From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-5.3 required=3.0 tests=DKIMWL_WL_HIGH,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_SANE_1 autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id AA9E6C7618F for ; Sun, 28 Jul 2019 21:24:24 +0000 (UTC) Received: from bombadil.infradead.org (bombadil.infradead.org [198.137.202.133]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 80D9A2070D for ; Sun, 28 Jul 2019 21:24:24 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=lists.infradead.org header.i=@lists.infradead.org header.b="FdFfLQre" DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 80D9A2070D Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=mit.edu Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-mtd-bounces+linux-mtd=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=lists.infradead.org; s=bombadil.20170209; h=Sender: Content-Transfer-Encoding:Content-Type:Cc:List-Subscribe:List-Help:List-Post: List-Archive:List-Unsubscribe:List-Id:In-Reply-To:MIME-Version:References: Message-ID:Subject:To:From:Date:Reply-To:Content-ID:Content-Description: Resent-Date:Resent-From:Resent-Sender:Resent-To:Resent-Cc:Resent-Message-ID: List-Owner; bh=GQH8N/O0lGbY+vHUj3DwQMR4HUXvUwQ72irY3Dq3/us=; b=FdFfLQreie7nAt 17LVRulz8s97o06ZYLkYFjm1GXE0rUm4HIZpXBAfZZKLBXxljAYBGYBcX3WDvxRfof/3U3ihx7bZX 6cq4ERkW5lYLUKIjl6sPTk08v6SmwMbRgUmiBd3CTNpQdgL3yRQ88/ivWUrz8f/eFlxMgiDAtmWc+ e0+I6LP87/a7ZjEETADaZAIOCtmtTjnZPq71J2rH11sN3J9bBYT4s6m1HZwKTvG1d2+oELQAaIGF5 fIRAkN3HmhT5B29uMZrx0z5+iuQ9hL1R+ENuNj5kGX4wh2l8XYqUOGimcM0bnOFZbm80Z0WqD8XeO dSTjH9W/Z98rm4gupo8Q==; Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1] helo=bombadil.infradead.org) by bombadil.infradead.org with esmtp (Exim 4.92 #3 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1hrqeJ-0007Gx-DK; Sun, 28 Jul 2019 21:24:11 +0000 Received: from outgoing-auth-1.mit.edu ([18.9.28.11] helo=outgoing.mit.edu) by bombadil.infradead.org with esmtps (Exim 4.92 #3 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1hrqeG-0007Gg-Ia for linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org; Sun, 28 Jul 2019 21:24:09 +0000 Received: from callcc.thunk.org (96-72-102-169-static.hfc.comcastbusiness.net [96.72.102.169] (may be forged)) (authenticated bits=0) (User authenticated as tytso@ATHENA.MIT.EDU) by outgoing.mit.edu (8.14.7/8.12.4) with ESMTP id x6SLO3BG013518 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Sun, 28 Jul 2019 17:24:04 -0400 Received: by callcc.thunk.org (Postfix, from userid 15806) id 87A1D4202F5; Sun, 28 Jul 2019 17:24:02 -0400 (EDT) Date: Sun, 28 Jul 2019 17:24:02 -0400 From: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" To: Eric Biggers Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 12/16] fscrypt: require that key be added when setting a v2 encryption policy Message-ID: <20190728212402.GM6088@mit.edu> References: <20190726224141.14044-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> <20190726224141.14044-13-ebiggers@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20190726224141.14044-13-ebiggers@kernel.org> User-Agent: Mutt/1.10.1 (2018-07-13) X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.8.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20190728_142408_776782_0D681D0A X-CRM114-Status: UNSURE ( 8.40 ) X-CRM114-Notice: Please train this message. X-BeenThere: linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Linux MTD discussion mailing list List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: Satya Tangirala , linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, Paul Crowley Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: "linux-mtd" Errors-To: linux-mtd-bounces+linux-mtd=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org Archived-At: List-Archive: On Fri, Jul 26, 2019 at 03:41:37PM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote: > From: Eric Biggers > > By looking up the master keys in a filesystem-level keyring rather than > in the calling processes' key hierarchy, it becomes possible for a user > to set an encryption policy which refers to some key they don't actually > know, then encrypt their files using that key. Cryptographically this > isn't much of a problem, but the semantics of this would be a bit weird. > Thus, enforce that a v2 encryption policy can only be set if the user > has previously added the key, or has capable(CAP_FOWNER). > > We tolerate that this problem will continue to exist for v1 encryption > policies, however; there is no way around that. > > Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Looks good, feel free to add: Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o - Ted ______________________________________________________ Linux MTD discussion mailing list http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-mtd/