linux-mm.kvack.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
To: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
	Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, Yu Zhao <yuzhao@google.com>,
	Nick Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>,
	x86@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 3/5] x86/mm: check exec permissions on fault
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 2021 12:59:56 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <YXaOLAIo7B0+1NUc@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20211021122112.592634-4-namit@vmware.com>

On Thu, Oct 21, 2021 at 05:21:10AM -0700, Nadav Amit wrote:
> From: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>

> Add a check to prevent access_error() from returning mistakenly that
> page-faults due to instruction fetch are not allowed. Intel SDM does not
> indicate whether "instruction fetch" and "write" in the hardware error
> code are mutual exclusive, so check both before returning whether the
> access is allowed.

Dave, can we get that clarified? It seems a bit naf and leads to
confusing code IMO.

Other than that, the change looks ok to me.

> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
> index b2eefdefc108..e776130473ce 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
> @@ -1100,10 +1100,17 @@ access_error(unsigned long error_code, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
>  				       (error_code & X86_PF_INSTR), foreign))
>  		return 1;
>  
> -	if (error_code & X86_PF_WRITE) {
> +	if (error_code & (X86_PF_WRITE | X86_PF_INSTR)) {
>  		/* write, present and write, not present: */
> -		if (unlikely(!(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)))
> +		if ((error_code & X86_PF_WRITE) &&
> +		    unlikely(!(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)))
>  			return 1;
> +
> +		/* exec, present and exec, not present: */
> +		if ((error_code & X86_PF_INSTR) &&
> +		    unlikely(!(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)))
> +			return 1;
> +
>  		return 0;
>  	}





  reply	other threads:[~2021-10-25 11:00 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-10-21 12:21 [PATCH v2 0/5] mm/mprotect: avoid unnecessary TLB flushes Nadav Amit
2021-10-21 12:21 ` [PATCH v2 1/5] x86: Detection of Knights Landing A/D leak Nadav Amit
2021-10-26 15:54   ` Dave Hansen
2021-10-26 15:57     ` Nadav Amit
2021-10-21 12:21 ` [PATCH v2 2/5] mm: avoid unnecessary flush on change_huge_pmd() Nadav Amit
2021-10-25 10:52   ` Peter Zijlstra
2021-10-25 16:29     ` Nadav Amit
2021-10-26 16:06   ` Dave Hansen
2021-10-26 16:47     ` Nadav Amit
2021-10-26 16:53       ` Nadav Amit
2021-10-26 17:44       ` Nadav Amit
2021-10-26 18:44         ` Dave Hansen
2021-10-26 19:06           ` Nadav Amit
2021-10-26 19:40             ` Dave Hansen
2021-10-26 20:07               ` Nadav Amit
2021-10-26 20:47                 ` Dave Hansen
2021-10-21 12:21 ` [PATCH v2 3/5] x86/mm: check exec permissions on fault Nadav Amit
2021-10-25 10:59   ` Peter Zijlstra [this message]
2021-10-25 11:13     ` Andrew Cooper
2021-10-25 14:23     ` Dave Hansen
2021-10-25 14:20   ` Dave Hansen
2021-10-25 16:19     ` Nadav Amit
2021-10-25 17:45       ` Dave Hansen
2021-10-25 17:51         ` Nadav Amit
2021-10-25 18:00           ` Dave Hansen
2021-10-21 12:21 ` [PATCH v2 4/5] mm/mprotect: use mmu_gather Nadav Amit
2021-10-21 12:21 ` [PATCH v2 5/5] mm/mprotect: do not flush on permission promotion Nadav Amit
2021-10-25 11:12   ` Peter Zijlstra
2021-10-25 16:27     ` Nadav Amit
2021-10-22  3:04 ` [PATCH v2 0/5] mm/mprotect: avoid unnecessary TLB flushes Andrew Morton
2021-10-22 21:58   ` Nadav Amit
2021-10-26 16:09     ` Dave Hansen
2021-10-25 10:50   ` Peter Zijlstra
2021-10-25 16:42     ` Nadav Amit

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=YXaOLAIo7B0+1NUc@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net \
    --to=peterz@infradead.org \
    --cc=aarcange@redhat.com \
    --cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=andrew.cooper3@citrix.com \
    --cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
    --cc=luto@kernel.org \
    --cc=nadav.amit@gmail.com \
    --cc=namit@vmware.com \
    --cc=npiggin@gmail.com \
    --cc=peterx@redhat.com \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=will@kernel.org \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    --cc=yuzhao@google.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).