From: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
To: hpa@zytor.com, kys@microsoft.com, haiyangz@microsoft.com,
wei.liu@kernel.org, decui@microsoft.com, luto@kernel.org,
peterz@infradead.org, davem@davemloft.net, edumazet@google.com,
kuba@kernel.org, pabeni@redhat.com, lpieralisi@kernel.org,
robh@kernel.org, kw@linux.com, bhelgaas@google.com,
arnd@arndb.de, hch@lst.de, m.szyprowski@samsung.com,
robin.murphy@arm.com, thomas.lendacky@amd.com,
brijesh.singh@amd.com, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com,
bp@alien8.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com,
Tianyu.Lan@microsoft.com, kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com,
sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com, ak@linux.intel.com,
isaku.yamahata@intel.com, dan.j.williams@intel.com,
jane.chu@oracle.com, seanjc@google.com, tony.luck@intel.com,
x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
linux-pci@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
iommu@lists.linux.dev
Cc: mikelley@microsoft.com
Subject: [PATCH v5 06/14] x86/ioremap: Support hypervisor specified range to map as encrypted
Date: Thu, 12 Jan 2023 13:42:25 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1673559753-94403-7-git-send-email-mikelley@microsoft.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1673559753-94403-1-git-send-email-mikelley@microsoft.com>
In a AMD SEV-SNP VM using vTOM, devices in MMIO space may be provided by
the paravisor and need to be mapped as encrypted. Provide a function
for the hypervisor to specify the address range for such devices.
In __ioremap_caller(), map addresses in this range as encrypted.
Only a single range is supported. If multiple devices need to be
mapped encrypted, the paravisor must place them within the single
contiguous range.
Signed-off-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/io.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h
index e902564..72eb366 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h
@@ -169,6 +169,8 @@ static inline unsigned int isa_virt_to_bus(volatile void *address)
}
#define isa_bus_to_virt phys_to_virt
+extern void ioremap_set_encrypted_range(resource_size_t addr, unsigned long size);
+
/*
* The default ioremap() behavior is non-cached; if you need something
* else, you probably want one of the following.
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
index 6453fba..8db5846 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
@@ -37,6 +37,10 @@ struct ioremap_desc {
unsigned int flags;
};
+/* Range of "other" addresses to treat as encrypted when remapping */
+resource_size_t other_encrypted_start;
+resource_size_t other_encrypted_end;
+
/*
* Fix up the linear direct mapping of the kernel to avoid cache attribute
* conflicts.
@@ -108,14 +112,35 @@ static unsigned int __ioremap_check_encrypted(struct resource *res)
}
/*
+ * Allow a hypervisor to specify an additional range of addresses to
+ * treat as encrypted when remapping.
+ */
+void ioremap_set_encrypted_range(resource_size_t addr, unsigned long size)
+{
+ other_encrypted_start = addr;
+ other_encrypted_end = addr + size - 1;
+}
+
+/*
* The EFI runtime services data area is not covered by walk_mem_res(), but must
- * be mapped encrypted when SEV is active.
+ * be mapped encrypted when SEV is active. Also check the hypervisor specified
+ * "other" address range to treat as encrypted.
*/
static void __ioremap_check_other(resource_size_t addr, struct ioremap_desc *desc)
{
if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
return;
+ /*
+ * Check for an address within the "other" encrypted address range. If such
+ * a range is set, it must include the entire space used by the device,
+ * so we don't need to deal with a partial fit.
