From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.6 required=3.0 tests=DKIM_INVALID,DKIM_SIGNED, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 75D25C35670 for ; Mon, 24 Feb 2020 00:40:55 +0000 (UTC) Received: from ml01.01.org (ml01.01.org [198.145.21.10]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4C919206E0 for ; Mon, 24 Feb 2020 00:40:55 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (2048-bit key) header.d=intel-com.20150623.gappssmtp.com header.i=@intel-com.20150623.gappssmtp.com header.b="WLRjQ0ey" DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 4C919206E0 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=intel.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-nvdimm-bounces@lists.01.org Received: from ml01.vlan13.01.org (localhost [IPv6:::1]) by ml01.01.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 147A31003E9AA; Sun, 23 Feb 2020 16:41:47 -0800 (PST) Received-SPF: Pass (mailfrom) identity=mailfrom; client-ip=2607:f8b0:4864:20::244; helo=mail-oi1-x244.google.com; envelope-from=dan.j.williams@intel.com; receiver= Received: from mail-oi1-x244.google.com (mail-oi1-x244.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::244]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ml01.01.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2A7EB1007B1F6 for ; Sun, 23 Feb 2020 16:41:45 -0800 (PST) Received: by mail-oi1-x244.google.com with SMTP id q81so7442474oig.0 for ; Sun, 23 Feb 2020 16:40:52 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=intel-com.20150623.gappssmtp.com; s=20150623; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=/fWYYQZ1tUAo30vrwKRme2xC0z7VIUZp9g41h1//e/o=; b=WLRjQ0eyFKzsOa97x37vwYC4JCVblsUAEaOFOHkNbJ7sXhCoTayazSDFNNH+Wn5CSc jlSwUn8u1cCowXWer4TGls3dNbkd8Wl0yFBkpnLKDD3Uvj5nzZ65Ca26aGAwbcSEiLEY a+u/a7VbNJIK3yrdhHx4m5YET/DFdOSIKIuTuMZr7Db2WSfQgNzEEpfjOBR6IW+bKWH8 uQwvTyouue5J+jZz2/lZwW/PgG74G8U1klJM3ccqtm/NesLGWX5gHbet38H35FQtai/P f9fAvBa9Zgzqn2K7pYPLGVpHqZ2wpCqn4OvgZdUIOUP38zTtT5tIyFOiaPtKMwlJ+Bmq D8PQ== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=/fWYYQZ1tUAo30vrwKRme2xC0z7VIUZp9g41h1//e/o=; b=B1akJAWpWOOPora7bby5ajBMtJ3EYBi1t5+aK+pC475y1d9ZlRTP9Q8QJPVERekDTv j0q7+dO6MXgpuSZ9BpeFsJxXlyvvOO1H+EQScuF3wHKJiEb5Nan3r8Xtzrqsrus/dB34 CP5BnDM+8Z8uYstamFARb7aSk0vMSUYMUxm7k2A01Kfadqs3N5k3fEGH2drMjKlsHSPj /Te1BAdCnK3ghSd5NjvmTRejY33wlTwONduXjf8z6jvC5Jj3auuZ4uanlyEMxPVORB4M 8bSpR9YgUfc4W3STYMREwdO5f4xrv8VH8xuoyHjbVzOSg1LfZjHj/nTkFpSko1cA6+uO DTNg== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAXGcUqGeVU4/oNLuUk4PrOq9dR62KdwP4I1idiB+wYTno7XFF0v o8PBwFlDJfLnloY8vuIGu8Vl9US9Pd3GcT04k3snCw== X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqwrH1BeHXIjpPFXOS9J7oM8tzow/HkEMYsIW3IDVepJp41zLBuZXXglRgycv6nOwaG/2wuAr/itaObiTZGZwRY= X-Received: by 2002:aca:3f54:: with SMTP id m81mr10454580oia.73.1582504851476; Sun, 23 Feb 2020 16:40:51 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <20200218214841.10076-1-vgoyal@redhat.com> <20200218214841.10076-3-vgoyal@redhat.com> <20200220215707.GC10816@redhat.com> <20200221201759.GF25974@redhat.com> <20200223230330.GE10737@dread.disaster.area> In-Reply-To: <20200223230330.GE10737@dread.disaster.area> From: Dan Williams Date: Sun, 23 Feb 2020 16:40:40 -0800 Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 2/8] drivers/pmem: Allow pmem_clear_poison() to accept arbitrary offset and len To: Dave Chinner Message-ID-Hash: 6MR6YL4QVLYFDBMCQDNQ5PS4OCAXFEGP X-Message-ID-Hash: 6MR6YL4QVLYFDBMCQDNQ5PS4OCAXFEGP X-MailFrom: dan.j.williams@intel.com X-Mailman-Rule-Misses: dmarc-mitigation; no-senders; approved; emergency; loop; banned-address; member-moderation; nonmember-moderation; administrivia; implicit-dest; max-recipients; max-size; news-moderation; no-subject; suspicious-header CC: linux-fsdevel , linux-nvdimm , Christoph Hellwig , device-mapper development X-Mailman-Version: 3.1.1 Precedence: list List-Id: "Linux-nvdimm developer list." Archived-At: List-Archive: List-Help: List-Post: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit On Sun, Feb 23, 2020 at 3:03 PM Dave Chinner wrote: > > On Fri, Feb 21, 2020 at 03:17:59PM -0500, Vivek Goyal wrote: > > On Fri, Feb 21, 2020 at 01:32:48PM -0500, Jeff Moyer wrote: > > > Vivek Goyal writes: > > > > > > > On Thu, Feb 20, 2020 at 04:35:17PM -0500, Jeff Moyer wrote: > > > >> Vivek Goyal writes: > > > >> > > > >> > Currently pmem_clear_poison() expects offset and len to be sector aligned. > > > >> > Atleast that seems to be the assumption with which code has been written. > > > >> > It is called only from pmem_do_bvec() which is called only from pmem_rw_page() > > > >> > and pmem_make_request() which will only passe sector aligned offset and len. > > > >> > > > > >> > Soon we want use this function from dax_zero_page_range() code path which > > > >> > can try to zero arbitrary range of memory with-in a page. So update this > > > >> > function to assume that offset and length can be arbitrary and do the > > > >> > necessary alignments as needed. > > > >> > > > >> What caller will try to zero a range that