10 17:56 [PATCH v20 00/25] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-10 17:56 ` [PATCH v20 01/25] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-10 17:56 ` [PATCH v20 02/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode control-flow protection Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-10 19:33   ` Kees Cook
2021-02-10 19:40     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-02-10 17:56 ` [PATCH v20 03/25] x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-10 17:56 ` [PATCH v20 04/25] x86/cpufeatures: Introduce X86_FEATURE_CET and setup functions Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-10 17:56 ` [PATCH v20 05/25] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-10 17:56 ` [PATCH v20 06/25] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-10 19:34   ` Kees Cook
2021-02-10 19:48   ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2021-02-10 17:56 ` [PATCH v20 07/25] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY from kernel RO pages Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-10 19:35   ` Kees Cook
2021-02-10 17:56 ` [PATCH v20 08/25] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-10 19:42   ` Kees Cook
2021-02-10 20:28     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-02-15 16:49       ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-02-10 17:56 ` [PATCH v20 09/25] drm/i915/gvt: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-10 17:56 ` [PATCH v20 10/25] x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-10 17:56 ` [PATCH v20 11/25] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-10 19:43   ` Kees Cook
2021-02-10 17:56 ` [PATCH v20 12/25] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-10 17:56 ` [PATCH v20 13/25] x86/mm: Shadow Stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-10 17:56 ` [PATCH v20 14/25] x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-10 17:56 ` [PATCH v20 15/25] mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-10 17:56 ` [PATCH v20 16/25] mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-10 17:56 ` [PATCH v20 17/25] mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-10 17:56 ` [PATCH v20 18/25] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte() for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-10 17:56 ` [PATCH v20 19/25] mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap() Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-10 17:56 ` [PATCH v20 20/25] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-10 17:56 ` [PATCH v20 21/25] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-10 19:58   ` Kees Cook
2021-02-10 21:38     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-02-11  2:05       ` Kees Cook
2021-02-10 17:57 ` [PATCH v20 22/25] ELF: Introduce arch_setup_elf_property() Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-10 17:57 ` [PATCH v20 23/25] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-10 17:57 ` [PATCH v20 24/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for " Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-10 17:57 ` [PATCH v20 25/25] mm: Introduce PROT_SHSTK " Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-10 19:46   ` Kees Cook

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