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From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: "luto@amacapital.net" <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>,
	the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
	Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
	Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
	"Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	"Shankar, Ravi V" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
	Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>,
	Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>,
	Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>,
	Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@intel.com>,
	Rick P Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
	"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v28 09/32] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW
Date: Tue, 17 Aug 2021 23:01:18 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <YRwjnmT9O8jYmL/9@zn.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <490345b6-3e3d-4692-8162-85dcb71434c9@www.fastmail.com>

On Tue, Aug 17, 2021 at 01:51:52PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> WRSS can be used from user mode depending on the configuration.

My point being, if you're going to do shadow stack management
operations, you should check whether the target you're writing to is a
shadow stack page. Clearly userspace can't do that but userspace will
get notified of that pretty timely.

> Double-you shmouble-you. You can't write it with MOV, but you can
> write it from user code and from kernel code. As far as the mm is
> concerned, I think it should be considered writable.

Because?

> Although... anyone who tries to copy_to_user() it is going to be a bit
> surprised. Hmm.

Ok, so you see the confusion.

In any case, I don't think you can simply look at a shadow stack page as
simple writable page. There are cases where it is going to be fun.

So why are we even saying that a shadow stack page is writable? Why
can't we simply say that a shadow stack page is, well, something
special?

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette


  reply	other threads:[~2021-08-17 21:00 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 62+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-07-22 20:51 [PATCH v28 00/32] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 20:51 ` [PATCH v28 01/32] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 20:51 ` [PATCH v28 02/32] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 20:51 ` [PATCH v28 03/32] x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 20:51 ` [PATCH v28 04/32] x86/cpufeatures: Introduce CPU setup and option parsing for CET Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-09 16:06   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-10 15:39     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-08-10 16:51       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-07-22 20:51 ` [PATCH v28 05/32] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-09 16:46   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-10 15:50     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-07-22 20:51 ` [PATCH v28 06/32] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-09 17:51   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-10 16:06     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-07-22 20:51 ` [PATCH v28 07/32] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY from kernel RO pages Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 20:51 ` [PATCH v28 08/32] x86/mm: Move pmd_write(), pud_write() up in the file Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-09 18:02   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-07-22 20:51 ` [PATCH v28 09/32] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-16 10:43   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-17 18:24     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-08-17 19:54       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-17 20:13         ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-08-17 20:24           ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-17 20:51             ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-08-17 21:01               ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2021-08-18 16:38                 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-08-21 16:27                   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-07-22 20:51 ` [PATCH v28 10/32] drm/i915/gvt: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 20:51 ` [PATCH v28 11/32] x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 20:51 ` [PATCH v28 12/32] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-16 16:01   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-17 18:33     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-07-22 20:52 ` [PATCH v28 13/32] mm: Move VM_UFFD_MINOR_BIT from 37 to 38 Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 20:52 ` [PATCH v28 14/32] mm: Introduce VM_SHADOW_STACK for shadow stack memory Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-16 16:35   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-17 18:35     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-07-22 20:52 ` [PATCH v28 15/32] x86/mm: Shadow Stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 20:52 ` [PATCH v28 16/32] x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-16 17:03   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-17 18:36     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-07-22 20:52 ` [PATCH v28 17/32] mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 20:52 ` [PATCH v28 18/32] mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 20:52 ` [PATCH v28 19/32] mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 20:52 ` [PATCH v28 20/32] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte() for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 20:52 ` [PATCH v28 21/32] mm/mprotect: Exclude shadow stack from preserve_write Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 20:52 ` [PATCH v28 22/32] mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap() Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 20:52 ` [PATCH v28 23/32] x86/cet/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack support Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 20:52 ` [PATCH v28 24/32] x86/process: Change copy_thread() argument 'arg' to 'stack_size' Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 20:52 ` [PATCH v28 25/32] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 21:05   ` Dave Hansen
2021-07-23 17:30     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-07-22 20:52 ` [PATCH v28 26/32] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce shadow stack token setup/verify routines Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 21:15   ` Dave Hansen
2021-07-23 18:01     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-07-22 20:52 ` [PATCH v28 27/32] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 20:52 ` [PATCH v28 28/32] ELF: Introduce arch_setup_elf_property() Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 20:52 ` [PATCH v28 29/32] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 20:52 ` [PATCH v28 30/32] mm: Move arch_calc_vm_prot_bits() to arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 20:52 ` [PATCH v28 31/32] mm: Update arch_validate_flags() to test vma anonymous Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 20:52 ` [PATCH v28 32/32] mm: Introduce PROT_SHADOW_STACK for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 21:08 ` [PATCH v28 00/32] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Dave Hansen
2021-07-23 17:28   ` Yu, Yu-cheng

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