From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.1 required=3.0 tests=DKIMWL_WL_HIGH,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 696CBCA9EC5 for ; Wed, 30 Oct 2019 21:28:39 +0000 (UTC) Received: from kanga.kvack.org (kanga.kvack.org [205.233.56.17]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1470A20862 for ; Wed, 30 Oct 2019 21:28:38 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="GcWeTabO" DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 1470A20862 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=kernel.org Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=owner-linux-mm@kvack.org Received: by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix) id 97E546B0007; Wed, 30 Oct 2019 17:28:38 -0400 (EDT) Received: by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix, from userid 40) id 92F236B0008; Wed, 30 Oct 2019 17:28:38 -0400 (EDT) X-Delivered-To: int-list-linux-mm@kvack.org Received: by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix, from userid 63042) id 8449C6B000A; Wed, 30 Oct 2019 17:28:38 -0400 (EDT) X-Delivered-To: linux-mm@kvack.org Received: from forelay.hostedemail.com (smtprelay0024.hostedemail.com [216.40.44.24]) by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 634846B0007 for ; Wed, 30 Oct 2019 17:28:38 -0400 (EDT) Received: from smtpin10.hostedemail.com (10.5.19.251.rfc1918.com [10.5.19.251]) by forelay03.hostedemail.com (Postfix) with SMTP id E20AA8249980 for ; Wed, 30 Oct 2019 21:28:37 +0000 (UTC) X-FDA: 76101740274.10.bee40_857b5e263cb4d X-HE-Tag: bee40_857b5e263cb4d X-Filterd-Recvd-Size: 7980 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by imf13.hostedemail.com (Postfix) with ESMTP for ; Wed, 30 Oct 2019 21:28:37 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail-wr1-f45.google.com (mail-wr1-f45.google.com [209.85.221.45]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id DC88621734 for ; Wed, 30 Oct 2019 21:28:35 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1572470916; bh=XnMIsHcVdwBeAptKPGJSNsffx0HxomByGS8vfIyd67I=; h=References:In-Reply-To:From:Date:Subject:To:Cc:From; b=GcWeTabOhXFFYmG9IuepIBfPV5QRfttQWMLS1Y6Rk8rh2vTkVAkEhB6Um3JyKeqy4 LNs6p/NikovmiHK4i1587lHitpzbIZZEceZQnp9MC1Dd+FLh2eEfMYUuuLrCU/z23G d6YvUwcSinsTp5iE3gKiIYHIUUNColKmb8wgsW14= Received: by mail-wr1-f45.google.com with SMTP id n1so3963245wra.10 for ; Wed, 30 Oct 2019 14:28:35 -0700 (PDT) X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAVXJhxALc1SGSzYEw5VLACLH205UrF/ny76rHpmAZ78T9lAQzuR nB2yUbLpvVQkJcf9GVcSBqxEdbnoFsW6gdKux3aCbg== X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqxL52nW7f18FABq7zaYN4yb2n3VI3Wgyrkk3D0RE6Z3WVzN667TLF9aXzvjCfAynZrgm0oE0wYz3oOaoK5HeOI= X-Received: by 2002:adf:f342:: with SMTP id e2mr1983177wrp.61.1572470914076; Wed, 30 Oct 2019 14:28:34 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <1572171452-7958-1-git-send-email-rppt@kernel.org> <20191029093254.GE18773@rapoport-lnx> <20191030084005.GC20624@rapoport-lnx> In-Reply-To: <20191030084005.GC20624@rapoport-lnx> From: Andy Lutomirski Date: Wed, 30 Oct 2019 14:28:21 -0700 X-Gmail-Original-Message-ID: Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC] mm: add MAP_EXCLUSIVE to create exclusive user mappings To: Mike Rapoport Cc: Andy Lutomirski , LKML , Alexey Dobriyan , Andrew Morton , Arnd Bergmann , Borislav Petkov , Dave Hansen , James Bottomley , Peter Zijlstra , Steven Rostedt , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , "H. Peter Anvin" , Linux API , Linux-MM , X86 ML , Mike Rapoport Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Bogosity: Ham, tests=bogofilter, spamicity=0.000000, version=1.2.4 Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org Precedence: bulk X-Loop: owner-majordomo@kvack.org List-ID: On Wed, Oct 30, 2019 at 1:40 AM Mike Rapoport wrote: > > On Tue, Oct 29, 2019 at 10:00:55AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > > On Tue, Oct 29, 2019 at 2:33 AM Mike Rapoport wrote: > > > > > > On Mon, Oct 28, 2019 at 02:44:23PM -0600, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > > > > > > > > > On Oct 27, 2019, at 4:17 AM, Mike Rapoport wrot= e: > > > > > > > > > > =EF=BB=BFFrom: Mike Rapoport > > > > > > > > > > Hi, > > > > > > > > > > The patch below aims to allow applications to create mappins that= have > > > > > pages visible only to the owning process. Such mappings could be = used to > > > > > store