From: "Andrea Parri (Microsoft)" <parri.andrea@gmail.com>
To: KY Srinivasan <kys@microsoft.com>,
Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@microsoft.com>,
Stephen Hemminger <sthemmin@microsoft.com>,
Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>, Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com>,
Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>,
Lorenzo Pieralisi <lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com>,
Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>,
Krzysztof Wilczynski <kw@linux.com>,
Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org, linux-pci@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
"Andrea Parri (Microsoft)" <parri.andrea@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] PCI: hv: Add validation for untrusted Hyper-V values
Date: Wed, 4 May 2022 14:50:38 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220504125039.2598-2-parri.andrea@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220504125039.2598-1-parri.andrea@gmail.com>
For additional robustness in the face of Hyper-V errors or malicious
behavior, validate all values that originate from packets that Hyper-V
has sent to the guest in the host-to-guest ring buffer. Ensure that
invalid values cannot cause data being copied out of the bounds of the
source buffer in hv_pci_onchannelcallback().
While at it, remove a redundant validation in hv_pci_generic_compl():
hv_pci_onchannelcallback() already ensures that all processed incoming
packets are "at least as large as [in fact larger than] a response".
Signed-off-by: Andrea Parri (Microsoft) <parri.andrea@gmail.com>
---
drivers/pci/controller/pci-hyperv.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/pci/controller/pci-hyperv.c b/drivers/pci/controller/pci-hyperv.c
index cf2fe5754fde4..9a3e17b682eb7 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/controller/pci-hyperv.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/controller/pci-hyperv.c
@@ -981,11 +981,7 @@ static void hv_pci_generic_compl(void *context, struct pci_response *resp,
{
struct hv_pci_compl *comp_pkt = context;
- if (resp_packet_size >= offsetofend(struct pci_response, status))
- comp_pkt->completion_status = resp->status;
- else
- comp_pkt->completion_status = -1;
-
+ comp_pkt->completion_status = resp->status;
complete(&comp_pkt->host_event);
}
@@ -1602,8 +1598,13 @@ static void hv_pci_compose_compl(void *context, struct pci_response *resp,
struct pci_create_int_response *int_resp =
(struct pci_create_int_response *)resp;
+ if (resp_packet_size < sizeof(*int_resp)) {
+ comp_pkt->comp_pkt.completion_status = -1;
+ goto out;
+ }
comp_pkt->comp_pkt.completion_status = resp->status;
comp_pkt->int_desc = int_resp->int_desc;
+out:
complete(&comp_pkt->comp_pkt.host_event);
}
@@ -2806,7 +2807,8 @@ static void hv_pci_onchannelcallback(void *context)
case PCI_BUS_RELATIONS:
bus_rel = (struct pci_bus_relations *)buffer;
- if (bytes_recvd <
+ if (bytes_recvd < sizeof(*bus_rel) ||
+ bytes_recvd <
struct_size(bus_rel, func,
bus_rel->device_count)) {
dev_err(&hbus->hdev->device,
@@ -2820,7 +2822,8 @@ static void hv_pci_onchannelcallback(void *context)
case PCI_BUS_RELATIONS2:
bus_rel2 = (struct pci_bus_relations2 *)buffer;
- if (bytes_recvd <
+ if (bytes_recvd < sizeof(*bus_rel2) ||
+ bytes_recvd <
struct_size(bus_rel2, func,
bus_rel2->device_count)) {
dev_err(&hbus->hdev->device,
@@ -2834,6 +2837,11 @@ static void hv_pci_onchannelcallback(void *context)
case PCI_EJECT:
dev_message = (struct pci_dev_incoming *)buffer;
+ if (bytes_recvd < sizeof(*dev_message)) {
+ dev_err(&hbus->hdev->device,
+ "eject message too small\n");
+ break;
+ }
hpdev = get_pcichild_wslot(hbus,
dev_message->wslot.slot);
if (hpdev) {
@@ -2845,6 +2853,11 @@ static void hv_pci_onchannelcallback(void *context)
case PCI_INVALIDATE_BLOCK:
inval = (struct pci_dev_inval_block *)buffer;
+ if (bytes_recvd < sizeof(*inval)) {
+ dev_err(&hbus->hdev->device,
+ "invalidate message too small\n");
+ break;
+ }
hpdev = get_pcichild_wslot(hbus,
inval->wslot.slot);
if (hpdev) {
--
2.25.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-05-04 12:51 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-05-04 12:50 [PATCH 0/2] PCI: hv: (More) Hardening changes Andrea Parri (Microsoft)
2022-05-04 12:50 ` Andrea Parri (Microsoft) [this message]
2022-05-05 21:59 ` [PATCH 1/2] PCI: hv: Add validation for untrusted Hyper-V values Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2022-05-06 7:47 ` Andrea Parri
2022-05-04 12:50 ` [PATCH 2/2] PCI: hv: Fix synchronization between channel callback and hv_pci_bus_exit() Andrea Parri (Microsoft)
2022-05-05 22:00 ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
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