From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
Khalid Aziz <khalid.aziz@oracle.com>,
juergh@gmail.com, Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>,
jsteckli@amazon.de, Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
Juerg Haefliger <juerg.haefliger@canonical.com>,
deepa.srinivasan@oracle.com, chris.hyser@oracle.com,
Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>,
Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
iommu <iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org>,
X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>,
"linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org"
<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
"open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux List Kernel Mailing <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
Khalid Aziz <khalid@gonehiking.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>,
Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v9 03/13] mm: Add support for eXclusive Page Frame Ownership (XPFO)
Date: Thu, 18 Apr 2019 08:14:48 +0200 (CEST) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <alpine.DEB.2.21.1904180811570.3174@nanos.tec.linutronix.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHk-=whUwOjFW6RjHVM8kNOv1QVLJuHj2Dda0=mpLPdJ1UyatQ@mail.gmail.com>
On Wed, 17 Apr 2019, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> On Wed, Apr 17, 2019 at 4:42 PM Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> wrote:
> > On Wed, 17 Apr 2019, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> > > With SMEP, user space pages are always NX.
> >
> > We talk past each other. The user space page in the ring3 valid virtual
> > address space (non negative) is of course protected by SMEP.
> >
> > The attack utilizes the kernel linear mapping of the physical
> > memory. I.e. user space address 0x43210 has a kernel equivalent at
> > 0xfxxxxxxxxxx. So if the attack manages to trick the kernel to that valid
> > kernel address and that is mapped X --> game over. SMEP does not help
> > there.
>
> Oh, agreed.
>
> But that would simply be a kernel bug. We should only map kernel pages
> executable when we have kernel code in them, and we should certainly
> not allow those pages to be mapped writably in user space.
>
> That kind of "executable in kernel, writable in user" would be a
> horrendous and major bug.
>
> So i think it's a non-issue.
Pretty much.
> > From the top of my head I'd say this is a non issue as those kernel address
> > space mappings _should_ be NX, but we got bitten by _should_ in the past:)
>
> I do agree that bugs can happen, obviously, and we might have missed something.
>
> But in the context of XPFO, I would argue (*very* strongly) that the
> likelihood of the above kind of bug is absolutely *miniscule* compared
> to the likelihood that we'd have something wrong in the software
> implementation of XPFO.
>
> So if the argument is "we might have bugs in software", then I think
> that's an argument _against_ XPFO rather than for it.
No argument from my side. We better spend time to make sure that a bogus
kernel side X mapping is caught, like we catch other things.
Thanks,
tglx
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-04-18 6:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 70+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-04-03 17:34 [RFC PATCH v9 00/13] Add support for eXclusive Page Frame Ownership Khalid Aziz
2019-04-03 17:34 ` [RFC PATCH v9 01/13] mm: add MAP_HUGETLB support to vm_mmap Khalid Aziz
2019-04-03 17:34 ` [RFC PATCH v9 02/13] x86: always set IF before oopsing from page fault Khalid Aziz
2019-04-04 0:12 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-04-04 1:42 ` Tycho Andersen
2019-04-04 4:12 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-04-04 15:47 ` Tycho Andersen
2019-04-04 16:23 ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2019-04-04 16:28 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-04-04 17:11 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-04-03 17:34 ` [RFC PATCH v9 03/13] mm: Add support for eXclusive Page Frame Ownership (XPFO) Khalid Aziz
2019-04-04 7:21 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-04-04 9:25 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-04-04 14:48 ` Tycho Andersen
2019-04-04 7:43 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-04-04 15:15 ` Khalid Aziz
2019-04-04 17:01 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-04-17 16:15 ` Ingo Molnar
2019-04-17 16:49 ` Khalid Aziz
2019-04-17 17:09 ` Ingo Molnar
2019-04-17 17:19 ` Nadav Amit
2019-04-17 17:26 ` Ingo Molnar
2019-04-17 17:44 ` Nadav Amit
2019-04-17 21:19 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-04-17 23:18 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-04-17 23:42 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-04-17 23:52 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-04-18 4:41 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-04-18 5:41 ` Kees Cook
2019-04-18 14:34 ` Khalid Aziz
2019-04-22 19:30 ` Khalid Aziz
2019-04-22 22:23 ` Kees Cook
2019-04-18 6:14 ` Thomas Gleixner [this message]
2019-04-17 17:33 ` Khalid Aziz
2019-04-17 19:49 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-04-17 19:52 ` Tycho Andersen
2019-04-17 20:12 ` Khalid Aziz
2019-05-01 14:49 ` Waiman Long
2019-05-01 15:18 ` Khalid Aziz
2019-04-03 17:34 ` [RFC PATCH v9 04/13] xpfo, x86: Add support for XPFO for x86-64 Khalid Aziz
2019-04-04 7:52 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-04-04 15:40 ` Khalid Aziz
2019-04-03 17:34 ` [RFC PATCH v9 05/13] mm: add a user_virt_to_phys symbol Khalid Aziz
2019-04-03 17:34 ` [RFC PATCH v9 06/13] lkdtm: Add test for XPFO Khalid Aziz
2019-04-03 17:34 ` [RFC PATCH v9 07/13] arm64/mm: Add support " Khalid Aziz
2019-04-03 17:34 ` [RFC PATCH v9 08/13] swiotlb: Map the buffer if it was unmapped by XPFO Khalid Aziz
2019-04-03 17:34 ` [RFC PATCH v9 09/13] xpfo: add primitives for mapping underlying memory Khalid Aziz
2019-04-03 17:34 ` [RFC PATCH v9 10/13] arm64/mm, xpfo: temporarily map dcache regions Khalid Aziz
2019-04-03 17:34 ` [RFC PATCH v9 11/13] xpfo, mm: optimize spinlock usage in xpfo_kunmap Khalid Aziz
2019-04-04 7:56 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-04-04 16:06 ` Khalid Aziz
2019-04-03 17:34 ` [RFC PATCH v9 12/13] xpfo, mm: Defer TLB flushes for non-current CPUs (x86 only) Khalid Aziz
2019-04-04 4:10 ` Andy Lutomirski
[not found] ` <91f1dbce-332e-25d1-15f6-0e9cfc8b797b@oracle.com>
2019-04-05 7:17 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-04-05 14:44 ` Dave Hansen
2019-04-05 15:24 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-04-05 15:56 ` Tycho Andersen
2019-04-05 16:32 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-04-05 15:56 ` Khalid Aziz
2019-04-05 16:01 ` Dave Hansen
2019-04-05 16:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-04-05 16:41 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-04-05 17:35 ` Khalid Aziz
2019-04-05 15:44 ` Khalid Aziz
2019-04-05 15:24 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-04-04 8:18 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-04-03 17:34 ` [RFC PATCH v9 13/13] xpfo, mm: Optimize XPFO TLB flushes by batching them together Khalid Aziz
2019-04-04 16:44 ` [RFC PATCH v9 00/13] Add support for eXclusive Page Frame Ownership Nadav Amit
2019-04-04 17:18 ` Khalid Aziz
2019-04-06 6:40 ` Jon Masters
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