Hi Al, Today's linux-next merge of the signal tree got a conflict in fs/exec.c between commit 5b8a94d461a7 ("coredump: move core dump functionality into its own file") from the vfs tree and commits 282124d18626 ("generic kernel_execve()") and 38b983b3461e ("generic sys_execve()") from the signal tree. I fixed it up (see below) and can carry the fix as necessary (no action is required). -- Cheers, Stephen Rothwell sfr@canb.auug.org.au diff --cc fs/exec.c index 48fb26e,50a1270..0000000 --- a/fs/exec.c +++ b/fs/exec.c @@@ -1645,3 -2031,342 +1644,55 @@@ int get_dumpable(struct mm_struct *mm { return __get_dumpable(mm->flags); } + -static void wait_for_dump_helpers(struct file *file) -{ - struct pipe_inode_info *pipe; - - pipe = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_pipe; - - pipe_lock(pipe); - pipe->readers++; - pipe->writers--; - - while ((pipe->readers > 1) && (!signal_pending(current))) { - wake_up_interruptible_sync(&pipe->wait); - kill_fasync(&pipe->fasync_readers, SIGIO, POLL_IN); - pipe_wait(pipe); - } - - pipe->readers--; - pipe->writers++; - pipe_unlock(pipe); - -} - - -/* - * umh_pipe_setup - * helper function to customize the process used - * to collect the core in userspace. Specifically - * it sets up a pipe and installs it as fd 0 (stdin) - * for the process. Returns 0 on success, or - * PTR_ERR on failure. - * Note that it also sets the core limit to 1. This - * is a special value that we use to trap recursive - * core dumps - */ -static int umh_pipe_setup(struct subprocess_info *info, struct cred *new) -{ - struct file *files[2]; - struct fdtable *fdt; - struct coredump_params *cp = (struct coredump_params *)info->data; - struct files_struct *cf = current->files; - int err = create_pipe_files(files, 0); - if (err) - return err; - - cp->file = files[1]; - - sys_close(0); - fd_install(0, files[0]); - spin_lock(&cf->file_lock); - fdt = files_fdtable(cf); - __set_open_fd(0, fdt); - __clear_close_on_exec(0, fdt); - spin_unlock(&cf->file_lock); - - /* and disallow core files too */ - current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CORE] = (struct rlimit){1, 1}; - - return 0; -} - -void do_coredump(long signr, int exit_code, struct pt_regs *regs) -{ - struct core_state core_state; - struct core_name cn; - struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; - struct linux_binfmt * binfmt; - const struct cred *old_cred; - struct cred *cred; - int retval = 0; - int flag = 0; - int ispipe; - bool need_nonrelative = false; - static atomic_t core_dump_count = ATOMIC_INIT(0); - struct coredump_params cprm = { - .signr = signr, - .regs = regs, - .limit = rlimit(RLIMIT_CORE), - /* - * We must use the same mm->flags while dumping core to avoid - * inconsistency of bit flags, since this flag is not protected - * by any locks. - */ - .mm_flags = mm->flags, - }; - - audit_core_dumps(signr); - - binfmt = mm->binfmt; - if (!binfmt || !binfmt->core_dump) - goto fail; - if (!__get_dumpable(cprm.mm_flags)) - goto fail; - - cred = prepare_creds(); - if (!cred) - goto fail; - /* - * We cannot trust fsuid as being the "true" uid of the process - * nor do we know its entire history. We only know it was tainted - * so we dump it as root in mode 2, and only into a controlled - * environment (pipe handler or fully qualified path). - */ - if (__get_dumpable(cprm.mm_flags) == SUID_DUMPABLE_SAFE) { - /* Setuid core dump mode */ - flag = O_EXCL; /* Stop rewrite attacks */ - cred->fsuid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID; /* Dump root private */ - need_nonrelative = true; - } - - retval = coredump_wait(exit_code, &core_state); - if (retval < 0) - goto fail_creds; - - old_cred = override_creds(cred); - - /* - * Clear any false indication of pending signals that might - * be seen by the filesystem code called to write the core file. - */ - clear_thread_flag(TIF_SIGPENDING); - - ispipe = format_corename(&cn, signr); - - if (ispipe) { - int dump_count; - char **helper_argv; - - if (ispipe < 0) { - printk(KERN_WARNING "format_corename failed\n"); - printk(KERN_WARNING "Aborting core\n"); - goto fail_corename; - } - - if (cprm.limit == 1) { - /* See umh_pipe_setup() which sets RLIMIT_CORE = 1. - * - * Normally core limits are irrelevant to pipes, since - * we're not writing to the file system, but we use - * cprm.limit of 1 here as a speacial value, this is a - * consistent way to catch recursive crashes. - * We can still crash if the core_pattern binary sets - * RLIM_CORE = !1, but it runs as root, and can do - * lots of stupid things. - * - * Note that we use task_tgid_vnr here to grab the pid - * of the process group leader. That way we get the - * right pid if a thread in a multi-threaded - * core_pattern process dies. - */ - printk(KERN_WARNING - "Process %d(%s) has RLIMIT_CORE set to 