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k1mr6104740jaa.14.1593218721910; Fri, 26 Jun 2020 17:45:21 -0700 (PDT) Received: from ziepe.ca ([206.223.160.26]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id f2sm9778744ioc.52.2020.06.26.17.45.20 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Fri, 26 Jun 2020 17:45:20 -0700 (PDT) Received: from jgg by mlx with local (Exim 4.93) (envelope-from ) id 1joyy7-000SSN-Cf; Fri, 26 Jun 2020 21:45:19 -0300 Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2020 21:45:19 -0300 From: Jason Gunthorpe To: Hillf Danton Cc: syzbot , chuck.lever@oracle.com, dledford@redhat.com, leon@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org, parav@mellanox.com, Markus Elfring , syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: KASAN: use-after-free Read in addr_handler (2) Message-ID: <20200627004519.GB25301@ziepe.ca> References: <000000000000107b4605a7bdce7d@google.com> <20200614085321.8740-1-hdanton@sina.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20200614085321.8740-1-hdanton@sina.com> Sender: linux-rdma-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org On Sun, Jun 14, 2020 at 04:53:21PM +0800, Hillf Danton wrote: > > Wed, 10 Jun 2020 10:02:11 -0700 > > syzbot found the following crash on: > > > > HEAD commit: 7ae77150 Merge tag 'powerpc-5.8-1' of git://git.kernel.org.. > > git tree: upstream > > console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=16c0d3a6100000 > > kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=d195fe572fb15312 > > dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=a929647172775e335941 > > compiler: gcc (GCC) 9.0.0 20181231 (experimental) > > > > Unfortunately, I don't have any reproducer for this crash yet. > > > > IMPORTANT: if you fix the bug, please add the following tag to the commit: > > Reported-by: syzbot+a929647172775e335941@syzkaller.appspotmail.com > > > > ================================================================== > > BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:938 [inline] > > BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __mutex_lock+0x1033/0x13c0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1103 > > Read of size 8 at addr ffff888088ec33b0 by task kworker/u4:5/14014 > > > > CPU: 1 PID: 14014 Comm: kworker/u4:5 Not tainted 5.7.0-syzkaller #0 > > Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 > > Workqueue: ib_addr process_one_req > > Call Trace: > > __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] > > dump_stack+0x188/0x20d lib/dump_stack.c:118 > > print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xd3/0x413 mm/kasan/report.c:383 > > __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:513 [inline] > > kasan_report.cold+0x1f/0x37 mm/kasan/report.c:530 > > __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:938 [inline] > > __mutex_lock+0x1033/0x13c0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1103 > > addr_handler+0xa0/0x340 drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c:3100 > > process_one_req+0xfa/0x680 drivers/infiniband/core/addr.c:643 > > process_one_work+0x965/0x16a0 kernel/workqueue.c:2268 > > worker_thread+0x96/0xe20 kernel/workqueue.c:2414 > > kthread+0x388/0x470 kernel/kthread.c:268 > > ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:351 > > > > Allocated by task 31499: > > save_stack+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:48 > > set_track mm/kasan/common.c:56 [inline] > > __kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:494 [inline] > > __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xbf/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:467 > > kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x153/0x7d0 mm/slab.c:3551 > > kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:555 [inline] > > kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:669 [inline] > > __rdma_create_id+0x5b/0x850 drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c:861 > > ucma_create_id+0x1d1/0x590 drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c:503 > > ucma_write+0x285/0x350 drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c:1729 > > __vfs_write+0x76/0x100 fs/read_write.c:495 > > vfs_write+0x268/0x5d0 fs/read_write.c:559 > > ksys_write+0x1ee/0x250 fs/read_write.c:612 > > do_syscall_64+0xf6/0x7d0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:295 > > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xb3 > > > > Freed by task 31496: > > save_stack+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:48 > > set_track mm/kasan/common.c:56 [inline] > > kasan_set_free_info mm/kasan/common.c:316 [inline] > > __kasan_slab_free+0xf7/0x140 mm/kasan/common.c:455 > > __cache_free mm/slab.c:3426 [inline] > > kfree+0x109/0x2b0 mm/slab.c:3757 > > ucma_close+0x111/0x300 drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c:1807 > > __fput+0x33e/0x880 fs/file_table.c:281 > > task_work_run+0xf4/0x1b0 kernel/task_work.c:123 > > tracehook_notify_resume include/linux/tracehook.h:188 [inline] > > exit_to_usermode_loop+0x2fa/0x360 arch/x86/entry/common.c:165 > > prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:196 [inline] > > syscall_return_slowpath arch/x86/entry/common.c:279 [inline] > > do_syscall_64+0x6b1/0x7d0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:305 > > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xb3 > > > > The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888088ec3000 > > which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048 > > The buggy address is located 944 bytes inside of > > 2048-byte region [ffff888088ec3000, ffff888088ec3800) > > The buggy address belongs to the page: > > page:ffffea000223b0c0 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 > > flags: 0xfffe0000000200(slab) > > raw: 00fffe0000000200 ffffea000299f588 ffffea000263d0c8 ffff8880aa000e00 > > raw: 0000000000000000 ffff888088ec3000 0000000100000001 0000000000000000 > > page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected > > > > Memory state around the buggy address: > > ffff888088ec3280: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb > > ffff888088ec3300: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb > > >ffff888088ec3380: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb > > ^ > > ffff888088ec3400: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb > > ffff888088ec3480: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb > > ================================================================== > > Add extra grab to id_priv to make addr_handler() safe. > It may also fix what's > Reported-by: syzbot+08092148130652a6faae@syzkaller.appspotmail.com In some way adding the refcounting is appealing, but it is not quite right.. Once rdma_resolve_addr() is called the cm_id state is supposed to go to RDMA_CM_ADDR_QUERY and stay there until the address is resolved. The first thing rdma_destroy_id() does (which is what triggered the kfree) is to call cma_cancel_operation(), which does a cancel_delayed_work_sync(). So, to hit this syzkaller one of these must have happened: 1) rdma_addr_cancel() didn't work and the process_one_work() is still runnable/running 2) The state changed away from RDMA_CM_ADDR_QUERY without doing rdma_addr_cancel() 3) rdma_resolve_addr() ran concurrently with rdma_destroy_id() I think #1 and #3 are not likely as I've already fixed those in the past, but maybe you can see something? So, this is probably #2. Actually it looks like there are many cases where #2 is possible, so lets start there. Something sort of like this should help: >From 036b462378a376725d81072c47754a89a51e4774 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jason Gunthorpe Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2020 16:54:30 -0300 Subject: [PATCH] RDMA/cma: Execute rdma_cm destruction from a handler properly When a rdma_cm_id needs to be destroyed after a handler callback fails, part of the destruction pattern is open coded into each call site. Unfortunately the blind assignment to state discards important information needed to do cma_cancel_operation(). This results in active operations being left running after rdma_destroy_id() completes, and the use-after-free bugs from KASAN. Consolidate this entire pattern into destroy_id_handler_unlock() and manage the locking correctly. The state should be set to RDMA_CM_DESTROYING under the handler_lock to atomically ensure no futher handlers are called. Reported-by: syzbot+a929647172775e335941@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe --- drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c | 212 ++++++++++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 101 insertions(+), 111 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c index 3d7cc9f0f3d40c..a599a628e45dc7 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c @@ -1825,23 +1825,11 @@ static void cma_leave_mc_groups(struct rdma_id_private *id_priv) } } -void rdma_destroy_id(struct rdma_cm_id *id) +static void _destroy_id(struct rdma_id_private *id_priv, + enum rdma_cm_state state) { - struct rdma_id_private *id_priv; - enum rdma_cm_state state; - - id_priv = container_of(id, struct rdma_id_private, id); - trace_cm_id_destroy(id_priv); - state = cma_exch(id_priv, RDMA_CM_DESTROYING); cma_cancel_operation(id_priv, state); - /* - * Wait for any active callback to finish. New callbacks will find - * the id_priv state set to destroying and abort. - */ - mutex_lock(&id_priv->handler_mutex); - mutex_unlock(&id_priv->handler_mutex); - rdma_restrack_del(&id_priv->res); if (id_priv->cma_dev) { if (rdma_cap_ib_cm(id_priv->id.device, 1)) { @@ -1870,6 +1858,38 @@ void rdma_destroy_id(struct rdma_cm_id *id) put_net(id_priv->id.route.addr.dev_addr.net); kfree(id_priv); } + +/* + * destroy an ID from within the handler_mutex. This ensures that no other + * handlers can start running concurrently. + */ +static void destroy_id_handler_unlock(struct rdma_id_private *id_priv) + __releases(&idprv->handler_mutex) +{ + enum rdma_cm_state state; + + trace_cm_id_destroy(id_priv); + + /* + * Setting the state to destroyed under the handler mutex provides a + * fence against calling handler callbacks. If this is invoked due to + * the failure of a handler callback then it guarentees that no future + * handlers will be called. + */ + lockdep_assert_held(&id_priv->handler_mutex); + state = cma_exch(id_priv, RDMA_CM_DESTROYING); + mutex_unlock(&id_priv->handler_mutex); + _destroy_id(id_priv, state); +} + +void rdma_destroy_id(struct rdma_cm_id *id) +{ + struct rdma_id_private *id_priv = + container_of(id, struct rdma_id_private, id); + + mutex_lock(&id_priv->handler_mutex); + destroy_id_handler_unlock(id_priv); +} EXPORT_SYMBOL(rdma_destroy_id); static int cma_rep_recv(struct rdma_id_private *id_priv) @@ -2001,9 +2021,7 @@ static int cma_ib_handler(struct ib_cm_id *cm_id, if (ret) { /* Destroy the CM ID by returning a non-zero value. */ id_priv->cm_id.ib = NULL; - cma_exch(id_priv, RDMA_CM_DESTROYING); - mutex_unlock(&id_priv->handler_mutex); - rdma_destroy_id(&id_priv->id); + destroy_id_handler_unlock(id_priv); return ret; } out: @@ -2170,7 +2188,7 @@ static int cma_ib_req_handler(struct ib_cm_id *cm_id, mutex_lock(&listen_id->handler_mutex); if (listen_id->state != RDMA_CM_LISTEN) { ret = -ECONNABORTED; - goto err1; + goto err_unlock; } offset = cma_user_data_offset(listen_id); @@ -2187,55 +2205,38 @@ static int cma_ib_req_handler(struct ib_cm_id *cm_id, } if (!conn_id) { ret = -ENOMEM; - goto err1; + goto err_unlock; } mutex_lock_nested(&conn_id->handler_mutex, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING); ret = cma_ib_acquire_dev(conn_id, listen_id, &req); - if (ret) - goto err2; + if (ret) { + destroy_id_handler_unlock(conn_id); + goto err_unlock; + } conn_id->cm_id.ib = cm_id; cm_id->context = conn_id; cm_id->cm_handler = cma_ib_handler; - /* - * Protect against the user destroying conn_id from another thread - * until we're done accessing it. - */ - cma_id_get(conn_id); ret = cma_cm_event_handler(conn_id, &event); - if (ret) - goto err3; - /* - * Acquire mutex to prevent user executing rdma_destroy_id() - * while we're accessing the cm_id. - */ - mutex_lock(&lock); + if (ret) { + /* Destroy the CM ID by returning a non-zero value. */ + conn_id->cm_id.ib = NULL; + destroy_id_handler_unlock(conn_id); + goto err_unlock; + } + + /* NOTE: Holding handler_mutex prevents concurrent destroy */ if (cma_comp(conn_id, RDMA_CM_CONNECT) && (conn_id->id.qp_type != IB_QPT_UD)) { trace_cm_send_mra(cm_id->context); ib_send_cm_mra(cm_id, CMA_CM_MRA_SETTING, NULL, 0); } - mutex_unlock(&lock); mutex_unlock(&conn_id->handler_mutex); - mutex_unlock(&listen_id->handler_mutex); - cma_id_put(conn_id); - if (net_dev) - dev_put(net_dev); - return 0; -err3: - cma_id_put(conn_id); - /* Destroy the CM ID by returning a non-zero value. */ - conn_id->cm_id.ib = NULL; -err2: - cma_exch(conn_id, RDMA_CM_DESTROYING); - mutex_unlock(&conn_id->handler_mutex); -err1: +err_unlock: mutex_unlock(&listen_id->handler_mutex); - if (conn_id) - rdma_destroy_id(&conn_id->id); net_dev_put: if (net_dev) @@ -2335,9 +2336,7 @@ static int cma_iw_handler(struct iw_cm_id *iw_id, struct iw_cm_event *iw_event) if (ret) { /* Destroy the CM ID by returning a non-zero value. */ id_priv->cm_id.iw = NULL; - cma_exch(id_priv, RDMA_CM_DESTROYING); - mutex_unlock(&id_priv->handler_mutex); - rdma_destroy_id(&id_priv->id); + destroy_id_handler_unlock(id_priv); return ret; } @@ -2384,15 +2383,13 @@ static int iw_conn_req_handler(struct iw_cm_id *cm_id, ret = rdma_translate_ip(laddr, &conn_id->id.route.addr.dev_addr); if (ret) { - mutex_unlock(&conn_id->handler_mutex); - rdma_destroy_id(new_cm_id); + destroy_id_handler_unlock(conn_id); goto out; } ret = cma_iw_acquire_dev(conn_id, listen_id); if (ret) { - mutex_unlock(&conn_id->handler_mutex); - rdma_destroy_id(new_cm_id); + destroy_id_handler_unlock(conn_id); goto out; } @@ -2403,25 +2400,15 @@ static int iw_conn_req_handler(struct iw_cm_id *cm_id, memcpy(cma_src_addr(conn_id), laddr, rdma_addr_size(laddr)); memcpy(cma_dst_addr(conn_id), raddr, rdma_addr_size(raddr)); - /* - * Protect against the user destroying conn_id from another thread - * until we're done accessing it. - */ - cma_id_get(conn_id); ret = cma_cm_event_handler(conn_id, &event); if (ret) { /* User wants to destroy the CM ID */ conn_id->cm_id.iw = NULL; - cma_exch(conn_id, RDMA_CM_DESTROYING); - mutex_unlock(&conn_id->handler_mutex); - mutex_unlock(&listen_id->handler_mutex); - cma_id_put(conn_id); - rdma_destroy_id(&conn_id->id); - return ret; + destroy_id_handler_unlock(conn_id); + goto out; } mutex_unlock(&conn_id->handler_mutex); - cma_id_put(conn_id); out: mutex_unlock(&listen_id->handler_mutex); @@ -2478,6 +2465,10 @@ static int cma_listen_handler(struct rdma_cm_id *id, { struct rdma_id_private *id_priv = id->context; + /* Listening IDs are always destroyed on removal */ + if (event->event == RDMA_CM_EVENT_DEVICE_REMOVAL) + return -1; + id->context = id_priv->id.context; id->event_handler = id_priv->id.event_handler; trace_cm_event_handler(id_priv, event); @@ -2651,21 +2642,21 @@ static void cma_work_handler(struct work_struct *_work) { struct cma_work *work = container_of(_work, struct cma_work, work); struct rdma_id_private *id_priv = work->id; - int destroy = 0; mutex_lock(&id_priv->handler_mutex); if (!cma_comp_exch(id_priv, work->old_state, work->new_state)) - goto out; + goto out_unlock; if (cma_cm_event_handler(id_priv, &work->event)) { - cma_exch(id_priv, RDMA_CM_DESTROYING); - destroy = 