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From: Long Li <longli@microsoft.com>
To: Andrea Parri <parri.andrea@gmail.com>
Cc: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>,
	"longli@linuxonhyperv.com" <longli@linuxonhyperv.com>,
	KY Srinivasan <kys@microsoft.com>,
	Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@microsoft.com>,
	Stephen Hemminger <sthemmin@microsoft.com>,
	Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>,
	Lorenzo Pieralisi <lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com>,
	Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>,
	Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>,
	"linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org" <linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-pci@vger.kernel.org" <linux-pci@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Andrea Parri <Andrea.Parri@microsoft.com>
Subject: RE: [PATCH] PCI: hv: Move completion variable from stack to heap in hv_compose_msi_msg()
Date: Fri, 4 Jun 2021 08:49:46 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <BY5PR21MB15061364D7D48499F5D7E8A0CE3B9@BY5PR21MB1506.namprd21.prod.outlook.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210601231339.GA1391@anparri>

> Subject: Re: [PATCH] PCI: hv: Move completion variable from stack to heap in
> hv_compose_msi_msg()
> 
> > I agree if the intent is to deal with a untrusted host, I can follow the same
> principle to add this support to all requests to VSP. But this is a different
> problem to what this patch intends to address. I can see they may share the
> same design principle and common code. My question on a untrusted host is:
> If a host is untrusted and is misbehaving on purpose, what's the point of
> keep the VM running and not crashing the PCI driver?
> 
> I think the principle can be summarized with "keep the VM _running, if you
> can handle the misbehaviour (possibly, warning on "something
> wrong/unexpected just happened"); crash, otherwise".
> 
> Of course, this is just a principle: the exact meaning of that 'handle' should be
> leverage case by case (which I admittedly haven't here); I'm thinking, e.g., at
> corresponding complexity/performance impacts and risks of 'mis-
> assessments'.
> 
> Thanks,
>   Andrea

I will follow Michael's suggestion and send v2.

Long

      reply	other threads:[~2021-06-04  8:49 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-05-12  8:07 [PATCH] PCI: hv: Move completion variable from stack to heap in hv_compose_msi_msg() longli
2021-05-26 18:27 ` Michael Kelley
2021-06-01 19:27   ` Long Li
2021-06-01 23:13     ` Andrea Parri
2021-06-04  8:49       ` Long Li [this message]

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