From: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
To: akpm@linux-foundation.org, broonie@kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-next@vger.kernel.org, mhocko@suse.cz,
mm-commits@vger.kernel.org, sfr@canb.auug.org.au,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Subject: Re: mmotm 2020-01-28-20-05 uploaded (security/security.c)
Date: Tue, 28 Jan 2020 20:52:28 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <56177bc4-441d-36f4-fe73-4e86edf02899@infradead.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200129040640.6PNuz0vcp%akpm@linux-foundation.org>
On 1/28/20 8:06 PM, akpm@linux-foundation.org wrote:
> The mm-of-the-moment snapshot 2020-01-28-20-05 has been uploaded to
>
> http://www.ozlabs.org/~akpm/mmotm/
>
> mmotm-readme.txt says
>
> README for mm-of-the-moment:
>
> http://www.ozlabs.org/~akpm/mmotm/
>
> This is a snapshot of my -mm patch queue. Uploaded at random hopefully
> more than once a week.
>
security/security.c contains duplicate lines for <lockdown_reasons> array:
/*
* These are descriptions of the reasons that can be passed to the
* security_locked_down() LSM hook. Placing this array here allows
* all security modules to use the same descriptions for auditing
* purposes.
*/
const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = {
[LOCKDOWN_NONE] = "none",
[LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE] = "unsigned module loading",
[LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM] = "/dev/mem,kmem,port",
[LOCKDOWN_EFI_TEST] = "/dev/efi_test access",
[LOCKDOWN_KEXEC] = "kexec of unsigned images",
[LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION] = "hibernation",
[LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS] = "direct PCI access",
[LOCKDOWN_IOPORT] = "raw io port access",
[LOCKDOWN_MSR] = "raw MSR access",
[LOCKDOWN_ACPI_TABLES] = "modifying ACPI tables",
[LOCKDOWN_PCMCIA_CIS] = "direct PCMCIA CIS storage",
[LOCKDOWN_TIOCSSERIAL] = "reconfiguration of serial port IO",
[LOCKDOWN_MODULE_PARAMETERS] = "unsafe module parameters",
[LOCKDOWN_MMIOTRACE] = "unsafe mmio",
[LOCKDOWN_DEBUGFS] = "debugfs access",
[LOCKDOWN_XMON_WR] = "xmon write access",
[LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity",
[LOCKDOWN_KCORE] = "/proc/kcore access",
[LOCKDOWN_KPROBES] = "use of kprobes",
[LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ] = "use of bpf to read kernel RAM",
[LOCKDOWN_PERF] = "unsafe use of perf",
[LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS] = "use of tracefs",
[LOCKDOWN_XMON_RW] = "xmon read and write access",
[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality",
};
/*
* These are descriptions of the reasons that can be passed to the
* security_locked_down() LSM hook. Placing this array here allows
* all security modules to use the same descriptions for auditing
* purposes.
*/
const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = {
[LOCKDOWN_NONE] = "none",
[LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE] = "unsigned module loading",
[LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM] = "/dev/mem,kmem,port",
[LOCKDOWN_EFI_TEST] = "/dev/efi_test access",
[LOCKDOWN_KEXEC] = "kexec of unsigned images",
[LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION] = "hibernation",
[LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS] = "direct PCI access",
[LOCKDOWN_IOPORT] = "raw io port access",
[LOCKDOWN_MSR] = "raw MSR access",
[LOCKDOWN_ACPI_TABLES] = "modifying ACPI tables",
[LOCKDOWN_PCMCIA_CIS] = "direct PCMCIA CIS storage",
[LOCKDOWN_TIOCSSERIAL] = "reconfiguration of serial port IO",
[LOCKDOWN_MODULE_PARAMETERS] = "unsafe module parameters",
[LOCKDOWN_MMIOTRACE] = "unsafe mmio",
[LOCKDOWN_DEBUGFS] = "debugfs access",
[LOCKDOWN_XMON_WR] = "xmon write access",
[LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity",
[LOCKDOWN_KCORE] = "/proc/kcore access",
[LOCKDOWN_KPROBES] = "use of kprobes",
[LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ] = "use of bpf to read kernel RAM",
[LOCKDOWN_PERF] = "unsafe use of perf",
[LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS] = "use of tracefs",
[LOCKDOWN_XMON_RW] = "xmon read and write access",
[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality",
};
Stephen, you might delete half of those for linux-next....
--
~Randy
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-01-29 4:52 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-01-29 4:06 mmotm 2020-01-28-20-05 uploaded akpm
2020-01-29 4:39 ` mmotm 2020-01-28-20-05 uploaded (net/mptcp/subflow.c) Randy Dunlap
2020-01-29 4:52 ` Randy Dunlap [this message]
2020-01-29 13:51 ` mmotm 2020-01-28-20-05 uploaded (security/security.c) Paul Moore
2020-01-29 16:02 ` Randy Dunlap
2020-01-29 22:32 ` Stephen Rothwell
2020-01-29 16:43 ` mmotm 2020-01-28-20-05 uploaded (objtool warnings) Randy Dunlap
2020-01-29 17:19 ` Josh Poimboeuf
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=56177bc4-441d-36f4-fe73-4e86edf02899@infradead.org \
--to=rdunlap@infradead.org \
--cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=broonie@kernel.org \
--cc=jmorris@namei.org \
--cc=linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
--cc=linux-next@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=mhocko@suse.cz \
--cc=mm-commits@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=serge@hallyn.com \
--cc=sfr@canb.auug.org.au \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).