On Thu, Apr 25, 2019 at 3:27 PM Paul Turner via Lsf-pc
<lsf-pc@lists.linux-foundation.org> wrote:
>
> On Thu, Apr 25, 2019 at 2:56 PM James Bottomley <
> James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com> wrote:
>
> > On Thu, 2019-04-25 at 13:47 -0700, Jonathan Adams wrote:
> > > It looks like the MM track isn't full, and I think this topic is an
> > > important thing to discuss.
> >
> > Mike just posted the RFC patches for this using a ROP gadget preventor
> > as a demo:
> >
> >
> > https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/1556228754-12996-1-git-send-email-rppt@linux.ibm.com
> >
> > but, unfortunately, he won't be at LSF/MM.
> >
> > James
> >
>
> Mike's proposal is quite different, and targeted at restricting ROP
> execution.
> The work proposed by Jonathan is aimed to transparently restrict
> speculative execution to provide generic mitigation against Spectre-V1
> gadgets (and similar) and potentially eliminate the current need for for
> page table switches under most syscalls due to Meltdown.

sounds very interesting.
"v1 gadgets" would include unpriv bpf code too?