From: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
Marco Elver <elver@google.com>,
Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>,
Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com>,
Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>,
kasan-dev@googlegroups.com,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH mm v3 04/19] kasan, arm64: unpoison stack only with CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
Date: Fri, 13 Nov 2020 23:19:54 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <d65e2fc1d7fc03b7ced67e401ff1ea9143b3382d.1605305978.git.andreyknvl@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1605305978.git.andreyknvl@google.com>
There's a config option CONFIG_KASAN_STACK that has to be enabled for
KASAN to use stack instrumentation and perform validity checks for
stack variables.
There's no need to unpoison stack when CONFIG_KASAN_STACK is not enabled.
Only call kasan_unpoison_task_stack[_below]() when CONFIG_KASAN_STACK is
enabled.
Note, that CONFIG_KASAN_STACK is an option that is currently always
defined when CONFIG_KASAN is enabled, and therefore has to be tested
with #if instead of #ifdef.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/If8a891e9fe01ea543e00b576852685afec0887e3
---
arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S | 2 +-
include/linux/kasan.h | 10 ++++++----
mm/kasan/common.c | 2 ++
4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S
index ba40d57757d6..bdadfa56b40e 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(_cpu_resume)
*/
bl cpu_do_resume
-#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
+#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
mov x0, sp
bl kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S
index c8daa92f38dc..5d3a0b8fd379 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(do_suspend_lowlevel)
movq pt_regs_r14(%rax), %r14
movq pt_regs_r15(%rax), %r15
-#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
+#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
/*
* The suspend path may have poisoned some areas deeper in the stack,
* which we now need to unpoison.
diff --git a/include/linux/kasan.h b/include/linux/kasan.h
index 0c89e6fdd29e..f2109bf0c5f9 100644
--- a/include/linux/kasan.h
+++ b/include/linux/kasan.h
@@ -76,8 +76,6 @@ static inline void kasan_disable_current(void) {}
void kasan_unpoison_range(const void *address, size_t size);
-void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task);
-
void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order);
void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order);
@@ -122,8 +120,6 @@ void kasan_restore_multi_shot(bool enabled);
static inline void kasan_unpoison_range(const void *address, size_t size) {}
-static inline void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task) {}
-
static inline void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order) {}
static inline void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order) {}
@@ -175,6 +171,12 @@ static inline size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache) { return 0; }
#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN */
+#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
+void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task);
+#else
+static inline void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task) {}
+#endif
+
#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC
void kasan_cache_shrink(struct kmem_cache *cache);
diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c
index 0a420f1dbc54..7648a2452a01 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/common.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/common.c
@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ void kasan_unpoison_range(const void *address, size_t size)
unpoison_range(address, size);
}
+#if CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
static void __kasan_unpoison_stack(struct task_struct *task, const void *sp)
{
void *base = task_stack_page(task);
@@ -90,6 +91,7 @@ asmlinkage void kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below(const void *watermark)
unpoison_range(base, watermark - base);
}
+#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_STACK */
void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
{
--
2.29.2.299.gdc1121823c-goog
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-11-13 22:20 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-11-13 22:19 [PATCH mm v3 00/19] kasan: boot parameters for hardware tag-based mode Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-13 22:19 ` [PATCH mm v3 01/19] kasan: simplify quarantine_put call site Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-13 22:19 ` [PATCH mm v3 02/19] kasan: rename get_alloc/free_info Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-13 22:19 ` [PATCH mm v3 03/19] kasan: introduce set_alloc_info Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-13 22:19 ` Andrey Konovalov [this message]
2020-11-16 11:00 ` [PATCH mm v3 04/19] kasan, arm64: unpoison stack only with CONFIG_KASAN_STACK Dmitry Vyukov
2020-11-13 22:19 ` [PATCH mm v3 05/19] kasan: allow VMAP_STACK for HW_TAGS mode Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-16 11:01 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-11-13 22:19 ` [PATCH mm v3 06/19] kasan: remove __kasan_unpoison_stack Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-13 22:19 ` [PATCH mm v3 07/19] kasan: inline kasan_reset_tag for tag-based modes Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-17 10:56 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-11-13 22:19 ` [PATCH mm v3 08/19] kasan: inline random_tag for HW_TAGS Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-17 10:58 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-11-13 22:19 ` [PATCH mm v3 09/19] kasan: open-code kasan_unpoison_slab Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-16 15:06 ` Marco Elver
2020-11-13 22:20 ` [PATCH mm v3 10/19] kasan: inline (un)poison_range and check_invalid_free Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-16 15:11 ` Marco Elver
2020-11-13 22:20 ` [PATCH mm v3 11/19] kasan: add and integrate kasan boot parameters Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-16 15:15 ` Marco Elver
2020-11-17 11:09 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-11-13 22:20 ` [PATCH mm v3 12/19] kasan, mm: check kasan_enabled in annotations Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-16 15:26 ` Marco Elver
2020-11-17 11:12 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-11-13 22:20 ` [PATCH mm v3 13/19] kasan, mm: rename kasan_poison_kfree Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-16 15:43 ` Marco Elver
2020-11-13 22:20 ` [PATCH mm v3 14/19] kasan: don't round_up too much Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-13 22:20 ` [PATCH mm v3 15/19] kasan: simplify assign_tag and set_tag calls Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-13 22:20 ` [PATCH mm v3 16/19] kasan: clarify comment in __kasan_kfree_large Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-13 22:20 ` [PATCH mm v3 17/19] kasan: clean up metadata allocation and usage Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-16 15:46 ` Marco Elver
2020-11-17 13:12 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-11-17 13:18 ` Marco Elver
2020-11-17 13:27 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-11-23 18:54 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-23 19:16 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-13 22:20 ` [PATCH mm v3 18/19] kasan, mm: allow cache merging with no metadata Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-16 15:45 ` Marco Elver
2020-11-17 13:25 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-11-23 13:52 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-13 22:20 ` [PATCH mm v3 19/19] kasan: update documentation Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-16 15:47 ` Marco Elver
2020-11-17 13:28 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-11-16 14:48 ` [PATCH mm v3 00/19] kasan: boot parameters for hardware tag-based mode Vincenzo Frascino
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