From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from mail-it0-f71.google.com (mail-it0-f71.google.com [209.85.214.71]) by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 08D476B0261 for ; Mon, 25 Jul 2016 20:54:35 -0400 (EDT) Received: by mail-it0-f71.google.com with SMTP id u186so372681504ita.0 for ; Mon, 25 Jul 2016 17:54:35 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail-io0-f177.google.com (mail-io0-f177.google.com. [209.85.223.177]) by mx.google.com with ESMTPS id z68si19305805itd.12.2016.07.25.17.54.30 for (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Mon, 25 Jul 2016 17:54:34 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-io0-f177.google.com with SMTP id q83so186049562iod.1 for ; Mon, 25 Jul 2016 17:54:30 -0700 (PDT) Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 12/12] mm: SLUB hardened usercopy support References: <1469046427-12696-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> <1469046427-12696-13-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> <0f980e84-b587-3d9e-3c26-ad57f947c08b@redhat.com> From: Laura Abbott Message-ID: Date: Mon, 25 Jul 2016 17:54:25 -0700 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org List-ID: To: Kees Cook Cc: "kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com" , Laura Abbott , Balbir Singh , Daniel Micay , Josh Poimboeuf , Rik van Riel , Casey Schaufler , PaX Team , Brad Spengler , Russell King , Catalin Marinas , Will Deacon , Ard Biesheuvel , Benjamin Herrenschmidt , Michael Ellerman , Tony Luck , Fenghua Yu , "David S. Miller" , "x86@kernel.org" , Christoph Lameter , Pekka Enberg , David Rientjes , Joonsoo Kim , Andrew Morton , Andy Lutomirski , Borislav Petkov , Mathias Krause , Jan Kara , Vitaly Wool , Andrea Arcangeli , Dmitry Vyukov , "linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org" , linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org, "linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" , sparclinux , linux-arch , Linux-MM , LKML On 07/25/2016 01:45 PM, Kees Cook wrote: > On Mon, Jul 25, 2016 at 12:16 PM, Laura Abbott wrote: >> On 07/20/2016 01:27 PM, Kees Cook wrote: >>> >>> Under CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY, this adds object size checking to the >>> SLUB allocator to catch any copies that may span objects. Includes a >>> redzone handling fix discovered by Michael Ellerman. >>> >>> Based on code from PaX and grsecurity. >>> >>> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook >>> Tested-by: Michael Ellerman >>> --- >>> init/Kconfig | 1 + >>> mm/slub.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ >>> 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+) >>> >>> diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig >>> index 798c2020ee7c..1c4711819dfd 100644 >>> --- a/init/Kconfig >>> +++ b/init/Kconfig >>> @@ -1765,6 +1765,7 @@ config SLAB >>> >>> config SLUB >>> bool "SLUB (Unqueued Allocator)" >>> + select HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR >>> help >>> SLUB is a slab allocator that minimizes cache line usage >>> instead of managing queues of cached objects (SLAB approach). >>> diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c >>> index 825ff4505336..7dee3d9a5843 100644 >>> --- a/mm/slub.c >>> +++ b/mm/slub.c >>> @@ -3614,6 +3614,42 @@ void *__kmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int >>> node) >>> EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kmalloc_node); >>> #endif >>> >>> +#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY >>> +/* >>> + * Rejects objects that are incorrectly sized. >>> + * >>> + * Returns NULL if check passes, otherwise const char * to name of cache >>> + * to indicate an error. >>> + */ >>> +const char *__check_heap_object(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, >>> + struct page *page) >>> +{ >>> + struct kmem_cache *s; >>> + unsigned long offset; >>> + size_t object_size; >>> + >>> + /* Find object and usable object size. */ >>> + s = page->slab_cache; >>> + object_size = slab_ksize(s); >>> + >>> + /* Find offset within object. */ >>> + offset = (ptr - page_address(page)) % s->size; >>> + >>> + /* Adjust for redzone and reject if within the redzone. */ >>> + if (kmem_cache_debug(s) && s->flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE) { >>> + if (offset < s->red_left_pad) >>> + return s->name; >>> + offset -= s->red_left_pad; >>> + } >>> + >>> + /* Allow address range falling entirely within object size. */ >>> + if (offset <= object_size && n <= object_size - offset) >>> + return NULL; >>> + >>> + return s->name; >>> +} >>> +#endif /* CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY */ >>> + >> >> >> I compared this against what check_valid_pointer does for SLUB_DEBUG >> checking. I was hoping we could utilize that function to avoid >> duplication but a) __check_heap_object needs to allow accesses anywhere >> in the object, not just the beginning b) accessing page->objects >> is racy without the addition of locking in SLUB_DEBUG. >> >> Still, the ptr < page_address(page) check from __check_heap_object would >> be good to add to avoid generating garbage large offsets and trying to >> infer C math. >> >> diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c >> index 7dee3d9..5370e4f 100644 >> --- a/mm/slub.c >> +++ b/mm/slub.c >> @@ -3632,6 +3632,9 @@ const char *__check_heap_object(const void *ptr, >> unsigned long n, >> s = page->slab_cache; >> object_size = slab_ksize(s); >> + if (ptr < page_address(page)) >> + return s->name; >> + >> /* Find offset within object. */ >> offset = (ptr - page_address(page)) % s->size; >> >> With that, you can add >> >> Reviwed-by: Laura Abbott > > Cool, I'll add that. > > Should I add your reviewed-by for this patch only or for the whole series? > > Thanks! > > -Kees > Just this patch for now, I'm working through a couple of others >> >>> static size_t __ksize(const void *object) >>> { >>> struct page *page; >>> >> >> Thanks, >> Laura > > > -- To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to majordomo@kvack.org. For more info on Linux MM, see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ . Don't email: email@kvack.org