From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.2 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, USER_AGENT_SANE_1 autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C891AC43603 for ; Mon, 16 Dec 2019 07:14:43 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9E35F20725 for ; Mon, 16 Dec 2019 07:14:43 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726558AbfLPHOn (ORCPT ); Mon, 16 Dec 2019 02:14:43 -0500 Received: from mga06.intel.com ([134.134.136.31]:44281 "EHLO mga06.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726252AbfLPHOm (ORCPT ); Mon, 16 Dec 2019 02:14:42 -0500 X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from orsmga003.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.27]) by orsmga104.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 15 Dec 2019 23:14:42 -0800 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.69,320,1571727600"; d="scan'208";a="217326071" Received: from linux.intel.com ([10.54.29.200]) by orsmga003.jf.intel.com with ESMTP; 15 Dec 2019 23:14:41 -0800 Received: from [10.251.95.214] (abudanko-mobl.ccr.corp.intel.com [10.251.95.214]) by linux.intel.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D67B05802C9; Sun, 15 Dec 2019 23:14:33 -0800 (PST) Subject: [PATCH v2 1/7] capabilities: introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON to kernel and user space From: Alexey Budankov To: Peter Zijlstra , Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo , Ingo Molnar , jani.nikula@linux.intel.com, joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com, rodrigo.vivi@intel.com, Alexei Starovoitov , james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com, benh@kernel.crashing.org, Casey Schaufler , serge@hallyn.com, James Morris Cc: Jiri Olsa , Andi Kleen , Stephane Eranian , Igor Lubashev , Alexander Shishkin , Namhyung Kim , Jann Horn , Kees Cook , Thomas Gleixner , Tvrtko Ursulin , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel , "linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org" , intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org, bgregg@netflix.com, Song Liu , bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org References: <26101427-c0a3-db9f-39e9-9e5f4ddd009c@linux.intel.com> Organization: Intel Corp. Message-ID: <9066ae10-63d6-67a1-d472-1f22826c9ae8@linux.intel.com> Date: Mon, 16 Dec 2019 10:14:32 +0300 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/60.9.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <26101427-c0a3-db9f-39e9-9e5f4ddd009c@linux.intel.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Language: en-US Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-parisc-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org Introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability devoted to secure system performance monitoring and observability operations so that CAP_SYS_PERFMON would assist CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in its governing role for perf_events, i915_perf and other performance monitoring and observability subsystems of the kernel. CAP_SYS_PERFMON intends to harden system security and integrity during system performance monitoring and observability operations by decreasing attack surface that is available to CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes. CAP_SYS_PERFMON intends to take over CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials related to system performance monitoring and observability operations and balance amount of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials following with the recommendations provided in the capabilities man page [1] for CAP_SYS_ADMIN: "Note: this capability is overloaded; see Notes to kernel developers, below." [1] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov --- include/uapi/linux/capability.h | 8 +++++++- security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h index 240fdb9a60f6..7d1f8606c3e6 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h @@ -366,8 +366,14 @@ struct vfs_ns_cap_data { #define CAP_AUDIT_READ 37 +/* + * Allow system performance and observability privileged operations + * using perf_events, i915_perf and other kernel subsystems + */ + +#define CAP_SYS_PERFMON 38 -#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_AUDIT_READ +#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_SYS_PERFMON #define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP) diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h index 7db24855e12d..bae602c623b0 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h @@ -27,9 +27,9 @@ "audit_control", "setfcap" #define COMMON_CAP2_PERMS "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", \ - "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read" + "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read", "sys_perfmon" -#if CAP_LAST_CAP > CAP_AUDIT_READ +#if CAP_LAST_CAP > CAP_SYS_PERFMON #error New capability defined, please update COMMON_CAP2_PERMS. #endif -- 2.20.1