linux-mm.kvack.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>,
	"Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>,
	"Larry Woodman" <lwoodman@redhat.com>,
	"Dave Young" <dyoung@redhat.com>,
	"Toshimitsu Kani" <toshi.kani@hpe.com>,
	"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	"Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Subject: [PATCH v10 16/38] efi: Add an EFI table address match function
Date: Mon, 17 Jul 2017 16:10:13 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <e1e06441d80f44776df391e0e4cb485b345b7518.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>

Add a function that will determine if a supplied physical address matches
the address of an EFI table.

Reviewed-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
 drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/efi.h        |  7 +++++++
 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
index 045d6d3..69d4d13 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
@@ -55,6 +55,25 @@ struct efi __read_mostly efi = {
 };
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(efi);
 
+static unsigned long *efi_tables[] = {
+	&efi.mps,
+	&efi.acpi,
+	&efi.acpi20,
+	&efi.smbios,
+	&efi.smbios3,
+	&efi.sal_systab,
+	&efi.boot_info,
+	&efi.hcdp,
+	&efi.uga,
+	&efi.uv_systab,
+	&efi.fw_vendor,
+	&efi.runtime,
+	&efi.config_table,
+	&efi.esrt,
+	&efi.properties_table,
+	&efi.mem_attr_table,
+};
+
 static bool disable_runtime;
 static int __init setup_noefi(char *arg)
 {
@@ -855,6 +874,20 @@ int efi_status_to_err(efi_status_t status)
 	return err;
 }
 
+bool efi_is_table_address(unsigned long phys_addr)
+{
+	unsigned int i;
+
+	if (phys_addr == EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR)
+		return false;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(efi_tables); i++)
+		if (*(efi_tables[i]) == phys_addr)
+			return true;
+
+	return false;
+}
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC
 static int update_efi_random_seed(struct notifier_block *nb,
 				  unsigned long code, void *unused)
diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
index 8269bcb..8e24f09 100644
--- a/include/linux/efi.h
+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
@@ -1091,6 +1091,8 @@ static inline bool efi_enabled(int feature)
 	return test_bit(feature, &efi.flags) != 0;
 }
 extern void efi_reboot(enum reboot_mode reboot_mode, const char *__unused);
+
+extern bool efi_is_table_address(unsigned long phys_addr);
 #else
 static inline bool efi_enabled(int feature)
 {
@@ -1104,6 +1106,11 @@ static inline bool efi_enabled(int feature)
 {
 	return false;
 }
+
+static inline bool efi_is_table_address(unsigned long phys_addr)
+{
+	return false;
+}
 #endif
 
 extern int efi_status_to_err(efi_status_t status);
-- 
1.9.1

--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in
the body to majordomo@kvack.org.  For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"dont@kvack.org"> email@kvack.org </a>

  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-07-17 21:11 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 46+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-07-17 21:09 [PATCH v10 00/38] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Tom Lendacky
2017-07-17 21:09 ` [PATCH v10 01/38] x86: Document AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) Tom Lendacky
2017-07-17 21:09 ` [PATCH v10 02/38] x86/mm/pat: Set write-protect cache mode for full PAT support Tom Lendacky
2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 03/38] x86, mpparse, x86/acpi, x86/PCI, x86/dmi, SFI: Use memremap for RAM mappings Tom Lendacky
2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 04/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature Tom Lendacky
2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 05/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size Tom Lendacky
2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 06/38] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support Tom Lendacky
2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 07/38] x86/mm: Remove phys_to_virt() usage in ioremap() Tom Lendacky
2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 08/38] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing Tom Lendacky
2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 09/38] x86/mm: Simplify p[g4um]d_page() macros Tom Lendacky
2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 10/38] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 11/38] x86/mm: Add SME support for read_cr3_pa() Tom Lendacky
2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 12/38] x86/mm: Extend early_memremap() support with additional attrs Tom Lendacky
2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 13/38] x86/mm: Add support for early encrypt/decrypt of memory Tom Lendacky
2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 14/38] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly Tom Lendacky
2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 15/38] x86/boot/e820: Add support to determine the E820 type of an address Tom Lendacky
2017-07-17 21:10 ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 17/38] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return an error rather than 0 Tom Lendacky
2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 18/38] x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 19/38] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear Tom Lendacky
2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 20/38] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data Tom Lendacky
2017-11-03 15:12   ` Tomeu Vizoso
2017-11-03 15:31     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-11-06  7:13       ` Tomeu Vizoso
2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 21/38] x86/mm: Add support to access persistent memory in the clear Tom Lendacky
2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 22/38] x86/mm: Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute Tom Lendacky
2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 23/38] x86/realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 24/38] x86, swiotlb: Add memory encryption support Tom Lendacky
2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 25/38] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 26/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Make the microcode level available earlier in the boot Tom Lendacky
2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 27/38] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 28/38] x86, realmode: Check for memory encryption on the APs Tom Lendacky
2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 29/38] x86, drm, fbdev: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings Tom Lendacky
2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 30/38] kvm: x86: svm: Support Secure Memory Encryption within KVM Tom Lendacky
2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 31/38] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 32/38] xen/x86: Remove SME feature in PV guests Tom Lendacky
2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 33/38] x86/mm: Use proper encryption attributes with /dev/mem Tom Lendacky
2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 34/38] x86/mm: Create native_make_p4d() for PGTABLE_LEVELS <= 4 Tom Lendacky
2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 35/38] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place Tom Lendacky
2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 36/38] x86/boot: Add early cmdline parsing for options with arguments Tom Lendacky
2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 37/38] compiler-gcc.h: Introduce __nostackp function attribute Tom Lendacky
2017-07-18  9:36   ` Ingo Molnar
2017-07-18 13:56     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 38/38] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-07-18 12:03 ` [PATCH v10 00/38] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Thomas Gleixner
2017-07-18 14:02   ` Tom Lendacky

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=e1e06441d80f44776df391e0e4cb485b345b7518.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com \
    --to=thomas.lendacky@amd.com \
    --cc=arnd@arndb.de \
    --cc=aryabinin@virtuozzo.com \
    --cc=bp@alien8.de \
    --cc=brijesh.singh@amd.com \
    --cc=corbet@lwn.net \
    --cc=dvyukov@google.com \
    --cc=dyoung@redhat.com \
    --cc=glider@google.com \
    --cc=hpa@zytor.com \
    --cc=kasan-dev@googlegroups.com \
    --cc=konrad.wilk@oracle.com \
    --cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-arch@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-doc@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-efi@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
    --cc=luto@kernel.org \
    --cc=lwoodman@redhat.com \
    --cc=matt@codeblueprint.co.uk \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=mst@redhat.com \
    --cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
    --cc=riel@redhat.com \
    --cc=rkrcmar@redhat.com \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=toshi.kani@hpe.com \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).