From: Bruce Fields <bfields@fieldses.org>
To: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Cc: Linux NFS Mailing List <linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC 4/4] NFSD: Prototype support for IMA on NFS (server)
Date: Fri, 1 Mar 2019 11:10:30 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190301161030.GB17671@fieldses.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <B8F76BFF-73DB-4904-8DB6-5ADE093AB051@oracle.com>
On Fri, Mar 01, 2019 at 11:01:14AM -0500, Chuck Lever wrote:
>
>
> > On Mar 1, 2019, at 10:04 AM, Bruce Fields <bfields@fieldses.org> wrote:
> >
> > On Mon, Feb 18, 2019 at 02:41:24PM -0500, Chuck Lever wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >>> On Feb 18, 2019, at 2:32 PM, bfields@fieldses.org wrote:
> >>>
> >>> On Thu, Feb 14, 2019 at 03:43:26PM -0500, Chuck Lever wrote:
> >>>> When NFSv4 Security Label support is enabled and kernel Integrity
> >>>> and IMA support is enabled (via CONFIG), then build in code to
> >>>> handle the "security.ima" xattr. The NFS server converts incoming
> >>>> GETATTR and SETATTR calls to acesses and updates of the xattr.
> >>>>
> >>>> The FATTR4 bit is made up; meaning we still have to go through a
> >>>> standards process to allocate a bit that all NFS vendors agree on.
> >>>> Thus there is no guarantee this prototype will interoperate with
> >>>> others or with a future standards-based implementation.
> >>>
> >>> Why the dependence on CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL?
> >>
> >> Hrm, well there is some mechanism on the client side that IMA
> >> needs that is behind CONFIG_NFS_V4_SECURITY_LABEL. I guess I
> >> didn't think about not doing the same thing on the server. It
> >> may just be an artifact of an earlier version of this code.
> >>
> >>
> >>> (Also, I wonder if we actually need CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL or if
> >>> we could just remove it, or replace it by CONFIG_SECURITY where
> >>> necessary.)
> >>
> >> On the server, there is already a (run-time) export option to
> >> enable and disable security labels. Is there a reason a
> >> distribution would want to disable client or server support
> >> for security labels at build time?
> >
> > Distributions tend to want kernels that can do anything, with run time
> > controls that are adequate to handle any use cases.
> >
> > So given that we need adequate run-time configuration, why might someone
> > also want the ability to disable at build time? Some reasons I can
> > think of:
> >
> > - they need a really small kernel.
> > - the feature is too hard to support, or they think it
> > introduces security risks, so they don't want their users
> > turning it on at all.
> >
> > I could see any of those being reasons for someone not to want NFSD_V4
> > or SECURITY at all, but is there likely to be a big need to configure in
> > both of those things but configure out NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL? That
> > seems unnecessarily fine grained.
>
> I'm not clear, then. Are you proposing to control support for IMA labels
> with the "security_labels" export option?
Just security labels. I'd think it'd make sense to support IMA labels
whenever IMA and NFSD_V4 are both turned on.
--b.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-03-01 16:10 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-02-14 20:43 [PATCH RFC 0/4] IMA on NFS prototype Chuck Lever
2019-02-14 20:43 ` [PATCH RFC 1/4] NFS: Define common IMA-related protocol elements Chuck Lever
2019-02-14 20:43 ` [PATCH RFC 2/4] NFS: Rename security xattr handler Chuck Lever
2019-02-14 20:43 ` [PATCH RFC 3/4] NFS: Prototype support for IMA on NFS (client) Chuck Lever
2019-02-14 20:43 ` [PATCH RFC 4/4] NFSD: Prototype support for IMA on NFS (server) Chuck Lever
2019-02-18 19:32 ` J. Bruce Fields
2019-02-18 19:41 ` Chuck Lever
2019-03-01 15:04 ` Bruce Fields
2019-03-01 16:01 ` Chuck Lever
2019-03-01 16:10 ` Bruce Fields [this message]
2019-02-20 0:36 ` [PATCH RFC 0/4] IMA on NFS prototype Mimi Zohar
2019-02-20 3:51 ` Chuck Lever
2019-02-20 12:26 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-02-21 14:49 ` Chuck Lever
2019-02-21 15:51 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-02-21 15:58 ` Chuck Lever
2019-02-22 20:16 ` J. Bruce Fields
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