1; + cma_id_put(id_priv); + destroy_id_handler_unlock(id_priv); + goto out_free; } -out: + +out_unlock: mutex_unlock(&id_priv->handler_mutex); cma_id_put(id_priv); - if (destroy) - rdma_destroy_id(&id_priv->id); +out_free: kfree(work); } @@ -2673,23 +2664,22 @@ static void cma_ndev_work_handler(struct work_struct *_work) { struct cma_ndev_work *work = container_of(_work, struct cma_ndev_work, work); struct rdma_id_private *id_priv = work->id; - int destroy = 0; mutex_lock(&id_priv->handler_mutex); if (id_priv->state == RDMA_CM_DESTROYING || id_priv->state == RDMA_CM_DEVICE_REMOVAL) - goto out; + goto out_unlock; if (cma_cm_event_handler(id_priv, &work->event)) { - cma_exch(id_priv, RDMA_CM_DESTROYING); - destroy = 1; + cma_id_put(id_priv); + destroy_id_handler_unlock(id_priv); + goto out_free; } -out: +out_unlock: mutex_unlock(&id_priv->handler_mutex); cma_id_put(id_priv); - if (destroy) - rdma_destroy_id(&id_priv->id); +out_free: kfree(work); } @@ -3165,9 +3155,7 @@ static void addr_handler(int status, struct sockaddr *src_addr, event.event = RDMA_CM_EVENT_ADDR_RESOLVED; if (cma_cm_event_handler(id_priv, &event)) { - cma_exch(id_priv, RDMA_CM_DESTROYING); - mutex_unlock(&id_priv->handler_mutex); - rdma_destroy_id(&id_priv->id); + destroy_id_handler_unlock(id_priv); return; } out: @@ -3822,9 +3810,7 @@ static int cma_sidr_rep_handler(struct ib_cm_id *cm_id, if (ret) { /* Destroy the CM ID by returning a non-zero value. */ id_priv->cm_id.ib = NULL; - cma_exch(id_priv, RDMA_CM_DESTROYING); - mutex_unlock(&id_priv->handler_mutex); - rdma_destroy_id(&id_priv->id); + destroy_id_handler_unlock(id_priv); return ret; } out: @@ -4354,9 +4340,7 @@ static int cma_ib_mc_handler(int status, struct ib_sa_multicast *multicast) rdma_destroy_ah_attr(&event.param.ud.ah_attr); if (ret) { - cma_exch(id_priv, RDMA_CM_DESTROYING); - mutex_unlock(&id_priv->handler_mutex); - rdma_destroy_id(&id_priv->id); + destroy_id_handler_unlock(id_priv); return 0; } @@ -4771,29 +4755,38 @@ static int cma_add_one(struct ib_device *device) return ret; } -static int cma_remove_id_dev(struct rdma_id_private *id_priv) +static void cma_send_device_removal_put(struct rdma_id_private *id_priv) { - struct rdma_cm_event event = {}; + struct rdma_cm_event event = { .event = RDMA_CM_EVENT_DEVICE_REMOVAL }; enum rdma_cm_state state; - int ret = 0; + unsigned long flags; /* Record that we want to remove the device */ - state = cma_exch(id_priv, RDMA_CM_DEVICE_REMOVAL); - if (state == RDMA_CM_DESTROYING) - return 0; - - cma_cancel_operation(id_priv, state); mutex_lock(&id_priv->handler_mutex); + spin_lock_irqsave(&id_priv->lock, flags); + state = id_priv->state; + if (state == RDMA_CM_DESTROYING || state == RDMA_CM_DEVICE_REMOVAL) { + spin_unlock_irqsave(&id_priv->lock, flags); + mutex_unlock(&id_priv->handler_mutex); + cm_id_put(id_priv); + return; + } + id_priv->state = RDMA_CM_DEVICE_REMOVAL; + spin_unlock_irqsave(&id_priv->lock, flags); - /* Check for destruction from another callback. */ - if (!cma_comp(id_priv, RDMA_CM_DEVICE_REMOVAL)) - goto out; - - event.event = RDMA_CM_EVENT_DEVICE_REMOVAL; - ret = cma_cm_event_handler(id_priv, &event); -out: + if (cma_cm_event_handler(id_priv, &event)) { + mutex_unlock(&id_priv->handler_mutex); + cm_id_put(id_priv); + trace_cm_id_destroy(id_priv); + _destroy_id(id_priv, state); + return; + } mutex_unlock(&id_priv->handler_mutex); - return ret; + + /* The thread that assigns state does the cancel */ + cma_cancel_operation(id_priv, state); + + cm_id_put(id_priv); } static void cma_process_remove(struct cma_device *cma_dev) @@ -4811,10 +4804,7 @@ static void cma_process_remove(struct cma_device *cma_dev) cma_id_get(id_priv); mutex_unlock(&lock); - ret = id_priv->internal_id ? 1 : cma_remove_id_dev(id_priv); - cma_id_put(id_priv); - if (ret) - rdma_destroy_id(&id_priv->id); + cma_send_device_removal_put(id_priv); mutex_lock(&lock); } -- 2.27.0