+ */
+ if ((addr >= other_encrypted_start) && (addr <= other_encrypted_end)) {
+ desc->flags |= IORES_MAP_ENCRYPTED;
+ return;
+ }
+
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI))
return;
--
1.8.3.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-01-12 21:49 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 70+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-01-12 21:42 [PATCH v5 00/14] Add PCI pass-thru support to Hyper-V Confidential VMs Michael Kelley
2023-01-12 21:42 ` [PATCH v5 01/14] x86/ioapic: Gate decrypted mapping on cc_platform_has() attribute Michael Kelley
2023-01-12 21:42 ` [PATCH v5 02/14] x86/hyperv: Reorder code to facilitate future work Michael Kelley
2023-01-12 21:42 ` [PATCH v5 03/14] Drivers: hv: Explicitly request decrypted in vmap_pfn() calls Michael Kelley
2023-01-12 21:42 ` [PATCH v5 04/14] x86/mm: Handle decryption/re-encryption of bss_decrypted consistently Michael Kelley
2023-01-12 21:42 ` [PATCH v5 05/14] init: Call mem_encrypt_init() after Hyper-V hypercall init is done Michael Kelley
2023-01-12 21:42 ` Michael Kelley [this message]
2023-01-20 20:15 ` [PATCH v5 06/14] x86/ioremap: Support hypervisor specified range to map as encrypted Borislav Petkov
2023-01-21 4:10 ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2023-01-25 14:55 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-02 5:49 ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2023-02-07 12:41 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-07 19:01 ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2023-02-07 19:33 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-07 19:48 ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2023-02-07 19:54 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-07 19:57 ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2023-02-08 0:18 ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2023-02-08 15:09 ` Dave Hansen
2023-02-09 17:29 ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2023-02-08 17:23 ` Dave Hansen
2023-02-09 17:47 ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2023-02-10 18:41 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-02-10 18:58 ` Dave Hansen
2023-02-10 19:03 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-10 19:15 ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2023-02-10 19:36 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-10 19:58 ` Dave Hansen
2023-02-10 20:50 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-02-10 20:57 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-02-10 21:27 ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2023-02-10 23:47 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-02-14 7:45 ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2023-02-16 13:32 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-16 16:16 ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2023-02-16 17:06 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-17 6:16 ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2023-02-17 14:55 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-22 22:13 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-02-22 22:33 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-22 22:54 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-02-22 23:34 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-23 1:21 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-02-23 10:45 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-23 20:01 ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2023-02-23 20:27 ` Dave Hansen
2023-03-06 21:51 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-09 11:12 ` David Woodhouse
2023-03-09 11:59 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-09 13:00 ` David Woodhouse
2023-03-09 14:19 ` Tom Lendacky
2023-03-09 14:36 ` Jörg Rödel
2023-03-09 14:45 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-09 15:45 ` David Woodhouse
2023-03-09 16:34 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-10 10:05 ` David Woodhouse
2023-02-23 20:26 ` Dave Hansen
2023-02-23 20:41 ` Dave Hansen
2023-02-23 20:51 ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2023-02-23 21:07 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-02-23 21:15 ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2023-02-23 21:24 ` Dave Hansen
2023-01-12 21:42 ` [PATCH v5 07/14] x86/hyperv: Change vTOM handling to use standard coco mechanisms Michael Kelley
2023-01-12 21:42 ` [PATCH v5 08/14] swiotlb: Remove bounce buffer remapping for Hyper-V Michael Kelley
2023-01-12 21:42 ` [PATCH v5 09/14] Drivers: hv: vmbus: Remove second mapping of VMBus monitor pages Michael Kelley
2023-01-12 21:42 ` [PATCH v5 10/14] Drivers: hv: vmbus: Remove second way of mapping ring buffers Michael Kelley
2023-01-12 21:42 ` [PATCH v5 11/14] hv_netvsc: Remove second mapping of send and recv buffers Michael Kelley
2023-01-12 21:42 ` [PATCH v5 12/14] Drivers: hv: Don't remap addresses that are above shared_gpa_boundary Michael Kelley
2023-01-12 21:42 ` [PATCH v5 13/14] PCI: hv: Add hypercalls to read/write MMIO space Michael Kelley
2023-01-12 21:42 ` [PATCH v5 14/14] PCI: hv: Enable PCI pass-thru devices in Confidential VMs Michael Kelley
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