From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from upbd19pa07.eemsg.mail.mil ([214.24.27.82]:62804 "EHLO upbd19pa07.eemsg.mail.mil" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1755332AbeDWNeO (ORCPT ); Mon, 23 Apr 2018 09:34:14 -0400 Subject: Re: [PATCH 04/24] VFS: Add LSM hooks for filesystem context [ver #7] To: David Howells , Paul Moore Cc: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-afs@lists.infradead.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov References: <152414466005.23902.12967974041384198114.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <152414469006.23902.8132059438921850399.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <3232.1524238511@warthog.procyon.org.uk> From: Stephen Smalley Message-ID: Date: Mon, 23 Apr 2018 09:25:09 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <3232.1524238511@warthog.procyon.org.uk> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Sender: linux-nfs-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: On 04/20/2018 11:35 AM, David Howells wrote: > Paul Moore wrote: > >> Adding the SELinux mailing list to the CC line; in the future please >> include the SELinux mailing list on patches like this. It would also >> be very helpful to include "selinux" somewhere in the subject line >> when the patch is predominately SELinux related (much like you did for >> the other LSMs in this patchset). > > I should probably evict the SELinux bits into their own patch since the point > of this patch is the LSM hooks, not specifically SELinux's implementation > thereof. > >> I can't say I've digested all of this yet, but what SELinux testing >> have you done with this patchset? > > Using the fsopen()/fsmount() syscalls, these hooks will be made use of, say > for NFS (which I haven't included in this list). Even sys_mount() will make > use of them a bit, so just booting the system does that. > > Note that for SELinux these hooks don't change very much except how the > parameters are handled. It doesn't actually change the checks that are made - > at least, not yet. There are some additional syscalls under consideration > (such as the ability to pick a live mounted filesystem into a context) that > might require additional permits. Neither fsopen() nor fscontext_fs_write() appear to perform any kind of up-front permission checking (DAC or MAC), although some security hooks may be ultimately called to allocate structures, parse security options, etc. Is there a reason not apply a may_mount() or similar check up front?