From: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
To: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
<sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
x86@kernel.org, Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com>,
Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com>,
Yehezkel Bernat <YehezkelShB@gmail.com>,
"Rafael J . Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org>,
Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <knsathya@kernel.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-pci@vger.kernel.org,
linux-usb@vger.kernel.org,
virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org, "Reshetova,
Elena" <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 2/6] driver core: Add common support to skip probe for un-authorized devices
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 2021 16:44:47 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210930204447.GA482974@rowland.harvard.edu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <00156941-300d-a34a-772b-17f0a9aad885@linux.intel.com>
On Thu, Sep 30, 2021 at 12:23:36PM -0700, Andi Kleen wrote:
>
> > I don't think the current mitigations under discussion here are about
> > keeping the system working. In fact most encrypted VM configs tend to
> > stop booting as a preferred way to handle security issues.
>
> Maybe we should avoid the "trusted" term here. We're only really using it
> because USB is using it and we're now using a common framework like Greg
> requested. But I don't think it's the right way to think about it.
>
> We usually call the drivers "hardened". The requirement for a hardened
> driver is that all interactions through MMIO/port/config space IO/MSRs are
> sanitized and do not cause memory safety issues or other information leaks.
> Other than that there is no requirement on the functionality. In particular
> DOS is ok since a malicious hypervisor can decide to not run the guest at
> any time anyways.
>
> Someone loading an malicious driver inside the guest would be out of scope.
> If an attacker can do that inside the guest you already violated the
> security mechanisms and there are likely easier ways to take over the guest
> or leak data.
>
> The goal of the device filter mechanism is to prevent loading unhardened
> drivers that could be exploited without them being themselves malicious.
If all you want to do is prevent someone from loading a bunch of
drivers that you have identified as unhardened, why not just use a
modprobe blacklist? Am I missing something?
Alan Stern
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-09-30 20:44 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 75+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-09-30 1:05 [PATCH v2 0/6] Add device filter support Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-09-30 1:05 ` [PATCH v2 1/6] driver core: Move the "authorized" attribute from USB/Thunderbolt to core Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-09-30 1:42 ` Alan Stern
2021-09-30 1:55 ` Dan Williams
2021-09-30 2:38 ` Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan
2021-09-30 4:59 ` Dan Williams
2021-09-30 9:05 ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2021-09-30 14:59 ` Alan Stern
2021-09-30 15:25 ` Dan Williams
2021-09-30 11:19 ` Yehezkel Bernat
2021-09-30 15:28 ` Dan Williams
2021-09-30 18:25 ` Yehezkel Bernat
2021-09-30 19:04 ` Dan Williams
2021-09-30 19:50 ` Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan
2021-09-30 20:23 ` Dan Williams
2021-09-30 1:05 ` [PATCH v2 2/6] driver core: Add common support to skip probe for un-authorized devices Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-09-30 10:59 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2021-09-30 13:52 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-09-30 14:38 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2021-09-30 14:49 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-09-30 15:00 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2021-09-30 15:22 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-09-30 17:17 ` Andi Kleen
2021-09-30 17:23 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-09-30 19:15 ` Andi Kleen
2021-10-01 6:29 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-10-01 15:51 ` Alan Stern
2021-10-01 15:56 ` Andi Kleen
2021-09-30 14:43 ` Alan Stern
2021-09-30 14:48 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2021-09-30 15:32 ` Alan Stern
2021-09-30 15:52 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2021-09-30 14:58 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2021-09-30 15:35 ` Alan Stern
2021-09-30 15:59 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2021-09-30 19:23 ` Andi Kleen
2021-09-30 20:44 ` Alan Stern [this message]
2021-09-30 20:52 ` Dan Williams
2021-10-01 1:41 ` Alan Stern
2021-10-01 2:20 ` Dan Williams
2021-09-30 21:12 ` Andi Kleen
2021-09-30 1:05 ` [PATCH v2 3/6] driver core: Allow arch to initialize the authorized attribute Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-09-30 1:05 ` [PATCH v2 4/6] virtio: Initialize authorized attribute for confidential guest Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-09-30 11:03 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2021-09-30 13:36 ` Dan Williams
2021-09-30 13:49 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-09-30 15:18 ` Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan
2021-09-30 15:20 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2021-09-30 15:23 ` Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan
2021-09-30 15:23 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-09-30 19:04 ` Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan
2021-09-30 19:16 ` Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan
2021-09-30 19:30 ` Andi Kleen
2021-09-30 19:40 ` Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan
2021-10-01 7:03 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-10-01 15:49 ` Andi Kleen
2021-10-02 11:04 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2021-10-02 11:14 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-10-02 14:20 ` Andi Kleen
2021-10-02 14:44 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-10-02 18:40 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2021-10-03 6:40 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-10-04 21:04 ` Dan Williams
2021-10-01 16:13 ` Dan Williams
2021-10-01 16:45 ` Alan Stern
2021-10-01 18:09 ` Dan Williams
2021-10-01 19:00 ` Alan Stern
2021-10-01 19:45 ` Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan
2021-10-01 19:57 ` Dan Williams
2021-10-04 5:16 ` Mika Westerberg
2021-10-05 22:33 ` Dan Williams
2021-10-06 5:45 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-09-30 19:25 ` Andi Kleen
2021-09-30 1:05 ` [PATCH v2 5/6] x86/tdx: Add device filter support for x86 TDX guest platform Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-09-30 1:05 ` [PATCH v2 6/6] PCI: Initialize authorized attribute for confidential guest Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
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