From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
To: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
akpm@linux-foundation.org, broonie@kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-next@vger.kernel.org, mhocko@suse.cz,
mm-commits@vger.kernel.org, sfr@canb.auug.org.au
Subject: Re: mmotm 2019-08-27-20-39 uploaded (objtool: xen)
Date: Thu, 29 Aug 2019 10:24:45 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190829082445.GM2369@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190828200134.d3lwgyunlpxc6cbn@treble>
On Wed, Aug 28, 2019 at 03:01:34PM -0500, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> On Wed, Aug 28, 2019 at 10:56:25AM -0700, Randy Dunlap wrote:
> > >> drivers/xen/gntdev.o: warning: objtool: gntdev_copy()+0x229: call to __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds() with UACCESS enabled
> > >
> > > Easy one :-)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.c b/tools/objtool/check.c
> > > index 0c8e17f946cd..6a935ab93149 100644
> > > --- a/tools/objtool/check.c
> > > +++ b/tools/objtool/check.c
> > > @@ -483,6 +483,7 @@ static const char *uaccess_safe_builtin[] = {
> > > "ubsan_type_mismatch_common",
> > > "__ubsan_handle_type_mismatch",
> > > "__ubsan_handle_type_mismatch_v1",
> > > + "__ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds",
> > > /* misc */
> > > "csum_partial_copy_generic",
> > > "__memcpy_mcsafe",
> > >
> >
> >
> > then I get this one:
> >
> > lib/ubsan.o: warning: objtool: __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds()+0x5d: call to ubsan_prologue() with UACCESS enabled
>
> And of course I jinxed it by calling it easy.
>
> Peter, how do you want to handle this?
>
> Should we just disable UACCESS checking in lib/ubsan.c?
No, that is actually unsafe and could break things (as would you patch
above).
I'm thinking the below patch ought to cure things:
---
Subject: x86/uaccess: Don't leak the AC flags into __get_user() argument evalidation
Identical to __put_user(); the __get_user() argument evalution will too
leak UBSAN crud into the __uaccess_begin() / __uaccess_end() region.
While uncommon this was observed to happen for:
drivers/xen/gntdev.c: if (__get_user(old_status, batch->status[i]))
where UBSAN added array bound checking.
This complements commit:
6ae865615fc4 ("x86/uaccess: Dont leak the AC flag into __put_user() argument evaluation")
Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: luto@kernel.org
---
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 9c4435307ff8..35c225ede0e4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -444,8 +444,10 @@ __pu_label: \
({ \
int __gu_err; \
__inttype(*(ptr)) __gu_val; \
+ __typeof__(ptr) __gu_ptr = (ptr); \
+ __typeof__(size) __gu_size = (size); \
__uaccess_begin_nospec(); \
- __get_user_size(__gu_val, (ptr), (size), __gu_err, -EFAULT); \
+ __get_user_size(__gu_val, __gu_ptr, __gu_size, __gu_err, -EFAULT); \
__uaccess_end(); \
(x) = (__force __typeof__(*(ptr)))__gu_val; \
__builtin_expect(__gu_err, 0); \
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-08-29 8:25 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-08-28 3:40 mmotm 2019-08-27-20-39 uploaded akpm
2019-08-28 16:58 ` mmotm 2019-08-27-20-39 uploaded (objtool: xen) Randy Dunlap
2019-08-28 17:19 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-08-28 17:56 ` Randy Dunlap
2019-08-28 20:01 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-08-29 8:24 ` Peter Zijlstra [this message]
2019-08-29 23:37 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-08-30 4:10 ` Sedat Dilek
2019-08-28 17:59 ` mmotm 2019-08-27-20-39 uploaded (gpu/drm/amd/display/) Randy Dunlap
2019-08-28 18:53 ` Alex Deucher
2019-08-28 18:30 ` mmotm 2019-08-27-20-39 uploaded (sound/hda/intel-nhlt.c) Randy Dunlap
2019-08-28 19:28 ` Pierre-Louis Bossart
2019-08-28 21:06 ` Randy Dunlap
2019-08-28 22:20 ` Pierre-Louis Bossart
2019-08-28 22:45 ` Pierre-Louis Bossart
2019-08-28 22:59 ` Randy Dunlap
2019-08-29 2:26 ` Randy Dunlap
2019-08-29 15:08 ` [alsa-devel] " Takashi Iwai
2019-08-29 16:22 ` Pierre-Louis Bossart
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