1\n", - task_tgid_vnr(current), current->comm); - printk(KERN_WARNING "Aborting core\n"); - goto fail_unlock; - } - cprm.limit = RLIM_INFINITY; - - dump_count = atomic_inc_return(&core_dump_count); - if (core_pipe_limit && (core_pipe_limit < dump_count)) { - printk(KERN_WARNING "Pid %d(%s) over core_pipe_limit\n", - task_tgid_vnr(current), current->comm); - printk(KERN_WARNING "Skipping core dump\n"); - goto fail_dropcount; - } - - helper_argv = argv_split(GFP_KERNEL, cn.corename+1, NULL); - if (!helper_argv) { - printk(KERN_WARNING "%s failed to allocate memory\n", - __func__); - goto fail_dropcount; - } - - retval = call_usermodehelper_fns(helper_argv[0], helper_argv, - NULL, UMH_WAIT_EXEC, umh_pipe_setup, - NULL, &cprm); - argv_free(helper_argv); - if (retval) { - printk(KERN_INFO "Core dump to %s pipe failed\n", - cn.corename); - goto close_fail; - } - } else { - struct inode *inode; - - if (cprm.limit < binfmt->min_coredump) - goto fail_unlock; - - if (need_nonrelative && cn.corename[0] != '/') { - printk(KERN_WARNING "Pid %d(%s) can only dump core "\ - "to fully qualified path!\n", - task_tgid_vnr(current), current->comm); - printk(KERN_WARNING "Skipping core dump\n"); - goto fail_unlock; - } - - cprm.file = filp_open(cn.corename, - O_CREAT | 2 | O_NOFOLLOW | O_LARGEFILE | flag, - 0600); - if (IS_ERR(cprm.file)) - goto fail_unlock; - - inode = cprm.file->f_path.dentry->d_inode; - if (inode->i_nlink > 1) - goto close_fail; - if (d_unhashed(cprm.file->f_path.dentry)) - goto close_fail; - /* - * AK: actually i see no reason to not allow this for named - * pipes etc, but keep the previous behaviour for now. - */ - if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) - goto close_fail; - /* - * Dont allow local users get cute and trick others to coredump - * into their pre-created files. - */ - if (!uid_eq(inode->i_uid, current_fsuid())) - goto close_fail; - if (!cprm.file->f_op || !cprm.file->f_op->write) - goto close_fail; - if (do_truncate(cprm.file->f_path.dentry, 0, 0, cprm.file)) - goto close_fail; - } - - retval = binfmt->core_dump(&cprm); - if (retval) - current->signal->group_exit_code |= 0x80; - - if (ispipe && core_pipe_limit) - wait_for_dump_helpers(cprm.file); -close_fail: - if (cprm.file) - filp_close(cprm.file, NULL); -fail_dropcount: - if (ispipe) - atomic_dec(&core_dump_count); -fail_unlock: - kfree(cn.corename); -fail_corename: - coredump_finish(mm); - revert_creds(old_cred); -fail_creds: - put_cred(cred); -fail: - return; -} - -/* - * Core dumping helper functions. These are the only things you should - * do on a core-file: use only these functions to write out all the - * necessary info. - */ -int dump_write(struct file *file, const void *addr, int nr) -{ - return access_ok(VERIFY_READ, addr, nr) && file->f_op->write(file, addr, nr, &file->f_pos) == nr; -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL(dump_write); - -int dump_seek(struct file *file, loff_t off) -{ - int ret = 1; - - if (file->f_op->llseek && file->f_op->llseek != no_llseek) { - if (file->f_op->llseek(file, off, SEEK_CUR) < 0) - return 0; - } else { - char *buf = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL); - - if (!buf) - return 0; - while (off > 0) { - unsigned long n = off; - - if (n > PAGE_SIZE) - n = PAGE_SIZE; - if (!dump_write(file, buf, n)) { - ret = 0; - break; - } - off -= n; - } - free_page((unsigned long)buf); - } - return ret; -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL(dump_seek); - + #ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_EXECVE + SYSCALL_DEFINE3(execve, + const char __user *, filename, + const char __user *const __user *, argv, + const char __user *const __user *, envp) + { + const char *path = getname(filename); + int error = PTR_ERR(path); + if (!IS_ERR(path)) { + error = do_execve(path, argv, envp, current_pt_regs()); + putname(path); + } + return error; + } + #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT + asmlinkage long compat_sys_execve(const char __user * filename, + const compat_uptr_t __user * argv, + const compat_uptr_t __user * envp) + { + const char *path = getname(filename); + int error = PTR_ERR(path); + if (!IS_ERR(path)) { + error = compat_do_execve(path, argv, envp, current_pt_regs()); + putname(path); + } + return error; + } + #endif + #endif + + #ifdef __ARCH_WANT_KERNEL_EXECVE + int kernel_execve(const char *filename, + const char *const argv[], + const char *const envp[]) + { + struct pt_regs *p = current_pt_regs(); + int ret; + + ret = do_execve(filename, + (const char __user *const __user *)argv, + (const char __user *const __user *)envp, p); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + /* + * We were successful. We won't be returning to our caller, but + * instead to user space by manipulating the kernel stack. + */ + ret_from_kernel_execve(p); + } + #endif