From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-5.2 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_INVALID, DKIM_SIGNED,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,NICE_REPLY_A, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_SANE_1 autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 14651C433E6 for ; Thu, 11 Feb 2021 10:02:32 +0000 (UTC) Received: from ml01.01.org (ml01.01.org [198.145.21.10]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B7D9264EA1 for ; Thu, 11 Feb 2021 10:02:31 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org B7D9264EA1 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=redhat.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-nvdimm-bounces@lists.01.org Received: from ml01.vlan13.01.org (localhost [IPv6:::1]) by ml01.01.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 761A2100EA92B; Thu, 11 Feb 2021 02:02:31 -0800 (PST) Received-SPF: Pass (mailfrom) identity=mailfrom; client-ip=63.128.21.124; helo=us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com; envelope-from=david@redhat.com; receiver= Received: from us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com (us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com [63.128.21.124]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ml01.01.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D0104100EA925 for ; Thu, 11 Feb 2021 02:02:28 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=redhat.com; s=mimecast20190719; t=1613037747; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=HvJ6ODrJsIAiBu7p562Cs80l2ihUXPDYjoFL2LYVwNg=; b=c5bsa43y5sQynpuLaf58W8udP9TioovbETtznXBYnDpqOo7vbUhqusFFm1LoANvMehc4Gw 1Y1etWtFBtVWQg853mc3msBQSMLulVOxUn0OQ3Re/yguwxptZcVcW48gILtkNtDjvHfYlr J1OMQrbL5c4ofJFAuXAt4PbQwJdAXTk= Received: from mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (mimecast-mx01.redhat.com [209.132.183.4]) (Using TLS) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP id us-mta-412-xjh0NtfMOp6y4PYLBjaekA-1; Thu, 11 Feb 2021 05:02:23 -0500 X-MC-Unique: xjh0NtfMOp6y4PYLBjaekA-1 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx04.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.14]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 79EADC73A0; Thu, 11 Feb 2021 10:02:18 +0000 (UTC) Received: from [10.36.114.52] (ovpn-114-52.ams2.redhat.com [10.36.114.52]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D2B4F5D9E8; Thu, 11 Feb 2021 10:02:08 +0000 (UTC) To: Michal Hocko References: <20210208084920.2884-1-rppt@kernel.org> <20210208084920.2884-8-rppt@kernel.org> <20210208212605.GX242749@kernel.org> <20210209090938.GP299309@linux.ibm.com> <20210211071319.GF242749@kernel.org> <0d66baec-1898-987b-7eaf-68a015c027ff@redhat.com> From: David Hildenbrand Organization: Red Hat GmbH Subject: Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Message-ID: Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2021 11:02:07 +0100 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:78.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/78.5.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: Content-Language: en-US X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.79 on 10.5.11.14 Message-ID-Hash: 2KZMOGPNPNCV6LMA4DATNRYBXJCPWRI5 X-Message-ID-Hash: 2KZMOGPNPNCV6LMA4DATNRYBXJCPWRI5 X-MailFrom: david@redhat.com X-Mailman-Rule-Hits: nonmember-moderation X-Mailman-Rule-Misses: dmarc-mitigation; no-senders; approved; emergency; loop; banned-address; member-moderation CC: Mike Rapoport , Mike Rapoport , Andrew Morton , Alexander Viro , Andy Lutomirski , Arnd Bergmann , Borislav Petkov , Catalin Marinas , Christopher Lameter , Dave Hansen , Elena Reshetova , "H. Peter Anvin" , Ingo Molnar , James Bottomley , "Kirill A. Shutemov" , Matthew Wilcox , Mark Rutland , Michael Kerrisk , Palmer Dabbelt , Paul Walmsley , Peter Zijlstra , Rick Edgecombe , Roman Gushchin , Shakeel Butt , Shuah Khan , Thomas Gleixner , Tycho Ander sen , Will Deacon , linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, x86@kernel.org, Hagen Paul Pfeifer , Palmer Dabbelt X-Mailman-Version: 3.1.1 Precedence: list List-Id: "Linux-nvdimm developer list." Archived-At: List-Archive: List-Help: List-Post: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format="flowed" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit On 11.02.21 10:38, Michal Hocko wrote: > On Thu 11-02-21 10:01:32, David Hildenbrand wrote: > [...] >> AFAIKS, we would need MFD_SECRET and disallow >> MFD_ALLOW_SEALING and MFD_HUGETLB. > > Yes for an initial version. But I do expect a request to support both > features is just a matter of time. > >> In addition, we could add MFD_SECRET_NEVER_MAP, which could disallow any kind of >> temporary mappings (eor migration). TBC. > > I believe this is the mode Mike wants to have by default. A more relax > one would be an opt-in. MFD_SECRET_RELAXED which would allow temporal > mappings in the kernel for content copying (e.g. for migration). > >> --- >> >> Some random thoughts regarding files. >> >> What is the page size of secretmem memory? Sometimes we use huge pages, >> sometimes we fallback to 4k pages. So I assume huge pages in general? > > Unless there is an explicit request for hugetlb I would say the page > size is not really important like for any other fds. Huge pages can be > used transparently. > >> What are semantics of MADV()/FALLOCATE() etc on such files? > > I would expect the same semantic as regular shmem (memfd_create) except > the memory doesn't have _any_ backing storage which makes it > unevictable. So the reclaim related madv won't work but there shouldn't > be any real reason why e.g. MADV_DONTNEED, WILLNEED, DONT_FORK and > others don't work. Another thought regarding "doesn't have _any_ backing storage" What are the right semantics when it comes to memory accounting/commit? As secretmem does not have a) any backing storage b) cannot go to swap The MAP_NORESERVE vs. !MAP_NORESERVE handling gets a little unclear. Why "reserve swap space" if the allocations cannot ever go to swap? Sure, we want to "reserve physical memory", but in contrast to other users that can go to swap. Of course, this is only relevant for MAP_PRIVATE secretmem mappings. Other MAP_SHARED assumes there is no need for reserving swap space as it can just go to the backing storage. (yeah, tmpfs/shmem is weird in that regard as well, but again, it's a bit different) -- Thanks, David / dhildenb _______________________________________________ Linux-nvdimm mailing list -- linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org To unsubscribe send an email to linux-nvdimm-leave@lists.01.org