secrets so that these secrets are not visible neither to ot= her > > > > > processes nor to the kernel. > > > > > > > > > > I've only tested the basic functionality, the changes should be v= erified > > > > > against THP/migration/compaction. Yet, I'd appreciate early feedb= ack. > > > > > > > > I=E2=80=99ve contemplated the concept a fair amount, and I think yo= u should > > > > consider a change to the API. In particular, rather than having it = be a > > > > MAP_ flag, make it a chardev. You can, at least at first, allow on= ly > > > > MAP_SHARED, and admins can decide who gets to use it. It might als= o play > > > > better with the VM overall, and you won=E2=80=99t need a VM_ flag f= or it =E2=80=94 you > > > > can just wire up .fault to do the right thing. > > > > > > I think mmap()/mprotect()/madvise() are the natural APIs for such > > > interface. > > > > Then you have a whole bunch of questions to answer. For example: > > > > What happens if you mprotect() or similar when the mapping is already > > in use in a way that's incompatible with MAP_EXCLUSIVE? > > Then we refuse to mprotect()? Like in any other case when vm_flags are no= t > compatible with required madvise()/mprotect() operation. > I'm not talking about flags. I'm talking about the case where one thread (or RDMA or whatever) has get_user_pages()'d a mapping and another thread mprotect()s it MAP_EXCLUSIVE. > > Is it actually reasonable to malloc() some memory and then make it excl= usive? > > > > Are you permitted to map a file MAP_EXCLUSIVE? What does it mean? > > I'd limit MAP_EXCLUSIVE only to anonymous memory. > > > What does MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_EXCLUSIVE do? > > My preference is to have only mmap() and then the semantics is more clear= : > > MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_EXCLUSIVE creates a pre-populated region, marks it lock= ed > and drops the pages in this region from the direct map. > The pages are returned back on munmap(). > Then there is no way to change an existing area to be exclusive or vice > versa. And what happens if you fork()? Limiting it to MAP_SHARED | MAP_EXCLUSIVE would about this particular nasty question. > > > How does one pass exclusive memory via SCM_RIGHTS? (If it's a > > memfd-like or chardev interface, it's trivial. mmap(), not so much.) > > Why passing such memory via SCM_RIGHTS would be useful? Suppose I want to put a secret into exclusive memory and then send that secret to some other process. The obvious approach would be to SCM_RIGHTS an fd over, but you can't do that with MAP_EXCLUSIVE as you've defined it. In general, there are lots of use cases for memfd and other fd-backed memory. > > > And finally, there's my personal giant pet peeve: a major use of this > > will be for virtualization. I suspect that a lot of people would like > > the majority of KVM guest memory to be unmapped from the host > > pagetables. But people might also like for guest memory to be > > unmapped in *QEMU's* pagetables, and mmap() is a basically worthless > > interface for this. Getting fd-backed memory into a guest will take > > some possibly major work in the kernel, but getting vma-backed memory > > into a guest without mapping it in the host user address space seems > > much, much worse. > > Well, in my view, the MAP_EXCLUSIVE is intended to keep small secrets > rather than use it for the entire guest memory. I even considered adding = a > limit for the mapping size, but then I decided that since RLIMIT_MEMLOCK = is > anyway enforced there is no need for a new one. > > I agree that getting fd-backed memory into a guest would be less pain tha= t > VMA, but KVM can already use memory outside the control of the kernel via > /dev/map [1]. That series doesn't address the problem I'm talking about at all. I'm saying that there is a legitimate use case where QEMU should *not* have a mapping of the memory. So QEMU would create some exclusive memory using /dev/exclusive_memory and would tell KVM to map it into the guest without mapping it into QEMU's address space at all. (In fact, the way that SEV currently works is *functionally* like this, except that there's a bogus incoherent mapping in the QEMU process that is a giant can of worms. IMO a major benefit of a chardev approach is that you don't need a new VM_ flag and you don't need to worry about wiring it up everywhere in the core mm code.