From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_INVALID, DKIM_SIGNED,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 590A6C433E5 for ; Wed, 19 Aug 2020 17:34:03 +0000 (UTC) Received: from ml01.01.org (ml01.01.org [198.145.21.10]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2330120888 for ; Wed, 19 Aug 2020 17:34:03 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (1024-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="PfCq2RYo" DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 2330120888 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=kernel.org Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-nvdimm-bounces@lists.01.org Received: from ml01.vlan13.01.org (localhost [IPv6:::1]) by ml01.01.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E471E1343C736; Wed, 19 Aug 2020 10:34:02 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: Pass (mailfrom) identity=mailfrom; client-ip=198.145.29.99; helo=mail.kernel.org; envelope-from=rppt@kernel.org; receiver= Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ml01.01.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 692651313D5DC for ; Wed, 19 Aug 2020 10:34:00 -0700 (PDT) Received: from kernel.org (unknown [87.70.91.42]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 2E536206FA; Wed, 19 Aug 2020 17:33:51 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1597858440; bh=1Kuiv8iGgm6SalVVkZfBiL4OHWxQAxShozxNk+zBolU=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=PfCq2RYoBnpI+rRZ0w6qSWuewp0KRf89Aalz44HYo9TFEhrDUQICW5QIJCrh8Ca0K uLAW8PYxM/i8eVvlbksIuqNR9MKaOckhfOZhXePVk3EU37CkhLrBof1KFmHs22XZC0 sszvftR/cJX4BhW1GWf6wauiWhaZ3R/1Xv2rD11Y= Date: Wed, 19 Aug 2020 20:33:47 +0300 From: Mike Rapoport To: David Hildenbrand Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 6/6] mm: secretmem: add ability to reserve memory at boot Message-ID: <20200819173347.GW752365@kernel.org> References: <20200818141554.13945-1-rppt@kernel.org> <20200818141554.13945-7-rppt@kernel.org> <03ec586d-c00c-c57e-3118-7186acb7b823@redhat.com> <20200819115335.GU752365@kernel.org> <10bf57a9-c3c2-e13c-ca50-e872b7a2db0c@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <10bf57a9-c3c2-e13c-ca50-e872b7a2db0c@redhat.com> Message-ID-Hash: GBUI2ABRLFXJ2ECQLPRGRZAZ2ZEVCMG2 X-Message-ID-Hash: GBUI2ABRLFXJ2ECQLPRGRZAZ2ZEVCMG2 X-MailFrom: rppt@kernel.org X-Mailman-Rule-Hits: nonmember-moderation X-Mailman-Rule-Misses: dmarc-mitigation; no-senders; approved; emergency; loop; banned-address; member-moderation CC: Andrew Morton , Alexander Viro , Andy Lutomirski , Arnd Bergmann , Borislav Petkov , Catalin Marinas , Christopher Lameter , Dave Hansen , Elena Reshetova , "H. Peter Anvin" , Idan Yaniv , Ingo Molnar , James Bottomley , "Kirill A. Shutemov" , Matthew Wilcox , Mark Rutland , Mike Rapoport , Michael Kerrisk , Palmer Dabbelt , Paul Walmsley , Peter Zijlstra , Thomas Gleixner , Tycho Andersen , Will Deacon , linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.o rg, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, x86@kernel.org X-Mailman-Version: 3.1.1 Precedence: list List-Id: "Linux-nvdimm developer list." Archived-At: List-Archive: List-Help: List-Post: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit On Wed, Aug 19, 2020 at 02:10:43PM +0200, David Hildenbrand wrote: > On 19.08.20 13:53, Mike Rapoport wrote: > > On Wed, Aug 19, 2020 at 12:49:05PM +0200, David Hildenbrand wrote: > >> On 18.08.20 16:15, Mike Rapoport wrote: > >>> From: Mike Rapoport > >>> > >>> Taking pages out from the direct map and bringing them back may create > >>> undesired fragmentation and usage of the smaller pages in the direct > >>> mapping of the physical memory. > >>> > >>> This can be avoided if a significantly large area of the physical memory > >>> would be reserved for secretmem purposes at boot time. > >>> > >>> Add ability to reserve physical memory for secretmem at boot time using > >>> "secretmem" kernel parameter and then use that reserved memory as a global > >>> pool for secret memory needs. > >> > >> Wouldn't something like CMA be the better fit? Just wondering. Then, the > >> memory can actually be reused for something else while not needed. > > > > The memory allocated as secret is removed from the direct map and the > > boot time reservation is intended to reduce direct map fragmentatioan > > and to avoid splitting 1G pages there. So with CMA I'd still need to > > allocate 1G chunks for this and once 1G page is dropped from the direct > > map it still cannot be reused for anything else until it is freed. > > > > I could use CMA to do the boot time reservation, but doing the > > reservesion directly seemed simpler and more explicit to me. > > Well, using CMA would give you the possibility to let the memory be used > for other purposes until you decide it's the right time to take it + > remove the direct mapping etc. I still can't say I follow you here. If I reseve a CMA area as a pool for secret memory 1G pages, it is still reserved and it still cannot be used for other purposes, right? > I wonder if a sane approach would be to require to allocate a pool > during boot and only take pages ever from that pool. That would avoid > spilling many unmovable pages all over the place, locally limiting them > to your area here. That's what I tried to implement. The pool reserved at boot time is in a way similar to booting with mem=X and then splitting the remaining memory between the VMs. In this case, the memory reserved at boot is never in the direct map and allocations from such pool will not cause fragmentation. > -- > Thanks, > > David / dhildenb > -- Sincerely yours, Mike. _______________________________________________ Linux-nvdimm mailing list -- linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org To unsubscribe send an email to linux-nvdimm-leave@lists.01.org