is smaller than a sector? > > > > > > > > Hi Jeff, > > > > > > > > New dax zeroing interface (dax_zero_page_range()) can technically pass > > > > a range which is less than a sector. Or which is bigger than a sector > > > > but start and end are not aligned on sector boundaries. > > > > > > Sure, but who will call it with misaligned ranges? > > > > create a file foo.txt of size 4K and then truncate it. > > > > "truncate -s 23 foo.txt". Filesystems try to zero the bytes from 24 to > > 4095. > > This should fail with EIO. Only full page writes should clear the > bad page state, and partial writes should therefore fail because > they do not guarantee the data in the filesystem block is all good. > > If this zeroing was a buffered write to an address with a bad > sector, then the writeback will fail and the user will (eventually) > get an EIO on the file. > > DAX should do the same thing, except because the zeroing is > synchronous (i.e. done directly by the truncate syscall) we can - > and should - return EIO immediately. > > Indeed, with your code, if we then extend the file by truncating up > back to 4k, then the range between 23 and 512 is still bad, even > though we've successfully zeroed it and the user knows it. An > attempt to read anywhere in this range (e.g. 10 bytes at offset 100) > will fail with EIO, but reading 10 bytes at offset 2000 will > succeed. > > That's *awful* behaviour to expose to userspace, especially when > they look at the fs config and see that it's using both 4kB block > and sector sizes... > > The only thing that makes sense from a filesystem perspective is > clearing bad page state when entire filesystem blocks are > overwritten. The data in a filesystem block is either good or bad, > and it doesn't matter how many internal (kernel or device) sectors > it has. > > > > And what happens to the rest? The caller is left to trip over the > > > errors? That sounds pretty terrible. I really think there needs to be > > > an explicit contract here. > > > > Ok, I think is is the contentious bit. Current interface > > (__dax_zero_page_range()) either clears the poison (if I/O is aligned to > > sector) or expects page to be free of poison. > > > > So in above example, of "truncate -s 23 foo.txt", currently I get an error > > because range being zeroed is not sector aligned. So > > __dax_zero_page_range() falls back to calling direct_access(). Which > > fails because there are poisoned sectors in the page. > > > > With my patches, dax_zero_page_range(), clears the poison from sector 1 to > > 7 but leaves sector 0 untouched and just writes zeroes from byte 0 to 511 > > and returns success. > > Ok, kernel sectors are not the unit of granularity bad page state > should be managed at. They don't match page state granularity, and > they don't match filesystem block granularity, and the whacky > "partial writes silently succeed, reads fail unpredictably" > assymetry it leads to will just cause problems for users. > > > So question is, is this better behavior or worse behavior. If sector 0 > > was poisoned, it will continue to remain poisoned and caller will come > > to know about it on next read and then it should try to truncate file > > to length 0 or unlink file or restore that file to get rid of poison. > > Worse, because the filesystem can't track what sub-parts of the > block are bad and that leads to inconsistent data integrity status > being exposed to userspace. The driver can't track it either. Latent poison isn't know until it is consumed, and writes to latent poison are not guaranteed to clear it. > > > > IOW, if a partial block is being zeroed and if it is poisoned, caller > > will not be return an error and poison will not be cleared and memory > > will be zeroed. What do we expect in such cases. > > > > Do we expect an interface where if there are any bad blocks in the range > > being zeroed, then they all should be cleared (and hence all I/O should > > be aligned) otherwise error is returned. If yes, I could make that > > change. > > > > Downside of current interface is that it will clear as many blocks as > > possible in the given range and leave starting and end blocks poisoned > > (if it is unaligned) and not return error. That means a reader will > > get error on these blocks again and they will have to try to clear it > > again. > > Which is solved by having partial page writes always EIO on poisoned > memory. The problem with the above is that partial page writes can not be guaranteed to return EIO. Poison is only detected on consumed reads, or a periodic scrub, not writes. IFF poison detection was always synchronous with poison creation then the above makes sense. However, with asynchronous signaling, it's fundamentally a false security blanket to assume even full block writes will clear poison unless a callback to firmware is made for every block. _______________________________________________ Linux-nvdimm mailing list -- linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org To unsubscribe send an email to linux-nvdimm-leave@lists.01.org