From: Bjorn Helgaas <helgaas@kernel.org>
To: Rajat Jain <rajatja@google.com>
Cc: "Raj, Ashok" <ashok.raj@intel.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>,
Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>,
Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>,
"Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@rjwysocki.net>,
Len Brown <lenb@kernel.org>,
"open list:AMD IOMMU (AMD-VI)" <iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-pci <linux-pci@vger.kernel.org>,
ACPI Devel Maling List <linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org>,
"Krishnakumar,
Lalithambika" <lalithambika.krishnakumar@intel.com>,
Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>,
Jean-Philippe Brucker <jean-philippe@linaro.org>,
Prashant Malani <pmalani@google.com>,
Benson Leung <bleung@google.com>, Todd Broch <tbroch@google.com>,
Alex Levin <levinale@google.com>,
Mattias Nissler <mnissler@google.com>,
Rajat Jain <rajatxjain@gmail.com>,
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Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>,
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Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>,
Saravana Kannan <saravanak@google.com>,
Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Heikki Krogerus <heikki.krogerus@linux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 4/4] PCI/ACS: Enable PCI_ACS_TB for untrusted/external-facing devices
Date: Sat, 11 Jul 2020 14:53:46 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200711195346.GA132330@bjorn-Precision-5520> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CACK8Z6F-8OZNJU8wqWuZq=moCaOi+3W=CzBeppfO31VZnkqBrg@mail.gmail.com>
On Fri, Jul 10, 2020 at 03:53:59PM -0700, Rajat Jain wrote:
> On Fri, Jul 10, 2020 at 2:29 PM Raj, Ashok <ashok.raj@intel.com> wrote:
> > On Fri, Jul 10, 2020 at 03:29:22PM -0500, Bjorn Helgaas wrote:
> > > On Tue, Jul 07, 2020 at 03:46:04PM -0700, Rajat Jain wrote:
> > > > When enabling ACS, enable translation blocking for external facing ports
> > > > and untrusted devices.
> > > >
> > > > Signed-off-by: Rajat Jain <rajatja@google.com>
> > > > ---
> > > > v4: Add braces to avoid warning from kernel robot
> > > > print warning for only external-facing devices.
> > > > v3: print warning if ACS_TB not supported on external-facing/untrusted ports.
> > > > Minor code comments fixes.
> > > > v2: Commit log change
> > > >
> > > > drivers/pci/pci.c | 8 ++++++++
> > > > drivers/pci/quirks.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
> > > > 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+)
> > > >
> > > > diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci.c b/drivers/pci/pci.c
> > > > index 73a8627822140..a5a6bea7af7ce 100644
> > > > --- a/drivers/pci/pci.c
> > > > +++ b/drivers/pci/pci.c
> > > > @@ -876,6 +876,14 @@ static void pci_std_enable_acs(struct pci_dev *dev)
> > > > /* Upstream Forwarding */
> > > > ctrl |= (cap & PCI_ACS_UF);
> > > >
> > > > + /* Enable Translation Blocking for external devices */
> > > > + if (dev->external_facing || dev->untrusted) {
> > > > + if (cap & PCI_ACS_TB)
> > > > + ctrl |= PCI_ACS_TB;
> > > > + else if (dev->external_facing)
> > > > + pci_warn(dev, "ACS: No Translation Blocking on external-facing dev\n");
> > > > + }
> > >
> > > IIUC, this means that external devices can *never* use ATS and
> > > can never cache translations.
>
> Yes, but it already exists today (and this patch doesn't change that):
> 521376741b2c2 "PCI/ATS: Only enable ATS for trusted devices"
>
> IMHO any external device trying to send ATS traffic despite having ATS
> disabled should count as a bad intent. And this patch is trying to
> plug that loophole, by blocking the AT traffic from devices that we do
> not expect to see AT from anyway.
Thinking about this some more, I wonder if Linux should:
- Explicitly disable ATS for every device at enumeration-time, e.g.,
in pci_init_capabilities(),
- Enable PCI_ACS_TB for every device (not just external-facing or
untrusted ones),
- Disable PCI_ACS_TB for the relevant devices along the path only
when enabling ATS.
One nice thing about doing that is that the "untrusted" test would be
only in pci_enable_ats(), and we wouldn't need one in
pci_std_enable_acs().
It's possible BIOS gives us devices with ATS enabled, and this might
break them, but that seems like something we'd want to find out about.
Bjorn
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-07-11 19:53 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-07-07 22:46 [PATCH v4 1/4] PCI: Move pci_enable_acs() and its dependencies up in pci.c Rajat Jain
2020-07-07 22:46 ` [PATCH v4 2/4] PCI: Keep the ACS capability offset in device Rajat Jain
2020-07-07 22:46 ` [PATCH v4 3/4] PCI: Treat "external-facing" devices as internal Rajat Jain
2020-07-07 22:46 ` [PATCH v4 4/4] PCI/ACS: Enable PCI_ACS_TB for untrusted/external-facing devices Rajat Jain
2020-07-10 20:29 ` Bjorn Helgaas
2020-07-10 21:28 ` Raj, Ashok
2020-07-10 22:53 ` Rajat Jain
2020-07-10 23:32 ` Bjorn Helgaas
2020-07-11 19:53 ` Bjorn Helgaas [this message]
2020-07-12 0:08 ` Rajat Jain
2020-07-12 2:58 ` Bjorn Helgaas
2020-07-13 8:01 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-07-14 20:19 ` Rajat Jain
2020-09-15 23:01 ` Rajat Jain
2020-09-16 21:46 ` Bjorn Helgaas
2020-07-10 20:39 ` [PATCH v4 1/4] PCI: Move pci_enable_acs() and its dependencies up in pci.c Bjorn Helgaas
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