From: Jue Wang <juew@google.com>
To: kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Cc: andi.kleen@intel.com, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com,
david@redhat.com, erdemaktas@google.com,
isaku.yamahata@intel.com, jmattson@google.com,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, luto@kernel.org, peterz@infradead.org,
pgonda@google.com, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com,
rientjes@google.com, seanjc@google.com, srutherford@google.com,
x86@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFCv2 00/13] TDX and guest memory unmapping
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 2021 07:36:25 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAPcxDJ6tkcgruegNfgPCjA3pS+-Q1iEGAZQejPhzOdx4x9cDnA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
On Fri, 16 Apr 2021 18:40:53 +0300, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> TDX integrity check failures may lead to system shutdown host kernel must
> not allow any writes to TD-private memory. This requirment clashes with
> KVM design: KVM expects the guest memory to be mapped into host userspace
> (e.g. QEMU).
> This patchset aims to start discussion on how we can approach the issue.
Hi Kirill,
Some potential food for thought:
Repurpose Linux page hwpoison semantics for TDX-private memory protection is
smart, however, treating PG_hwpoison or hwpoison swap pte differently when
kvm->mem_protected=true implicitly disabled the original capability of page
hwpoison: protecting the whole system from known corrupted physical memory
and giving user space applications an opportunity to recover from physical
memory corruptions.
Have you considered introducing a set of similar but independent
page/pte semantics
for TDX private memory protection purpose?
Best regards,
-Jue
next reply other threads:[~2021-04-22 14:36 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-04-22 14:36 Jue Wang [this message]
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2021-04-16 15:40 [RFCv2 00/13] TDX and guest memory unmapping Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-04-16 16:46 ` Matthew Wilcox
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